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Abstract
In this thesis an attempt is made to sketch the outlines of a cognitive theory of ethics,
i.e. a theory in which ethical statements are a subset of descriptive statements. It is
argued that the good is a quale, and that this quale roughly corresponds to what is
often referred to as "pleasure". If this conceptualisation of the good is correct, then the
resulting ethical theory is a cognitive, egoist version of ethical hedonism. The thesis
proceeds by relating this conceptualisation of the good to economic phenomena. An
investigation is then made of the conditions under which the following of a boundedly
rational rule is preferable to calculating which one of the possible options available to
the actor to follow. It is argued that one such rule is that "truth" should serve as a
norm of inquiry. Next the issue of "altruism" is considered. It is argued that our
intuitions regarding what egoist action should be are radically untrustworthy.
Considerations from evolutionary biology and game theory make it clear that an
egoist actor might well be best advised to perform a number of actions that would
normally be termed altruistic. The next topic concerns the relation between fact and
value. Arguments that claim to undermine the distinction between fact and value are
argued to be fallacious. It is also argued that the correct view of the relation between
fact and value can help to clarify some of the problems surrounding the
conceptualisation of "objectivity". The thesis ends by considering the gains that arise
from adopting the position argued for.
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Abstrak
In hierdie tesis word 'n poging aangewend om 'n kognitiwe teorie van etiek, m.a.w 'n
teorie waarbinne etiese stellings 'n subspesie van deskriptiewe stellings is, daar te stel.
Daar word geargumenteer dar "die goeie" 'n quale is, en dat hierdie quale rofweg
dieselfde objek is as wat dikwels na verwys word as plesier. Indien hierdie siening
van "die goeie" korrek is, dan impliseer dit die moontlikheid van 'n kognitiewe,
egoïstiese weergawe van etiese hedonisme. Die tesis poog eerstens om die verhouding
tussen hierdie siening van "die goeie" en ekonomise fenomene te verduidelik. Daarna
word ondersoek ingestel na die kondisies waaronder die volg van 'n begrensde
rasionele reël 'n beter opsie vir 'n akteur is as om an al die moontlike opsies te kyk en
die beste te kies. Daar word geargumenteer dat die idee dat die "waarheid" die doel
van ondersoek moet wees een so 'n reël is. Volgende word daar gekyk na die kwessie
van altruïsme. Daar word geargumenteer dat ons intuïsies insake die aard van
egoïstiese optrede radikaalonbetroubaar is. Sekere kwessies in evolusionêre biologie
en spelteorie laat dit blyk dat 'n egoïstiese akteur waarskynlik verskeie oënskynlik
"altruïstiese" aksies behoort uit te voer. Die volgende kwessie wat bespreek word is
die verhouding tussen feite en waardes. Daar word geargumenteer dat pogings om
hierdie onderskeid te ondermyn nie suksesvol is nie. Daar word verder geargumenteer
dat die korrekte siening insake hierdie verhouding sekere probleme insake die
verstaan van "obkjektiwiteit" kan ophelder. Die tesis eindig deur die voordele wat uit
spruit uit die aanvaarding van die posisie wat hier voor geargumenteer word.
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Introduction
1. What is Ethics?
There is a sense in which words matter, and a sense in which they do not. Which word
is chosen to refer to a concept is unimportant. It is a convention that can be changed
without affecting anything, cognitively speaking. What is important is that its usage
be intelligible and that it be consistently applied.
Consistently with the above, Karl Popper often warned against the essentialist urge to
ask "what is ..?" questions I. Such questions serve no purpose. If two people use the
same term to refer to different things there exists no substantial disagreement between
them. Both parties just need to realise that they are simply talking about different
things, and any possible reasonable dispute should be resolved.
This thesis concerns, in part, "ethics", here defined as "the attempt to answer the
question 'how should one act?'. The answer that will be defended can be described as
hedonist egoism. In other words, it will be claimed that one should seek to maximise
one's own pleasure, and that this answers the fundamental question of ethics.
This answer might well appear strange or counter-intuitive. This, admittedly, is the
case. This thesis will try to make it sound a lot less strange and counter-intuitive. For
now I wish to address the single objection that I have, both within formal contexts and
informally, most encountered with reference to the idea of egoist hedonism. This is
that it "is not ethics".
The best reply to such an objection is to state that "one should maximise one's
pleasure" is definitely an answer to the question "how should one act?". This is the
sense of the term "ethics" used in this thesis, and it is a sense that is as well
established historically as any other philosophical term. If the questioner has any
other sense of the word "ethics" in mind it might well be that this thesis does not
concern "ethics", as the questioner uses the term. There are lots of things that this
J See Popper (1976: 18-31) for a defence of nominalism against the kind of essentialism that leads to
"what is..T" questions.
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2thesis does not concern. The fact that the questioner uses the letters "e-t-h-i-c-s" to
refer to one of them does not make it any more relevant than any of the others.
The word "ethics" is sometimes used in ways other than to refer to "how should one
act?". Provided that these uses are kept separate, this would not cause any trouble.
But, when it comes to a matter as contentious as answering this question it would
seem that nothing is straightforward. One alternative definition of ethics is not to
define it as "how should one act?", but in terms of one particular answer to this
question, i.e. in terms of a value-judgement. In this manner some would define
"ethical action" in terms of its supposed opposite, i.e. self-interested action. Here a
specific answer to the question "how should one act?", namely "one should take
others in to consideration", is used to define the idea of ethics. In other words the
definition of ethics, in this case, already includes a value-judgement. There is nothing
necessarily wrong with such a definition. But it needs to be remembered that, on such
a definition, pronouncing egoism to be unethical does not tell us anything. Or, rather
it does not convey any insight regarding egoism or ethics, rather it just tells us how
someone has decided to use a word'. If the person intends the statement to serve as a
condemnation of egoism then he is engaged in sophistry, and trying to do by
definition what needs to be done by logic.
There are many possible different definitions of ethics that define ethics in terms of a
specific value-judgement regarding "how should one act?", as opposed to simply
defining it in terms of "how should one act?" Peter Singer defines "ethics" in terms of
"justifiability" (1993: 10-12). This seems to reflect his value-judgement that people
should act in such a way that their actions can be "justified", in his sense. He realises
however, that his definition does not allow him to condemn those who do not care
2 This type of argument seems to be found in Cilliers (1998: 139). He states that to behave ethically
means not to follow rules blindly - to merely calculate - but to follow them "responsibly". If this is
taken as a value-judgement against blindly following rules, it would make sense. But the author writes
that this is what it means to behave ethically. This is a strange way to state an argument. For, whether
this is really what "ethical" means is a matter of arbitrary definition. Even if it is true, it does not give
any rational support for the idea that one should not follow rules blindly. The author also discusses the
possibility of following a universal set of rules (137), and wonders whether such action can be called
"ethical". He proceeds to state that "what is at stake here is the very meaning of the word ethics" (137).
The argument seems to concern whether one should try to follow (possibly illusory) rules or not. But it
is not stated this way, rather it is written as if it is about the meaning of the word. Writing the argument
in this form, I would contend, makes it easier to fool the unwary into thinking that a factual, rather than
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3about whether their actions are justifiable. Rather, if one defines "ethics" in terms of a
given value-judgement, this just raises the question as to the judgement's validity. He
acknowledges this by asking the question "Why be ethical?" (1993: 314-335). This is
not a question that would be possible if one defined ethics as "how should one act?".
Singer is conscientious enough to acknowledge that, given his definition of ethics, this
becomes an intelligible question.
Ethics can, and has, been defined in terms of "justifiability", "universalisability",
"one's relation to the other", etc. These definitions all seem to reflect the judgement
that the specific element in terms of which ethics is being defined is ethically
desirable. These definitions, however, all make possible the question as to whether
these things really are desirable. As long as the author is aware of this, like Singer,
this should not lead to unnecessary disputes. But I would contend that definitions like
the above can be harmful to the understanding. If things are pronounced "unethical",
but this is just the result of a definition, it is easy for the unwary mind to be taken in
and to think that these judgements have some rational support behind them.
Meanwhile it is possible that all that really happened is that the author declared
actions she doesn't like to be unethical by definition. In other words, it is unclear what
uses such definitions can have apart from the rhetorical.
There is also something strange about using the same term to cover a field of study
and a substantive answer within this field of study. This is what is done when "ethics"
can mean both "how should one act?" and "[the study of] the kind of person one must
become in order to develop a non-violative relation to the Other" (Cornell, 1992: 13).
Here ethics refers both to the question "how should one act?" and the answer "one
should be in a non-violative relation to the other". The above is a bit like defining
physics as "the search for regularities in nature" and as "the investigation of the
implications of Newton's work". In other words, in both cases a field of study is
conflated with an influential view in this field of study.
I conclude that, while definitions of ethics that explicitly contain a value-judgement
are not necessarily bad, it is far from clear what useful purpose they have. It was
value-issue is at stake. In accordance with Popper above it must be stated that, if "the very meaning of
the word ethics is at stake", then, nothing at all is at stake.
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4explained earlier what unreasonable purpose they can have, namely givmg the
illusion of reason where none exists.
Above it was firstly argued that the existence of definitions of ethics other than "how
should one act?" are irrelevant to this thesis. This is because, as with all "what is ... ? -
questions" there is no such thing as the "correct" answer to the question "what is
ethics?". There are simply a number of definitions of ethics, and there need be no
discord between them. It was also suggested that existence of definitions other than
the standard "how should one act?" serve no useful purpose, but can only be
misleading tools of rhetoric.
2. Plan of the Work
This thesis wishes to defend a position that can be described as cognitive, egoist,
ethical hedonism. It is cognitive since it states that values are a subset of facts, not
something radically discontinuous with facts. It is egoist and hedonist, for reasons
mentioned already. The position is called ethical hedonism to distinguish it from
psychological hedonism. Ethical hedonism is ~iew that one should seek pleasure,
psychological hedonism the view that people do seek pleasure.
The above view might appear extremely peculiar. But in truth it rests on mixing
together three basic ideas, all of which have, historically, a degree of philosophical
respectability.
The first is hedonism. lts respectability might not be what it once was, but it still has
its defenders. I would also argue that the version of hedonism developed here allows
for certain traditional objections to hedonism to be overcome.
The second concerns the question "Do we call it good because we like it, or do we
like it because it is good?". If our pursuit of pleasure is understood to be the result of
pleasure being "good", rather than because we simply want pleasure, then this allows
for cognitive statements regarding value.
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5The third concerns qualia. If pleasure is accepted as standard, then it becomes clear
that what makes pleasure capable of being a standard of action, i.e. what makes it
"good", is irrevocably tied to the individual experiencing it. Simply put, no-one's
pleasure can matter to me in the same immediate way that my own does. This
observation is used to argue that pleasure (or "good) is a quale, and that hedonism
inevitably leads to egoism.
Chapter 1 will concern the main theoretical basis of this thesis. It will be argued that
one thing can be found which is "self-justifying" or good "in-itself' - pleasure. Itwill
be argued that accepting this inevitably leads to cognitive, egoist, ethical hedonism.
Chapter 2 will look at the various concepts involved in this position and try to clarify
any difficulties that their usage might raise. It will also look at some historically
influential objections to the ideas being defended.
Chapter 3 will take this account of human action and relate it to economics.
Economics is a discipline that has a rich tradition of theorising regarding value.
Therefore it is interesting to relate this view of value to what has happened, over the
last few hundred years, in economics. It also briefly relates the theory of value to
economic phenomena proper. This is done in order to show that it can make sense of
these phenomena.
Chapter 4 is the first of the chapters that try to give content to the injunction "act so as
to maximise pleasure". It will be argued that an actor with limited information and
constrained computational capacities will best maximise pleasure by being a rule-
following, rather than a calculating creature. It will also be argued that the design
history of the mind makes it almost impossible for human beings to be calculating
creatures. In other words, "satisficing" trumps "rational choice" where human beings
are concerned.
Chapter 5 will attempt to determine the content of one such rule that a pleasure-
maximiser should follow. A qualified version of the argument that "truth" should be a
norm of inquiry will be argued for.
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6Chapter 6 will look at the objection that is most often levelled at egoist theories of
ethics. This objection is that the existence and desirability of altruism shows egoism
to be false, both as a descriptive and normative theory. The chapter will argue that our
intuitions as to what egoist action would look like are radically untrustworthy. It will
be argued that we have good reason to suppose that a succesful egoist would commit
any number of actions that would not normally be considered to be nice. The possibly
counter-intuitive nature as to what would constitute egoist action can be shown by
considering the evolution of preferences, the structure of social interaction, the
bounded rationality of the actor and the possibility of cognitive mistakes.
Chapter 7 concerns more abstract matters. It looks at some further epistemological
implications of the view of value that is defended in this thesis. It will be argued that
certain confusions and problems regarding "objectivity" and the "fact/value"
dichotomy can be avoided by adopting the view defended here.
Chapter 8 is the final chapter. It will clarify some issues that arose in the thesis,
without explicitly being addressed.
It remains to clarify an important presupposition of this thesis, and to grve some
background to the problem that will be discussed.
3. A Note on Folk Psychology as Presupposition of this Thesis
Neurath's dictum to the effect that, if one wishes to rebuild a ship at sea one needs
some place to stand, while not universally acknowledged as a correct characterisation
of philosophy as such, definitely does apply to the writing of most particular works of
philosophy. Issues in philosophy tend to be related to one another in such a way that it
is hard to tackle a specific topic without making some assumptions concerning related
matters. This is also true of this thesis. The most important commitment of this thesis
that will not be extensively argued for concerns folk psychology.
Folk psychology is generally taken to be a conceptual framework in terms of which
actions can be explained or predicted. This conceptual framework includes terms like
"belief, desire, pain, pleasure, love, hate, joy, fear", etc. (Churchland, 1994: 308). In
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7other words, folk psychology concerns a certain view of action that characterises the
actor as a being with propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires, and who acts
upon these beliefs, often to satisfy these desires.
The most controversial issue surrounding folk psychology concerns the status of the
objects of folk psychology, i.e. the "beliefs", "desires", "intentions", etc. All would
acknowledge that we cannot really get by without folk psychology, but opinions differ
as to why this is the case. Some believe that folk psychology is a useful way of coping
with the world, but do not take the apparent ontological commitments of folk
psychology seriously. Others argue for the approximate ontological adequacy of folk
psychology',
This thesis will use the categories of folk psychology, and does partly depend on the
categories of folk psychology being ontologically respectable. While some of the
claims made might well have a truth-preserving interpretation in terms of a view that
does not view folk psychology as onto logically adequate, a lot of the central claims of
this thesis become unintelligible unless the categories of folk psychology, and
specifically qualia, are assumed.
It is often objected that the folk psychological categories should be examined in the
same manner as those of any other scientific theory. It will then be found that beliefs,
intentions, desires, etc. are like other theoretical entities, for instance phlogiston, that
have no explanatory value regarding the nature of reality. By an application of
Occam's razor it is then best to get rid of them qua understanding the nature of the
world. Folk psychology would still be an indispensable tool for coping with the
world, but would not be understood as having ontological import.
Something like the above position has been argued for by a number of authors", and it
is not hard to guess what the objection would be. It is objected that beliefs and desires
are not like phlogiston in that their existence is not inferred in order for them to have
3 A good introduction to the issues can be found in Guttenplan's Companion to the Philosophy of Mind
(1994). It is indicative of the degree of controversy surrounding folk psychology that two rather
divergent entries are listed under the heading "folk psychology".
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
8some explanatory function'. We experience ourselves as having intentions, we do not
observe phenomena and then come up with the theory of having intentions. In other
words, intentions belong to the primary data that need to be explained, not to the
explanatory structure we erect in order to explain data. To this it will then be objected
that we only ever observe behaviour, which is then interpreted in terms of intentional
concepts.
The above problem is closely related to the difference between "objectivity",
understood as the so-called third person view of the world, and "subjectivity",
understood as the so-called first person view. How we think about qualia and folk
psychology seems to largely be a function of whether we start with the third person
view or the first person view. A large amount has been written about the above topic,
especially after Nagel's famous "What is it like to be a bat?" (1974). It is not a topic
to which I intend to contribute here.
The problem with addressing the topic of folk psychology is that any number of
controversial issues are directly related to it. For instance, consider the issue
concerning which is primary: the first-person view or third-person view. There is a
long tradition in philosophy from idealism to phenomenalism to positivist
instrumentalism that seems to accept some version of the claim that sense-data
constitute "data", which then must be accounted for by theoretical entities like
physical objects. This type of view is less common in contemporary philosophy, no
doubt because of our current understanding of what the prestige of science consists in,
and also some specific work in philosophy, like Quine's attack against what he termed
the second dogma of empiricism (Quine, 1965). Launching into such a complex topic,
one that has been discussed and resurrected any number of times throughout the
history of philosophy, is not really feasible in terms of the main goals of this thesis.
And the problems would not end there, for the question as to which is "primary" is
not a question that could be usefully discussed without also bringing in any number of
other issues in the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. And treating some
4 See, for instance, Dennett's The Intentional Stance (1987) for a version of the above position. It
includes an enlightening comparison between his view and the view of other writers who have
addressed the topic (1987: 339-350).
5 See, for example, Searle (1992: 59): "We do not postulate beliefs and desires to account for anything.
We simply experience conscious beliefs and desires.".
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9other philosophical assumptions as pnmary m order to grve a defence of folk
psychology would not, in the context of this thesis, be that great an advance over
simply declaring that this thesis presupposes the ontological adequacy of folk
psychology".
If the above view is mistaken, then a lot of what is interesting in this thesis would
disappear. It would not, however, affect everything that will be said. Some of the
topics in this thesis, especially as related to economics, decision theory and
epistemology can survive the death of folk psychology unscathed. But the central
claim of this thesis, i.e. that the good is a quale we should pursue, would only make
sense if the folk psychological categories are accepted".
4. A Note on the Motivation for this Work and History of the Problem
There is one final point I wish to add. The research that led to the writing of this thesis
centred on the question of whether a cognitive ethics is possible. The egoist or
hedonist claims made within might well be more surprising, but I view the merit of
the present position in that it attempts to find a cognitive theory of ethics.
Ever smee Hume formulated the "is"-"ought" problem, philosophers have had
difficulty defending the rationality of value-judgements. If one accepts a basic
empiricist commitment, then Hume's criticism is devastating. Hume's problem can
only be overcome by changing what counts as rationality, i.e. deviating from the basic
framework of empiricism. Another option would be to accept two different, and
incommensurate, standards of rationality for factual knowledge and ethics. I am
extremely sceptical of both these options. Yet it seems that, if one wishes to have one
standard of rationality, and one wishes this to conform to basic empiricist standards,
there can be no matter of fact with reference to value-judgements.
6 Simply nailing one's colour to the mast is not an uncommon strategy to take. For instance Dennett,
one of the great opponents of allowing the objects of folk psychology to be part of reality, occasionally
asserts that he will assume the third-person point of view as it matches his "intuitions", or that this
choice is based on a "tactical hunch" (1987: 7), as opposed to a conclusive argument.
7 In accordance with this adoption of the rust-person perspective, an internalist account of mental
content will also be treated as a presupposition of this thesis. In other words any reference to mental
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The early part of this century, mostly due to the early Wittgenstein and the positivists,
underlined this claim. Sticking to empiricism, and not wishing to have another,
incommensurate set of standards for rational belief, they could not find a place for
value in the world. Of course, this was in no way particular to the positivists. For
example, the existentialists could also find no factual difference between right and
wrong. But the position was most closely associated with the positivists. They were
also the group most maligned for holding these positions.
I would contend that, with regard to cognitivity, the position hasn't changed much.
After the positivists, and under the influence of the later Wittgenstein, Austin and
others, philosophers started inquiring after the function of the language that an earlier
generation had called nonsense. Here, instead of calling ethical language nonsense,
they started viewing ethics as non-cognitive, yet meaningful. Ayer had, at this point,
already put forth the view that ethics was a matter of expressing wishes. These
"attitudinist" type of positions were a way of giving ethical language meaning,
without letting it refer to reality. In due course philosophers were arguing about
whether ethical language is the giving of commands, the expression of wishes,
prescriptions, etc. The most influential theory of this time was probably HM Hare's
"universal prescriptivism", whereby to state an ethical rule is to prescribe a course of
action for all.
All the above theories, however, agree that ethical language has no cognitive
meaning. The prevalence of this idea has persisted till today. A survey of different
ethical positions on the philosophical landscape would probably tum up a bewildering
array of possibilities, but very few would view ethics as cognitive.
I think the history of zo" century ethics in the analytic tradition is basically the history
of trying to cling to empiricism, while trying not to totally condemn ethics to the
wastebasket. This entailed giving up the idea of cognitivity, but keeping the idea of
meaningfulness.
content should be read as referring to the narrow conception of mental content, and it is being assumed
that "narrow content" is instantiated in our world.
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It is within this context that the present thesis should be seen as an attempt to solve
the problem in a slightly different manner. It is contended here that empiricism can be
kept and that the idea of only one standard of knowledge can be kept. Value-
judgements should be seen as being true or false in virtue of extra-linguistic entities,
the nature of which will be discussed in chapter 1. In other words value-judgements
can be squeezed to fit into even the very narrow standards of acceptability that the
positivists had. One need not fundamentally change one's epistemological views if
one wishes to keep cognitivity.
This thesis is an attempt to present one possibility regarding what one does need to
believe in order to achieve cognitivity, and an argument for the truth of these beliefs.
The basic claim of which I wish to convince the reader is that, what has always been
called "pleasure", is actually "the good". Chapter 1 will make this argument.
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Chapter 1: The Object of Ethics
1. Introduction
This thesis will argue that value-judgements are a delineable subspecies of factual
judgements, rather than something radically discontinuous with it. The continuity
between fact and value vests in the claim that both factual and normative discourse
can be true or false in virtue of a representation-independent matter of fact, i.e. that
truth-conditions can be assigned for both. The investigation of such truth-conditions
for normative discourse forms the main topic of this thesis.
This chapter is concerned with the nature of the extra-linguistic entity that serves as
justification for the claim that value-judgements are true or false. My argument will
firstly establish the conditions required for an entity to affect the truth-value of a
value-judgement. It will be argued that there is an entity that meets these conditions,
and a brief characterisation of this entity will be given. The second chapter will deal
with some difficulties regarding the conceptualisation of this entity, as well as
drawing some important implications from this determination.
2. Definitions of Fact, Value and Ethics
A "fact" will be defined as an extra-linguistic entity, in virtue of which the truth-value
of a proposition is fixed. This definition is deliberately vacuous, since the claims
made in this thesis can be consistent with more than one conception of "fact" or
"truth". The only constraint that it is necessary to specify at this point is that the
conception of fact must be conceptually distinct from the conception of "value". It
would be inconsistent with a crude pragmatism that takes "usefulness of belief' to be
the only possible constraint on belief-formation8. Any constraint, or set of constraints,
8 It seems unlikely that anyone has ever consistently held this position. Certainly James would reject it
as "the usual slander, repeated to satiety by my critics" (1978: 147). Rather he would say that
correspondence, coherence and value are the necessary components of "pragmatic truth". Thayer's
introduction to the 1975 edition of The Meaning of Truth interprets James in this way. Roughly this
interpretation is followed by Hallberg (1997: 205-223). Ayer, in the introduction to a joint edition of
Pragmatism and The Meaning of Truth (1978), interprets James as dismissing the notion of fact, and
hence as propounding something similar to the type of crude pragmatism defined above. It seems
equally possible that James vacillated between these two positions. See chapter 7 for a discussion of
James' position.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
13
on belief-formation over and above "usefulness" can serve as an adequate conception
of "truth", and consequently "facthood".
"Value" will be defined as the object of value-judgements. In other words "value" is
being defined as what is referred to by the "value-term" in a value-judgement. A
"value-judgement" is any judgement regarding the irreducible9 goodness, badness,
rightness, etc. of something. Note that nothing is being pre-judged by this definition
of value as "object". Non-cognitivists might allow this definition, but merely maintain
that value, as defined, does not exist.
A large part of this thesis will concern "ethics". "Ethics" is here defined as the attempt
to answer the question "How should I/we act?". This attempt must ultimately contain
value-judgements, as defined above, that seek to guide action. Hence any statement
that includes an irreducible value-term and seeks to guide action qualifies as ethical.
The first issue to be considered concerns the conditions for the cognitivity of value-
judgements. This issue is nicely brought into focus by the early Wittgenstein's famous
denial of the cognitivity of value-judgements. This will be examined in order to see
what exactly he denied when pronouncing ethics, etc. "unsayable".
3. The Conditions for Cognitivity
3.l.The Tractatus' epistemology
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein is concerned with trying to explicate the limits of what
can meaningfully be said'". Propositions are meaningful if they refer to facts; this
implies that the limits of meaning are fixed by the limits of what can possibly be
referred to. Ultimately these referents are the so-called "atomic facts"!', these are
constituted by "objects't",
9 "Irreducible" is meant to exclude any uses of value-terms (good, bad, right, etc.) that can be fully
analysed into non-value-terms, as well as the equivalent "conditional should".
10 "The book will, therefore, draw a limit to ... the expression ofthoughts ... ". (1960: 27). (Note: All
references are to the 1960 edition of the Ogden translation).
Il "2. What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts."
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The essence of Wittgenstein's conception of knowledge is that a proposition is only
meaningful if there exists objects that can ultimately ground its meaning. If this is not
the case, then a speaker is literally "talking about nothing". The idea of judging such
statements about nothing as either true or false is preposterous; they are simply
meaningless.
In this manner the requirement of cognitivity becomes the requirement for the
existence of a Wittgensteinian "object'l':'. Wittgenstein never specifies a numerus
clausus of objects, neither does he commit himself to any traditional ontological
doctrine regarding "what is really out there". He does assert that "natural science"
contains real propositions (6.53). This amounts to saying that there are some
representation-independent entities that make the propositions of natural science true
or false.
2.2. The Object of Ethics
The converse is then true when interpreting his remarks on ethics. His statement that
there can be no "ethical propositions" (6.42) is equivalent to the statement that no
object of ethics can be identified. This is a (substantive) ontological claim, a claim
that is, in principle, independent of his (formal) referential theory of meaning. If
Wittgenstein had supposed that such an object of ethics could be identified, then a
description of this object would have fitted seamlessly into the Tractatus. Instead of
the famous "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent", statement seven
could have contained an identification of the object of ethics and, presumably, an
explanation of the consequences of this identification". In this manner ethics would
have become another "natural science" on a par with other natural sciences.
12 "2.01. An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things)."
13 No two Tractatus commentators seem to agree on exactly what would constitute a Wittgensteinian
"object". (See, for a discussion of various positions and another suggested interpretation, Goddard and
Judge (1982». The situation is exacerbated by the fact that Wittgenstein explicitly repudiated (1994:
21e) his characterisation of objects as "simple" (2.01). This difficulty is glossed over in this thesis on
the assumption that thinking in terms of "propositions" and "what they refer to" is not fundamentally
misguided, i.e. that the difficulty lies with the characterisation of "objects referred to", and not the very
idea of "objects referred to".
14 After implicitly denying the existence of an "object" of ethics, Wittgenstein does add some cryptic
remarks, the most important being that ethics is "transcendental" (6.421), and that "[t]here is, indeed,
the inexpressible" (6.522). These remarks will not be considered, rather his argument will be
challenged at a point before the need for such remarks arise. Such treatment of the Tractatus is closely
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Wittgenstein denied that such an object of ethics exists, but did give a brief
explanation of what would be required of such an object. He writes that a sufficient
answer to an ethical question cannot merely refer to the consequences of a given
action, but must be capable of stating its case only with reference to the action itself
(6.422)15. This appears to be a restatement of the old point that justifications in terms
of instrumental value lead to an infinite regress if some object of inherent value is not
identified. Any candidate for the role of object of ethics needs to have, in some sense,
inherent value, or, since it amounts to the same thing, be self-justifying, This self-
justifying element would have to be of such a nature that the idea of further
justification of an action does not arise and the infinite regress ends.
It should by now be clear that Wittgenstein's denial of the cognitivity of ethics
amounts to the claim that no object can be identified that has inherent value. Or,
alternatively phrased, that no object can be found which is self-justifying in a sense
which allows the regress of justification to end.
To deny that something can literally have "inherent value" hardly amounts to a
controversial philosophical position. Itmight well seem to be no more than a denial of
the most essentialist, absolutist and metaphysically dubious position imaginable.
Indeed, one need not have any particular regard for the Tractatus to take this position.
Mackie, who has no particular positivist sympathies, dismisses the idea of a cognitive
ethics. His reasoning for this position is very similar to that of Wittgenstein, as will be
shown below.
3.3. Mackie's "Argument from Queerness"
Mackie explicitly disavows any belief in the existence of a self-justifying element, yet
he states that belief in the existence of such an element is a constitutive part of moral
discourse (1977: 48). Since such an element does not exist, moral discourse must take
aligned to the spirit of Ramsey's famous "[blut what we can't say we can't say, and we can't whistle it
either", or Neurath's "[o]ne must indeed be silent, but not about anything" (Ayer, 1985: 32).
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the form of an "error theory" (1977: 48-49). His "argument from queerness" gives a
good indication of what would be needed for ethics to be cognitive:
An objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with
it, not because of any contingent fact that this person, or every person, is
so constituted that he desires this end, but because the end has to-be-
pursuedness somehow built into it. Similarly, if there were objective
principles of right and wrong, any wrong (possible) course of action
would have not-to-be-doneness somehow built into it (1977: 40).
Mackie argues that the idea of "to-be-doneness" being built into an element of
experience'? is exceedingly peculiar, so peculiar that it is scarcely imaginable what
element could possibly satisfy such a requirement. This is then used to dismiss the
idea of the existence of to-be-doneness, and hence the possibility of a cognitive ethics
(1977: 49).
While both Wittgenstein and Mackie agree that ethics cannot be cognitive, they do
seem to share roughly the same idea about what would be required for a cognitive
ethics. For an entity to have Mackie's to-be-doneness would be for it to necessarily
require action without reference to some goal outside itself, i.e. it would need to be
self-justifying, or have inherent value, etc. These phrases amount to different ways of
affirming the same thing, namely that it can end the regress of justification in a non-
arbitrary manner.
Another way to say this would be to state that the entity in question is good "in-
itself', or simply "good". Note that this entity would not be evaluated as good, but, in
some sense, simply be good. For if it is a matter of being evaluated as good, then it
might be asked whether the standard of judgement used in this valuation is good, in
which case the same regress occurs as was referred to above. This inquiry can only
15 "6.422 .... There must be some sort of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but this must lie in the
action itself'.
16 Mackie and Wittgenstein's dismissal of an object of ethics is in agreement with Hume's famous
denial of the idea that such a peculiar quality ("vice") is an element of experience: "Take any action
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end if the standard of judgement is "goodness itself', and hence "good" somehow
functioned referentially.
Below it will be argued that Mackie's "metaphysically peculiar" (1977: 49) element
does exist, and that it can serve to make ethics cognitive in a way that satisfies even
the strict conditions of meaning in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. This will be done by
looking at the writings of Schlick, one of the few, along with Kurt Baier, of the
positivist admirers of the Tractatus who wrote substantially about ethics.
4. Cognitive Ethics and Schlick's "Tone of Experience"
3.1. The "Tone of Experience"
Is there an "object" of the good, i.e. does there exist a legitimate referential use of the
term "good"? Schlick's characterisation of hedonism in Problems of Ethics seems to
suggest this possibility:
Every idea, every content of our consciousness, as we learn from
experience, possesses a certain tone. And this has the consequence that the
content in question is not something completely neutral, or indifferent, but
is somehow characterised as agreeable or disagreeable, attractive or
repellent, joyful or painful, pleasant or unpleasant .... The essence of these
feelings is of course indescribable - every simple experience is of course
beyond description - and one can only make clear what is meant by
appropriate indications (1962: 37).
Schlick maintains that the content of part of our expenence "is not completely
neutral", and this quality of "non-neutralness" is "indescribable". He further states
that the pursuit of this quality constitutes the "law of human motivation" (1962: 36-
40). In doing so he joins a long line of philosophers who have advocated some form
of psychological hedonism.
allowed to be vicious: willful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights and see if you can find that
matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice ... "(Hume, 1969: 520).
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The phrase "psychological hedonism" is used to refer to thinkers who think that man
ultimately is controlled by pleasure or pain. The phrase "ethical hedonism" is usually
used to denote those who think that man should strive after pleasure or pain. Ethical
hedonism is usually advocated by those who also believe in psychological hedonism,
which gives rise to the question as to whether these two positions can be made
consistent and what the ethical should could possibly mean in this context'{.
In this thesis the relation between psychological hedonism and ethical hedonism will
be, in an important sense, reversed. This chapter will provide an argument for ethical
hedonism. In chapter 2 it will be shown why a version of psychological hedonism
follows from an acceptance of ethical hedonism.
This is diametrically opposed to the position that Schlick ended up taking. Ultimately
he states that "ethics" can only ever be a branch of psychology (1962: 29), since it can
only be concerned with what people do and not what they should d018• The "should"
can be used hypothetically, i.e. with reference to an already assumed goal, but the idea
of the justification of a final ground is "senseless" (1962: 18).
But, if ethics is considered to be concerned with the question "how should one act?",
and this "should" is not the unproblematic "hypothetical (conditional) should", then it
is precisely this justification of a final ground that is sought. What is sought is an
element that is self-justifying, that simply is to-be-done and that ends the infinite
regress of justification in a non-arbitrary manner. Above it was shown that Schlick
explicitly disavows the possibility of the justification of a final ground. In similar vein
Wittgenstein said that "[0 ]ught in itself is nonsensical" (Waismann, 1979: 118).
Hence Schlick's Problems of Ethics does not, fundamentally, constitute an exception
to the association between positivism and non-cognitive theories of ethical language.
17 Bentham's doctrine has had to face this problem. For a discussion and one proposed resolution of the
problem, see Hart and Burns' Introduction to the 1982 edition of The Principles of Morals and
Legislation.
18 This is consistent with Wittgenstein's assertion that " ... the will as a phenomenon is of interest only
to psychology"( 6.432).
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Psychological hedonism is perfectly compatible with believing ethics to be non-
cognitive or expressive'",
Schlick's denial of the possibility of the justification of a final ground of ethics
amounts to the denial of a legitimate referential use of "good". But his formulation of
psychological hedonism does point the way to a formulation of hedonism that
includes a legitimate referential use of "good" - and an object of ethics.
3.2. The Referential Use of "Good"
Consider the synonyms that Schlick provides for his indescribable notion of the
"tone" of experience. He mentions, among others, "agreeable", "joyful", and
"pleasant". It will surely be uncontroversial to assert that there are certain instances
where we use a value-term to refer to these experiences; this is the use of "good" as
included in the phrase "feeling good". All manner of "pleasurable" experiences are
commonly referred to in this manner. We will say that something "tastes good",
"sounds good", "smells good", etc. No doubt there are some instances where we use
these phrases to refer to something other than the pleasure evoked by these
experiences. But, it does seem reasonably clear that there are instances where "it feels
good" and "it feels pleasant" are synonymous. Hence there is an established usage of
the term "good" that refers to the same element of our experience that Schlick referred
to as the "tone" of our experience. In other words, there is an established usage of the
term "good" where it functions referentially.
This chapter will defend the idea that this usage of "feeling good" constitutes a
legitimate referential use of the term "good", and that this is the fundamental clue
towards developing a satisfactory theory of cognitive ethics. It will be argued that the
term "good", as it is used in "feeling good", provides the fundamental atoms or
building blocks for the understanding of axiological phenomena. In other words the
basic hedonist claim will be made that all axiological phenomena (ethics, aesthetics,
economics) can be explained as deriving from the basic idea of "feeling good". Itwill
19 Schlick seems to end up with an "attitudinist/expressive" theory of ethical language, interpreting
ethical language as the expression of desires: "Everyone knows [that] 'I ought to do something' never
means anything but 'Someone wants me to do it."'(1962: 110).
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be argued that this usage allows Wittgenstein's claim that there is no value in the
world (6.41) to be challenged.
The immediate objection to such a position based on the common usage of "feels
good" as synonymous to "feels pleasant" is that it overestimates the importance of
this usage. It could perhaps just be a linguistic curiosity that is unrelated to the idea of
"the Good". If there existed an established usage of the term "seeing a car" that was
commonly taken as synonymous to "seeing a good", and nothing definitively stops us
from establishing such a convention, nobody would be much impressed by an
argument that claimed cars to be the object of ethics. Here the term "good" as a
synonym for "car" has nothing to do with "the Good", the term synonymous to "car"
just happens to be a homonym for "good".
Is "feeling good" unrelated to "the Good" in the same manner as the example
constructed above? The answer is no. The argument for relating "feeling good" to
"the Good" is important in that it constitutes an argument for ethical hedonism, and
clarifies the relation between ethical hedonism and psychological hedonism.
3.3. "Feeling Good" and "The Good"
How can "feeling good" be related to "the Good"? It will surely be conceded that,
however undeveloped or even nonsensical our conception of "the Good" is, it is
inextricably linked to the idea of something being self-justifying. Ethics has
commonly been thought to concern the very idea of "justification'f", with the
qualification that such justification is of a specifically "ethical" type. When an action
is thought to be justified in the specifically ethical sense, then it is not merely
supposed that the action accomplishes a certain goal. It is also being implied that this
was a "worthy" goal of action, i.e. a "good" goal. Or, in other words, to call
something "good" in the "specifically ethical" sense is another way of saying that it is
self-justifying.
20 Some philosophers have claimed that the idea of "justification" is the element of ethics most
characteristic of it. For instance, Singer: "The notion of living according to ethical standards is tied up
with the notion of defending the way one is living, of giving a reason for it, of justifying it." (1993: 10).
Also compare Rescher's provisional definition of "a value": "A value represents a slogan capable of
providing for the rationalisation of action ... " (1969: 9).
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If it is agreed that our conception of something being "ethically good" is inseparable
from it being self-justifying, then this makes it possible to relate "the Good" to
"feeling good". For, if it can be shown that "feeling good" is, under certain
circumstances, self-justifying, then this shows that "feeling good" and "the Good" are
related by more than linguistic accident. It will firstly be argued that we intuitively
recognise "feeling good" to be self-justifying. Then it will be shown why this implies
ethical hedonism and not psychological hedonism.
3.4. Argument 1: "Feeling Good" is Self-Justifying
All of us have friends who have habits or commit actions that strike us as strange,
even bizarre (and, probably, vice versa). Most of us have accused others - or been
accused - of enjoying awful music, eating sickening food or wasting time in pointless
pursuits. The problem with these situations is that, to a bystander, these actions might
simply make no sense. Whether it is listening to industrial music or bubblegum-pop,
playing golf or bungee jumping, there will always be people willing to swear that
these activities are wonderful and others who are extremely puzzled by these
commendations.
Consider two people asked to justify such an action. Suppose that two people are
asked why they play golf. In such a case the one person might well reply that playing
golf gives her great pleasure, that nothing feels quite as "good" as the feeling of a
well-struck shot.
Imagine, however, that the second person states that she plays golf because a friend
also plays. In such a case we might well want to ask why the second person lets her
choice be controlled by the opinion of a friend. If the person refuses to answer, and
simply states that the goal of her actions is to imitate her friend, we are unlikely to
accept this as a sufficient answer. If the person keeps insisting that she simply does
what her friend does, and that there is no reason" beyond that, it might be suspected
that she is not being bona fide in answering the question.
21 "Reason" is here meant to indicate "goal". There might well be a "reason", in the sense of a prior
event that caused the person to imitate her friend, but that is a different matter. Here the question of
"reason" is the question "what goal are you trying to achieve?".
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But if the first person is asked why pleasure/"feels good" is the goal of action, she
might well consider this a puzzling question. She might answer that she plays golf
because it gives her pleasure, and that there simply is no further motive. If the
question is repeated, and it is asked why "pleasure" was a goal of action, she will
think the questioner has misunderstood her answer. Here it will be the questioner who
will be suspected of being mala fide, for how can anyone who knows what pleasure
feels like not understand why it can be a sufficient goal of action?
It might be suspected that the person is not being quite truthful when she states that
she derives pleasure from playing golf, it might also be difficult to imagine that the
activity can give rise to pleasure. But, if it is accepted that the person does derive
some enjoyment from the activity, their action gains a certain intelligibility. Simply
put, the action now makes sense in a way that it didn't when the goal of it was
unstated. This intelligibility is not only the result of a goal of action being specified,
for then the answer "because my friend plays golf' would have given the action the
same intelligibility. Rather the goal needs to be a sufficient or self-justifying goal, and
here "because it feels good" qualifies, while "because a friend told me to" does not.
This is why, if a friend is eating an exotic dish that we consider horrible, there is little
to be done other than asking "does that really taste good to you?", wait for the
affirmative nod, and change the subject. Unless, of course, you are willing to try and
gradually expose your friend to other dishes and educate his taste buds until what
"tastes good" has changed. Such an action rests on admitting that, as long as the dish
tastes good, this might be a worthwhile reason to eat it.
It is hard to express this point as anything other than a direct appeal to intuition of the
reader. But it will surely be granted that we are likely, under certain circumstances, to
accept "it just feels good" to be self-justifying in a sense that we cannot accept
"because my friend did". It is hard to explain what it is for something to be "self-
justifying?", yet the idea makes most intuitive sense when considering cases like
22 "Self-justifying" here means "self-justifying" to the person having the experience. It does not imply
that an action that is self-justifying in this sense should also be approved of or socially condoned. There
need not be any inconsistency between holding that an action is self-justifying jar someone, while also
strenuously opposing it. This point will hopefully be clarified when it is explained why "good" is a
phenomenal quality (below) that implies ethical egoism (chapter 2).
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"feels good". That "feels good" can be self-justifying means that it is related to our
conception of "the Good" by more than linguistic curiosity.
In this thesis it will be argued that our conception of "the Good" ultimately derives
from "feels good". Before the argument for such a contention can continue, however,
the interpretation of the above "appeal to intuition" needs to be defended against an
obvious objection.
3.5. Argument 2: Ethical Hedonism and Psychological Hedonism
It might well be agreed that we do allow "pleasure" to be a terminus of any inquiry
into goals, without it being conceded that this implies ethical hedonism. A
psychological hedonist (such as Schlick) might say that we allow an inquiry into goals
to end at this point, but that this is simply because people want pleasure. This does
not, in any sense, establish ethical hedonism, i.e. that pleasure is what should be
wanted. Rather it is the result of Schlick's "law of human motivation"; pleasure is
simply wanted, and this is a brute fact about people. When "feeling good"/pleasure is
allowed to go unchallenged as a goal of human action this is not because it is self-
justifying. Rather we are implicitly admitting that "wanting pleasure" is a type of
fundamental datum.
One need not be a psychological hedonist to develop this type of objection against the
argument advanced above. One might well take the "common sense"-view that people
simply want lots of things, and that pleasure is merely one of the many wanted
"objects". There is no reason to suppose that these wants are reducible to one primary
want, nor that there is any specific justification as to why one thing is wanted, rather
than another. This type of view is necessarily absurd if psychological hedonism can
be shown to be absurd, as will be explained below.
An ethical hedonist would say that pleasure is wanted because it is "good"; here
"wanting" is a secondary phenomenon derived from the nature of pleasure. A
psychological hedonist would say that we simply want pleasure, and that we happen
to then call "good" those actions that satisfy this fundamental wanr". Hence an ethical
23 Hobbes, although not quite a hedonist, held a similar view: "But whatsoever is the object of any
man's Apppetite or Desire, that is it, which he for his part calleth Good" (1973: 24).
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hedonist would state that we "want what is good", a psychological hedonist simply
that we "want what we want".
This type of debate is an old one with different versions having cropped up in a
variety of fields. The view that "wanting" is a brute fact, a fundamental datum, is
related to philosophical debates about the primacy of the will, psychological ideas
about a hierarchy of needs, and economic ideas about defining economic actors in
terms of a given ranking of preferences", Is it possible to adjudicate between these
two claims?
The approach taken here will be as follows. If it is conceded that questions regarding
goals will sooner or later encounter a terminus, this can only be interpreted in one of
two ways. Either the fact that it represents a terminus has to do with the goal itself, or
it is a brute fact about the person concerned. It will be argued that assuming it to be a
brute fact, i.e. assuming "wanting" to be an irreducible primary, leads to absurd
implications. Hence the fact of "wanting" does not make sense unless the reason for
wanting is located in the object of the want, i.e. unless this object is, in some sense,
"good".
If "wanting pleasure" is an irreducible primary, then the notion that human beings
want pleasure is, in principle, a contingent fact about human beings. This implies that
it is not, in principle, absurd to suppose that something else is wanted. Simply put, if
"pleasure is wanted" is an irreducible primary, then this implies that "wantedness" is
in no sense the result of anything peculiar to the object of the "want" (pleasure). And
if there is nothing peculiar - or "queer" in Mackie's sense - about pleasure that
enables it to be wanted, then it is not absurd to suppose that something else could
have been wanted.
Consider a being that does not, in any sense, want "pleasure". Imagine that there is a
being that is perfectly indifferent between pleasure and pain, and that feelings of
pleasure and pain do not ever factor into his decision-making processes as criteria of
24 An interesting version of this debate originates in Plato's Euthyphro. Does God approve of what is
Good, or does Good simply mean "what God approves of'? See Schlick (1962: 10-11), Mackie (1977:
229-232). Wittgenstein's comments on Schlick's position are in Waismann (1979: 115).
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choice. Let the being have a "want" as irreducible primary, imagine that the being
wishes to, say, build houses.
Now, if such a being succeeds in building houses, it is difficult to see in what sense
this can really matter. If feelings of "satisfaction" or "pride" or "taking pleasure in
your achievement" are of no consequence, wherein lies the point of success? If the
person fails in building a house, but still there are no "unpleasant experiences" such as
"frustration", "disappointment", "anger", etc., then it is hard to see why the person
should care. Does the very importance of the difference between success and failure
not disappear altogether? Can we still feel sympathy for the failures of the person if
any "emotional suffering" becomes irrelevant? There is something intuitively wrong
with this picture; it is hard to consider such a "person", driven to build houses, much
different from any object under the control of physical law.
The bare fact that a wanted goal was not achieved is not quite enough to arouse our
sympathies. We also want to know what happens when such a goal is not achieved.
And here the answer "I suffer" or "I feel pain" is sufficient in a sense that we cannot
imagine "I didn't build a house" to be. "I suffer" has "to-be-avoidedness" in a way
that "I didn't build a house" cannot.
The above "argument" is, in fact, little more than an appeal to intuition. It tries to
convince that the assumption of "wanting" as an irreducible primary leads to
situations where some indefinable element is clearly missing. This element, then,
would be that indefinable element that we refer to as good in-itself, self-justifying or
to-be-done. Adding examples that essentially trade on the same point would be
pointless; one more will hopefully suffice to show that assuming "wanting" to be an
irreducible primary leads to absurd implications.
3.6. Argument 3: Ethical Hedonism and Psychological Hedonism
If there is no a priori reason why one object is wanted rather than another, then this
equally well applies to what we normally call "pleasure" and "pain". Imagine that
pleasure and pain are now reintroduced. Imagine a being that can "feel pleasure" and
"feel pain", in the same sense as we normally use these terms, but that the creature
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simply wants pain, and does not want pleasure, and that this is an irreducible primary.
Imagine a creature that, subject to constraints of knowledge, seeks to live as much of
his/her life in agonising pain, and that this is a goal in-itself, a "want" as irreducible
pnmary.
If wanting pleasure or wanting pain was justified only with reference to "wanting",
and not with regards to "pleasure" or "pain" as objects of the want, then we could
have no absolute preference as to whether we would rather be pleasure-seeking or
pain-seeking beings. If there was nothing about pleasure or pain that causes us to
want the one and not the other, then we might as well have been pain-seeking beings.
But it must surely be conceded that it is absurd to suppose that we can be indifferent
between being "pleasure-seeking" or "pain-seeking" beings. We balk at the idea of
being forced to seek pain, for is a creature who is doomed to seek unbearable
suffering not the most wretched creature imaginable? Is the very possibility of seeking
pain for its own sake not unintelligible?
Intuition seems to insist that there is something specific about pleasure that enables it
to be wanted, and also something specific about pain that causes it to be avoided. This
intuition is one that cannot be explained by any doctrine that takes "wanting" to be a
brute fact, i.e. psychological hedonism. Ethical hedonism suffers no similar problem.
It states that we cannot be indifferent between pleasure and pain, because pleasure is
"good" and pain is "bad,,25.
3.7. Interpretation and Importance of the Three Arguments
Hence it is concluded that "wanting pleasure" cannot be an irreducible primary, since
this implies that there is nothing "special" about pleasure that enables it to be wanted.
And if there is nothing special about pleasure, then anything else could, in principle,
have been wanted, which is absurd.
25 Questions that arise due to the existence of masochism are briefly dealt with in chapter 6, note 150.
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The above sequence of three arguments, if accepted, enables a number of related ideas
to be rejected. If psychological hedonism fails, then all theories that locate the genesis
of action in a "want" or many "wants" as irreducible primaries fail in similar fashion.
For presumably those that contend that we want many things will also include
pleasure among these many things that are wanted. But if we cannot imagine a being
that is indifferent between pleasure and pain (argument 2) and cannot imagine a being
that wants pain instead of pleasure (argument 3), this implies that there is something
"special" about pleasure that enables it to be wanted. And if there is something
"special" about pleasure, then this implies that pleasure cannot merely be one wanted
object among many wanted objects. Hence the idea of many independent and
irreducible "wants", with none being more fundamental than any other, fails.
Non-cognitive "attitudinist" or "emotive" theories of ethics fail in a similar manner.
For if "expressing approval" of an action is really all there is to value-talk, then
approving or not-approving must be a brute fact or irreducible primary. This is akin to
saying that some situations are "wanted" and other "not wanted", i.e. the view that
was dismissed above. As soon as there is a "reason", in the sense of a self-sufficient
goal, for approving of a state of affairs, then approving can be based on the
identification of this fact, and hence cognitive.
In declaring "wanting pleasure" to be a fundamental datum, psychological hedonism
dismisses the very possibility of explaining why pleasure is wanted. Therefore it
cannot explain why assuming other objects to be wanted leads to implications that
offend against intuition. Ethical hedonism suffers from no such defect. It states that
pleasure is "good" and "self-justifying", and that this causes it to be wanted. Anyone
who attempts to ask why the fact that it is "good" is a sufficient reason, simply fails to
understand the sense of "good" being used, as explained in argument 1.
It is the main contention of this thesis that this seemingly strange "goodness" or
"badness", inevitably encountered when we imagine pleasure or pain, constitutes a
legitimate referential use of the term "good". In other words, it forms a part of reality,
irreducible to anything else, that can only be referred to by value-terms like "good".
Hence it qualifies to be Mackie's "metaphysically peculiar" element, the one that is
needed to make ethics cognitive.
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It remains to give a characterisation of the "good", the "metaphysically peculiar"
quality upon which this chapter depends.
5. "Good" as a Phenomenal Quality
5.1. "Phenomenal Qualities"
Below it will be argued that "good" is a non-definable, phenomenal quality (quale)
that we often refer to as "pleasure" or "consciousness of pleasure". A classic
explanation of a non-definable, phenomenal quality is given in Moore's polemic
against Naturalistic ethics:
Consider yellow, for example. We may try to define it, by describing its
physical equivalent; we may state what kind of light-vibrations must
stimulate the normal eye, in order that we may perceive it. But a
moment's reflection is sufficient to shew that those light-vibrations are not
themselves what we mean by yellow. They are not what we perceive.
Indeed we should never have been able to discover their existence, unless
we had first been struck by the patent difference of quality between the
different colours. The most we can be entitled to say of those vibrations is
that they are what corresponds in space to the yellow which we actually
perceive (1969: 10).
Phenomenal qualities, or qualia, are those qualities that have, to use Searle's phrase,
"a subjective, first-person ontology". Simply put, the term phenomenal quality refers
to "what colour looks like", "what music sounds like", "what pain feels like", etc.
They are those qualities that, even if a complete physical description (size, mass,
motion, etc.) of the universe is given, have not been cited. Phenomenal qualities are
controversial, some ("qualiaphobes") deny their existence altogether. Others view
their existence as self-evident, and use it as an argumentative base from which to
establish the irreducibility of consciousness to physiological-neurological states".
26 Most famously Nagel's "What is it like to be a bat?" (1974), which argues that there must be
something that it is like to be a bat, and that this quality is irreducibly subjective. Also see Searle (1992:
111-126) and Searle (1998: 55-57).
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The characterisation of "good" here developed depends on the existence, in some
sense, of phenomenal qualities ". It is outside the scope of this thesis to present an
elaborate argument for their existence. Personally I am convinced by the fact that a
being can be without the sense of hearing, and yet give a "full" account of sound in
terms of wavelengths, etc. Yet it seems undeniable that a being that can hear knows
something about sound that a being without hearing does not. Simply put, the average
human being knows what sound "sounds like", the object of this knowledge (however
understood) is the phenomenal quality".
5.2. "Good" as "Phenomenal Quality"
Schlick states that " ... every content of our consciousness, as we learn from
experience, possesses a certain lone" (1962: 37); in a similar vein Searle asserts that
for every" ... chunk [of consciousness], it seems to me there is always a dimension of
pleasure or unpleasure" (1992: 141). To ignore this results in a " ... strikingly joyless
picture of pleasure or happiness" , one, which" ... seems to lose all the sparkle which
life has at its best" (Sprigge, 1988: 132).
Above it was argued that this "tone", (or "pleasure", or 'joy" or "sparkle") is self-
justifying, or includes to-be-doneness in a sense that other justifications do not. And,
since they allow the infinite regress of justification to end in a manner that is not
arbitrary, but one determined by the nature of these experiences, they give content to
our notion of "good".
A physical (neurological-physiological) account of pleasure can be given, such an
account can be complete and yet the term "good" will never be employed. However, it
was argued above that the experience of "pleasure" does have something intuitively
"good" about it, and that this "goodness" is needed to render our attitudes toward
pleasure and pain intelligible. Since this "goodness" does appear to be part of our
experience of the world, it is here contended that it is a phenomenal quality.
27 What type of ontology is implied in taking phenomenal qualities seriously is a matter of debate. It
would fit with substance-dualism, or (the more respectable) property-dualism. Searle (1992) defends
the idea that taking phenomenal qualities to be real does not entail a rejection of physicalism at all.
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Phenomenal qualities are intrinsically "indefinable" in Moore's (and Schlick's) sense
of the term. But, as stated by Schlick, "we can... make clear what is meant by
appropriate indications" (1962: 37). In this manner we can make clear what is meant
by "yellow" by saying that "yellow" refers to what it looks like when light-vibrations
of a certain kind stimulates the eye. In a similar manner it can be made clear what is
meant by "good" by saying that "good" is what it feels like when we are in a certain
physiological-neurological state, one that we often call "pleasant'r'".
It is important to be very clear about the claim made above, as will be shown when
Moore's "open question"-argument is discussed in chapter 2. It is being maintained
that pleasure (phenomenal) is identical to what should properly be characterised as
"good", not that "goodness" can be predicated of pleasure (phenomenal). In other
words, it is being argued that pleasure (phenomenal) and "good" refer to the same
object, and that it has not commonly been realised that this object is metaphysically
strange in that it can end the regress of justification in a non-arbitrary manner. Hence
"pleasure" (phenomenal) can be used to refer to "good", but then it functions as an
irreducible value-term.
It is not being claimed that pleasure is "valuable", but simply that it is "value". Saying
"pleasure (phenomenal) is valuable" is akin to saying that "colour is coloured" or
"length is long". Rather we say that, for instance, "the table is coloured" or "the stick
is long". In a similar way it can be said that a certain state "is valuable", if this is
taken to mean the same as saying that "pleasure" (phenomenal) or "goodness" is an
attribute of such a state.
It remains to clear up a terminological issue.
28 This is a version of Jackson's "knowledge argument". For a discussion, a more careful formulation
of phenomenal qualities than the Moorean one cited above, and a discussion of the argument between
"qualiaphobes" and "qualia-freaks" in general, see Burwood (116-137).
29 Treating "good" as a quality of a subjective, fust person state means that it is impossible for a third
party to have direct access to facts concerning "good". This is a consequence of taking first person
states seriously. Viewing the "good" as a quale implies that they can be directly known only to the
person having the experience, and that the first person only knows them by "acquaintance". My choice
for the first person view was explained in the introduction, and will not be defended here.
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6. The "Value of Experience"
"Pleasure" (phenomenal) is often used without the implication that it is an irreducible
value-term being realised. This is much less likely with "feeling good", therefore
"feeling good" is a better characterisation than "pleasure". For this reason the word
"pleasure" will be discarded wherever possible.
There are also less important reasons why dropping "pleasure" seems a good idea.
"Pleasure", because of its most common usage to refer to "bodily pleasure", also
doesn't always easily communicate all that can be communicated by "feeling good".
"Pleasure" seems somehow inadequate to capture feelings of ecstasy or triumph,
"feeling good" (or "feeling great!") works better. The phrase "intellectual pleasures"
also seems oddly unsatisfying (to me, at least). Experiences like, for example, solving
a difficult problem, or having a previously impenetrable argument suddenly become
clear in a moment of insight, can be among the most profound imaginable. To
describe these as "extremely pleasurable" or even "enjoyable" almost seems to belittle
them. On the other hand, if you have just solved Fermat's Last Theorem and say that
you simply feel "indescribably good", you are less likely to feel that you are insulting
the experience.
The meanings of "pleasure" and "pain" seem to need some uncomfortable stretching
to include all that can be covered under "feeling good" or "feeling bad". And yet it is
not immediately evident what could adequately replace them. "Hedonic tone" is too
closely linked to "pleasure" and "pain". Meinong's phrase "value-experience"
remains peculiar to himself and is conceptualised in a way radically different from the
conceptualisation of "feeling good" in this chapter.
The phrase "value of experience" (where value means roughly "worth") seems most
suited to convey the sense of "goodnesslbadness of experience", and will be used for
the rest of this thesis. "Value", as explained at the start of this chapter, will be used as
a technical term to denote "that aspect of experience that can only be expressed using
irreducible value-terms". The main claim of this chapter then becomes that the "value
of experience" is a phenomenal quality of a physiological-neurological state that has
the special property of ending the regress of justification in a non-arbitrary manner.
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(The term "value" also has other meanmgs (numerical value, etc.) that will be
employed in this thesis, but the context should be clear enough to prevent any
confusion. )
7. Conclusion
This chapter firstly attempted to determine what would be needed for value-
judgements to be cognitive, and hence a delineable subspecies of factual judgements.
The requirement of cognitivity was shown to amount to the requirement that a
legitimate referential use of "good", as irreducible value-term, be identified.
This requirement can also be stated as the requirement of a non-arbitrary end to the
regress of justification. It was then argued that what is commonly called "pleasure" is
often allowed to end the regress of justification. It was also argued that considering
"pleasure" as justification gives us the clearest intuitive sense of what it is for this
regress to end in a non-arbitrary (and self-justifying) way.
Attempts to explain our attitudes towards pleasure by making the idea of a "want" an
irreducible primary (as is done by psychological hedonists) were dismissed as
incoherent. Our attitudes toward pleasure only gain intelligibility if pleasure is
identified with "good", i.e. allowed to be self-justifying by its very nature. This leads
to the theory of cognitive, ethical hedonism. The main novelty of this position, as
developed so far, is that it is cognitive, i.e. it allows for value-judgements to be on par
with factual judgements.
The object of this referential use of "good" was characterised as a phenomenal
quality. It can be defined as "what pleasure (physiological-neurological) feels like".
This phenomenal quality will hereafter be referred to as "the value of experience".
The position outlined above is cognitivist and hedonist. Numerous arguments have,
over time, accumulated against these positions. This is, indeed, to be expected of
positions that have been around for ages. The next chapter will attempt to refute the
most important or obvious of these arguments.
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Chapter 2: Cognitive, Egoist, Ethical Hedonism
1. Introduction
The conceptualisation of "good" developed in chapter 1 leads to a theory of cognitive,
egoist, ethical hedonism. There are various conceptual difficulties with, and well-
known objections to, the various components of such a theory. This chapter will
attempt to clarify the most important of these difficulties, and to answer the most
serious of these objections.
The first component that will be considered is "hedonism".
2. Cognitive, Egoist, Ethical Hedonism
2.1. Hedonism - Characterisation and Clarifications
In chapter 1 it was argued that what we commonly refer to as "pleasure" is more
adequately characterised as the irreducible value (goodness/badness) of experience.
Hence the argument for hedonism has, too a large degree, already been made. A few
points still stand in need of some clarification.
The first concerns the conceptualisation of "good" as a phenomenal quality.
Phenomenal qualities, by definition, relate to the experience of the world, and not the
world itself. This poses the question of the relation between phenomenal qualities and
the world, or between phenomenal and physical facts. Itwill be assumed that changes
in phenomenal facts can mostly be correlated to changes in physical facts. For
example, if I add wood to a fire and it grows bigger (physical facts), then I will feel
warmer (phenomenal fact). This appears to be no more than mere common sense, but
is important since it implies that an explanation of a change in phenomenal states can
be given by referring to a change in correlated physical states''".
30 While it will be assumed that changes in physical and phenomenal states are correlated enough for
this type of explanation to be possible, it need not be assumed that they are always, and precisely, so
correlated. The idea of a strict supervenience between phenomenal and physical states might well be
the most elegant and intuitively sensible way to conceive of this relation, but nothing in this thesis
depends on the defence of such a claim.
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Another important implication of the characterisation of "good" as a phenomenal
quality is that "goodness", in the literal sense, can only exist where there is
experience. Of course, there are a multitude of other things, besides experience, that
are often referred to as "good". These can include actions, paintings, personality-
traits, moral codes and so on, ad infinitum. While it will be maintained that none of
these things can, literally and by themselves, be good, these uses of "good" will not be
dismissed as unimportant. Rather these uses might well be explained as ultimately
deriving from the value of experience. This explanation will be attempted from
chapter 3 onwards.
It will be assumed that all experience has value, i.e. that it can be asked of any
experience whether it is good, bad, or, metaphorically speaking "in between,,3l. If this
is not the case, i.e. if the question regarding the value of experience is sometimes
simply inapplicable, this would not seriously matter. Such cases would simply
disappear from consideration.
It will be assumed that the difference between "good" and "bad" experiences can be
spoken of as a matter of degree. In other words, any two experiences must either have
the same value, or stand in a relation of "better" or "worse". This is another way of
stating that there exists an ordinal ranking of all experiences that is both complete and
transitive. (Whether this ranking can also be thought of as cardinal is discussed
below.)
A final word about "incorrigibility". Is it possible to be wrong about the value of your
experience, while having the experience? A number of philosophers who have no
quarrel with the idea of subjective, qualitative experience have denied that any reports
of such experiences are incorrigible ". Nothing much in this thesis seems to rest on
deciding this issue either way. Hence issues regarding "the incorrigibility of pain-
experiences" will be ignored.
31 Compare Searle (1992: 141): "For such a chunk [of consciousness], it seems to me there is always a
dimension of pleasure and unpleasure. One can always at least ask some questions in the inventory that
includes "Was it fun or not?" "Did you enjoy it or not?" ... "
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2.2. Objections Related to "Philosophical Grammar"
One oft-cited objection to hedonism is that it misunderstands the grammar of
"pleasure" and "pain". It is sometimes claimed that "pleasure" does not directly refer
to a set of experiences that have certain attributes in common. Rather "pleasure" is a
type of umbrella-term for a number of experiences that are, at best, loosely linked in a
manner akin to Wittgensteinian "family-resemblances".
If all uses of "pleasure" are taken into account then something like the above is
probably true. This difficulty is removed by the narrower conception of the "value of
experience" developed in chapter 1. The value of experience is supposed to refer to
that aspect of experience that cannot be expressed except by employing irreducible
value-terms. Any uses of "pleasure" that do not refer to such an object are irrelevant
to this thesis, and excluded from consideration':'. (It might, of course, be doubted if
anything satisfies this requirement. This is a different issue, and was discussed in
chapter 1.)
There are other possible objections based on the grammar of "pleasure" and "pain";
these are mostly due to the behaviourist strains in the later Wittgenstein, Ryle, etc. For
example, a behaviourist might well object to the conception of "pleasure" as inner
experience. Rather a behaviourist might define "pleasurable action" as "action we are
likely to persist in". This would render any claim that people seek pleasure
tautological.
The above objections to the uses of "pleasure" or "pain" normally form part of a more
general scepticism regarding the "folk psychology" behind intentional and
teleological descriptions as such. The issues involved in such arguments tend to hinge
on complicated questions regarding the philosophy of language and the conception of
mind. To truly take all such considerations into account would require an enormous
amount of time, and for this thesis to run into several volumes. The situation is further
32 For example, see Searle (1992: 144-149).
33 Another possibility would be to admit that certain parts of our experience are inexpressible except
through value-terms, but to doubt that this is simply, at any given time, a brute fact. Rather the value of
experience can be conceived as a composite of co-existent value-components. It is being assumed that
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complicated by the fact that several of the questions concerning language and mind
might well depend our understanding of value-judgements. Hence I will not do much
more than to once again cite Neurath's oft-repeated metaphor: if a ship is to be rebuilt
at sea, then we need somewhere to stand. In this case the "somewhere to stand"
amounts to an acceptance of intentional and teleological description, i.e. that
experience is irreducible to action (or "outward criteria") and that people can be said
to "strive after" something.
The next issue to be discussed concerns "cognitivity".
3. Cognitive, Egoist, Ethical Hedonism
3.1. Cognitivity ~ Definition and Problems
In chapter 1 the idea of "cognitivity" was defined in terms of facts and truth. There
are many different accounts of fact and truth, and there seems no particular reason to
suppose that the main ideas of this thesis are compatible with only one of them. A
minimum proviso, stated in chapter 1, is that truth not simply be identified with value.
If this type of crude pragmatism is dismissed, then fact and value are conceptually
distinct. This raises the question of the relation between them. The central aim of this
thesis is to portray this relation as that between a class and sub-class, i.e. to present a
theory on which value-judgements are a delineable sub-species of factual judgements.
Or, in other words, "ought" becomes a type of "is".
There are certain well-documented difficulties with such an attempt. The most general
concerns the so-called "Naturalistic fallacy", both in its Humean and Moorean form.
This will be the first problem considered below. The other concerns the question in
what sense value (as defined) is the type of thing that can be said to be capable of
being maximised. This is an extremely difficult problem, and will receive substantial
treatment below.
is not the case, but if this assumption were false it would not matter a great deal. Rather the problem of
aggregation, discussed below, would rear its head one step earlier.
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3.2. The Naturalistic Fallacy - Hume
The term "naturalistic fallacy" was originally used by G E Moore to refer to a mistake
he thought typical of ethical reasoning. The essence of the problem was originally
pointed out by Hume. His version is also known as "Hume's law" or the "is/ought"-
fallacy.
In Hume's Treatise he states that writers commonly argue about "what is", and "is
not", and then suddenly proceed to use the terms "ought" or "ought not". This is
surprising, because" ... as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new affirmation or
relation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time
that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new
relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it (1969:
521). An example of such a doctrine would be crude social Darwinism. It might well
argue that society is the result of survival of the fittest. If it tries to derive the
conclusion that the fittest should survive from this "data", it violates Hume's law.
Simply put, Hume is saying that no statement that includes an ought can be logically
implied by a statement that relates to what is. Such a relation of logical implication is
only possible if there is a premise connecting the two, but writers do not make this
claim. Rather they just suddenly make the leap from "is" to "ought". He adds that any
claim regarding a relation between "is" and "ought" that would justify such inference
seems "altogether inconceivable", for they are "entirely different".
On this formulation it must surely be apparent that Hume's problem does not add
anything to the problem identified when discussing the Tractatus and Mackie's
"argument from queerness". If the statement "You should do what is good" is taken to
be a tautology, then saying that "is" and "ought" are "entirely different" amounts to
the same as saying that ethics has no "object". In chapter 1 it was argued that ethics
does have an object, i.e. that "goodness" or "to-be-doneness" is instantiated. If this is
correct then value-judgements form a subset of factual judgements in the same sense
that judgements about any particular thing form a subset of factual judgements as
such. Hence there is no particular problem about the cognitive status of value-
judgements as such.
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The Humean version of the Naturalistic fallacy does not present any additional
problem for the idea of a cognitive ethics; rather it amounts to a reformulation of the
point under dispute in chapter 1. The same can, in a sense, be said about Moore's
version of the argument. Still it will be useful to discuss as it allows for the
clarification of some related issues.
3.3. The Naturalistic Fallacy - Moore
3.3.1. Clarifications
Two points need to be clarified before Moore's argument is discussed. Firstly, he
defines hedonism as the view that "pleasure is the sole good" (1968: 69). This is not
the contention being defended in this thesis, rather it is being claimed that what we
often call "pleasure" is identical with "good". This was explained in chapter 1. Any
objeetion of Moore' s (to the view defended in this thesis) that relies on this definition
will not be considered.
The second concerns the main aims of Principia Ethica. A large part of Moore's
writing is directed at a defense of the claim that "good" is "simple" or indefinable.
This is to say that it is not a "whole" made up of "parts" that can be used for a
definition, in the sense that a "horse" can be defined by its parts as an animal
" ... [having] four legs, a head, a heart, a liver, etc." (1968: 8). The conceptualisation
of "good" developed in this thesis does not dispute Moore's claim that "good" is
indefinable in this sense. In chapter 1 it was, in accordance with Schlick, agreed that
all phenomenal qualities are indefinable, and that we can "only make clear what is
meant by appropriate indications"(1962: 37). The thrust of Moore's argument is
against "naturalistic ethics", i.e. any attempt to define good in terms of natural
qualities. Since this thesis does not, in Moore's sense, attempt to define "good", it
does not really constitute a naturalistic ethics.
3.3.2. The "Open Question-Argument": Statement
Moore would, however, still reject the claims made in this thesis. For, although
"good" is not being defined in terms of "pleasure", it is being asserted to be identical
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to what is ·often called "pleasure". Rather Moore would claim that "pleasure" and
"good" are distinct, so that the statement "pleasure is good" is true and synthetic
(1968: 9). Pleasure, on Moore's account, is simply one of the good things that are to
be found in the world (1968: 9).
Moore's reasoning in dismissing any identification of pleasure with good rests on his
celebrated "open question-argument". Consider the question: is pleasure good? This
question can only make sense if "pleasure" and "good" are distinct. Hence, if it is
admitted that the question makes sense, then it is thereby admitted that "good" is not
identical with "pleasure" (1968: 9-12).
3.3.3. The "Open Question - Argument": Identical
The first consideration when responding to Moore concerns the idea of pronouncing
one thing to be identical with another. There is a prima facie sense in which any such
undertaking is absurd, for one thing cannot, by definition, be another. This truism
obviously inspired much of Moore's thinking in his Principia; the title page contains
Bishop Butler's statement that "[e]verything is what it is, and not another thing".
Hence it needs to be clarified in what sense it is not absurd to say that one thing is
another.
The above difficulty is solved by realising that the same object can be identified by
different criteria. Frege's famous example in drawing the distinction between sense
and reference illustrates this point well. The criteria whereby "morning star" is
identified differ from the criteria whereby "Evening star" is identified, yet they both
refer to what is also called "Venus". "Evening star" and "Morning star" are co-
referential. Hence I can say "the Evening star is the Morning star", and, if I simply
mean they are co-referential, this is correct. This is one sense in which one thing can
be said to be identical with another, where "identical" simply means "co-referential".
This is equivalent to what is being claimed in this thesis. It is being claimed that
pleasure (phenomenal) is co-referential with "good" (or "to-be-doneness" or "end-the-
regress-of-justification-in-a-non-arbitrary-mannerness", etc).
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3.3.4. The "Open Question - Argument": Pleasure is Good
The above demonstrates one possible sense in which a claim of "identity" can be
made sense of. The case with "pleasure" and "good" has a difficulty that does not
occur with "Evening star" and "Morning star". This is that both "Evening star" and
"Morning star" are complex objects, in Moore's terms, i.e. they are both definable.
This is not the case with "pleasure" and "good". Moore contends that both are
indefinable, simple." objects. Hence the difficulty boils down to this: Moore finds two
simple, indefinable objects, whereas I can find only one.
In chapter 1 it was argued that only the consideration of what is often called
"pleasure" gives a type of intelligibility to the idea of something being "self-
justifying". While this would be consistent with the idea that "pleasure is the sole
good thing", such an interpretation seems needlessly profligate. Rather an application
of Occam's razor leads to the conclusion that pleasure simply is goodness-itself.
Moore, however, thinks there is a need to postulate an extra entity. He states that, if
anyone asks "Is pleasure good?", he quickly realises that, concerning "goodness", he
"has before his mind a unique object" (1968: 16). Is he correct? Itwill not be disputed
that there appears to be a distinct entity before the mind when such a question is
asked. Rather, and in the spirit of Occam, it will be argued that this "appearance" can
be accounted for without reifying this entity.
It will surely be conceded that words like "pleasure" can be used in a variety of
senses. Consider "pleasure (phenomenal)", "pleasure (physiological-neurological)",
"long-term pleasure", "immediate pleasure", etc. Hence it is possible that, if someone
claims to have in mind a clear conception of the good, distinct from "pleasure", the
sense of pleasure used is not the one proposed in this thesis as the "object" of ethics.
In fact, it can be argued that the mind has a habit of interpreting statements in such a
manner as to give them a sense. This habit then leads to assuming a sense of
"pleasure" that makes the statement "pleasure is good" concern two different objects.
34 Moore is in agreement with Schlick's assertion that "pleasure" is indefinable (1968: 13).
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It will be argued in chapter 5 that, while pleasure should be maximised, this is, in-
itself, a poor guide to action. In other words, pleasure can be better maximised by
consistently trying to achieve a set of distinct objectives, which are much easier to
follow than "maximise pleasure". This would then lead to the possibility that, when
we ask of something whether it is good, the "objects before our minds" concern these
distinct objectives. Such a situation would clearly give illusory support to Moore's
point of view, but explain why it seems to make sense.
There is another powerful reason for not trusting Moore's assertion that, when
considering goodness, he has before his mind a distinct object. This is based on the
insight for which Wittgenstein is famous. If Wittgenstein is correct in saying that
language can mislead in such a way that nonsensical statements are mistaken for
"real" propositions, then this leads to the possibility that the sense of "good" before
the mind of Moore is a linguistic illusiorr". If there is merit in Wittgenstein's claim
that language can give rise to such confusions, then Moore's conviction that he has a
clear sense of "the good" before his mind is not to be taken at face-value.
Hence it has been shown that Moore's argument cannot function as a knock-down
argument against the type of hedonism being defended in this thesis. Furthermore,
some of his central insights are even preserved in this thesis. But a combination of
these insights with Occam's razor and the arguments presented in chapter 1 leads to a
dismissal of any argument he might have against the type of hedonism argued for in
this thesis.
There is another, more subtle point that needs to be highlighted before proceeding. On
page 60 of Principia Ethica, Moore writes:
In ordinary speech, 'I want this', 'I like this', I care about this', are
constantly used as equivalents for 'I think this is good'. And in this way it
35 Austin has claimed Moore's conception of "good" to be such a linguistic confusion: "If someone did
not know about cricket and were obsessed with the use of such 'normal' words as 'yellow', he might
gaze at the ball, the bat, the building, the weather, trying to detect the 'common quality', which (he
assumes) is attributed to these things by the prefix "cricket". But no such quality meets his eye; and so
perhaps he concludes that "cricket" must designate a non-natural quality, a quality not to be detected in
any ordinary way but by intuition. If this story strikes you as too absurd, remember what philosophers
have said about the word 'good' ... " (1962: 64).
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is very natural to be led to suppose that there is no distinct class of ethical
judgements, but only the class of 'things enjoyed' ...
The above reasoning is not totally dissimilar to the reasoning employed in chapter 1,
but the conclusion drawn was the direct opposite of that reached in the above passage.
Moore is against the reduction of the predicate "good" to a natural quality. This is
reasoning that is commonly found in a psychological hedonist position, and can
rightfully be charged with having committed the naturalistic fallacy. But that it is not
the case with the argument advanced in this thesis. Here "good" is not being reduced
to "pleasure", rather "pleasure" is being, metaphorically speaking, "upgraded" to the
status of "good". Hence the idea of value in the theory of ethical hedonism is not
being used to dismiss the idea of a distinct class of ethical statements. Rather it is
being argued that certain statements about "pleasure", fully understood, constitute the
distinct class of ethical statements.
It has now been shown why the argument in the first chapter, if accepted, dissolves
any problems vis-a-vis the naturalistic fallacy, and some related issues have been
clarified. There is another problem with the idea of a cognitive ethics that specifically
relates to hedonism. This is the problem concerning the meaning of maximisation, and
needs to be discussed at length.
3.4. Cognitivity - Maximisation
3.4.1 Statement of the Problem
There exists a problem regarding the ordinality or cardinality of pleasure, and hence
"goodness". A scale is ordinal if it is simply a ranking of certain things. For example,
the horses in a horse-race can be ranked as first, second, third, fourth, etc. A scale is
cardinal if it ranks certain things relatively to each other, but also defines the position
of these things with reference to more than their relative position. Here they also have
an "absolute" position according to a given scale. Take a ranking of horses in a race
that orders them according to the time it took them to complete the race. Here each
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horse has a relative position, but also an absolute position in terms of the time it took
to complete the race.
An ordinal scale only grves information regarding relative position, and cannot
answer questions like "was the difference between first and second greater than the
difference between second and third?". A cardinal scale is an absolute measure, and
can answer questions like the above and questions regarding relative position. Note
that any cardinal scale also implies an ordinal scale. In other words the cardinal
measure "time it took to past the post" implies the possibility of an ordinal measure
"position when passing the post".
Is "pleasure" or "goodness" an ordinal or cardinal measure? In other words, can it
only be used to rank given alternatives as more or less pleasurable, or can it assign
some absolute magnitude to each alternative?
An easy way to distinguish ordinal and cardinal scales is with reference to the
difference between the positions of ranked elements. On an ordinal scale this
difference has no meaning, it tells us nothing about the relative difference between
third and fourth and fourth and fifth. On a cardinal scale this has meaning, each
element has a position based on an absolute commensurate scale. This means that
mathematically it is possible to perform certain mathematical operations, for instance
adding and subtracting, on cardinal numbers. For instance I can subtract the time it
took A to complete the race from the time it took B, in order to get the difference
between their times. This would be nonsensical with ordinals.
The above forms the main reason why the issue of cardinality is relevant to this thesis.
This thesis defends the view that the subject should maximise value. This amounts to
the view that the option that will yield the most pleasure over time should be chosen.
For the idea of "most pleasure over time" to make sense, it needs to be possible to add
and subtract the different levels of pleasure experienced by the subject at different
times. This is only possible if pleasure is cardinal, not if it is only an ordinal measure.
Hence it is central to this thesis that pleasure should be a cardinal measure.
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3.4.2 Argument for Cardinality
The central difference between ordinality and cardinality is whether the difference
between the positions it assigns to things make sense. Consider the relative
"goodness" of two moments of experience. On the one hand it is obvious that this
goodness can lead to an ordinal measure; one will be preferred over the other. But the
preferred experience could have been even better. Simply put, however good the
experience was, it could have been slightly better or worse. This can be the case
without influencing the ordinal scale. In other words it makes sense to say that one
option can be better than another, but another can be much better than the first. If
these expressions make sense then pleasure does not only produce an ordinal scale. It
also gives the experience a position according to some other measure, independent of
the other experiences it is ranked against'". In other words, pleasure is cardinal.
The central fact in the above argument is that anything that is good, can be better,
without this necessarily meaning it changes position on the ordinal ranking.". Hence
pleasure reveals more than just an ordinal ranking, it also reveals the existence of an
independent and absolute scale.
If pleasure is cardinal, then the phrase "maximisation of value" has a determinate
sense. The next issue that stands in need of clarification is that of egoism.
36 The above argument to the effect that there exists a cardinal scale, should not be taken to imply that
people's knowledge as to this cardinal scale is always correct, nor that they can always remember their
previous rankings correctly. It just implies that there is a consistent scale that can count as a matter of
fact in determining whether their judgements are correct or incorrect.
37 This is not the case with "utility" in "revealed preference theory", as will be seen in chapter 3. Utility
is only defined in terms of behaviour, and hence cannot result in cardinal rankings. One exception to
this is von Neumann - scales, where behaviour with regards to lotteries is used to construct cardinal
scales. Von Neumann cardinality won't do for this thesis, since it does not portray the "behavioural
cardinality" as a measure or expression of any "internal cardinality". For this reason it will not be
discussed in this thesis. Hence "cardinality" above should be read as referring to only "internal
cardinality" .
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4. Cognitive, Egoist, Ethical Hedonism
4.1. Egoism and Phenomenal Qualities
It has already been mentioned that ethical hedonism leads inevitably to Egoism. The
characterisation of "good" as a phenomenal quality must surely make it clear why this
is the case. The sense in which pleasure can be referred to as "good" is the
"phenomenal" sense of pleasure, meanmg that it has an irreducibly subjective
ontology. Hence the sense in which pleasure is a "self-justifying" (ethical hedonism)
and motivating (psychological hedonism) goal of action is irrevocably tied to the
individual experiencing it. Simply put, I cannot feel the feelings of another, and
therefore the "to-be-doneness" of another's pleasure does not "exist" for me.
The assertion that egoism is not a lamentable fact about human nature, but rather
represents the "good" in matters of ethics might strike some as strange. Here it is
important to distinguish between the ultimate goal of action and the strategy (set of
decision-rules) that best accomplishes it. The fact that the ultimate goal of action
should be egoist does not, of itself, say anything about the behaviour that is prescribed
by such a goal. It will be argued, from chapter 5 onward, that the actual
recommendations of an egoist ethics is roughly consistent with our ordinary moral
intuitions. The argument is an extremely complex one, but I will at least ask the
reader to suspend judgement until the issue is discussed.
Two remaining issues concerning egoism will be dealt with here. The first concerns
the logical consistency of egoism, the second the historical association of hedonism
with utilitarianism.
4.2. Objection - Logical Consistency of Egoism
Moore has claimed that egoism is logically inconsistent.
What Egoism holds, therefore, is that each man's happiness is the sole
good - that a number of different things are each of them the only good
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thing that there is - an absolute contradiction! No more complete and
thorough refutation of any theory can be desired (Moore, 1968: 99).
Moore is saying that the very idea of egoism is self-contradictory, that I am saying
that a class of certain things are said to have a certain property, and yet also saying
that each of these things have this property exclusively. Clearly Moore is right in
calling this contradictory, three chairs cannot be red and yet one of them be the only
red chair. But it will presently be shown that it is Moore's formulation of egoism that
is to blame for this contradiction. This is not at all what egoism is saying. For egoism
does not hold that each man's happiness is the "sole good". It holds that each man's
happiness is the "sole good-for-him"! Phenomenal qualities are, as Searle puts it,
irreducibly subjective. If "goodness" is conceptualised as a phenomenal quality then
the idea of a "sole good", understood as something distinct from sole "good-for-him",
becomes a chimera. If Moore's statement is reformulated, substituting" good- for-him"
for "good", the contradiction disappears:
What Egoism holds, therefore, is that each man's "good-for-him" is the
sole "good-for-him" - that a number of different things are each of them
the only "good-for-the person concerned".
It is analogous to asserting that something is "painful". Ten different experiences can
be "painful" to the specific people concerned, and each specific experience can be the
"sole painful" thing to the person concerned, without this implying a contradiction.
The class of these experiences can be described as "painful-to-someone", yet each
experience can be the "sole painful" experience to a "specific someone".
The possibility that "good" is irreducibly subjective is something that Moore seems to
consider, but dismisses.
It is obvious, if we reflect, that the only thing which can belong to me,
which can be mine, is something which is good, and not the fact that it is
good (Moore, 1968: 99).
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Moore is saying that the thing which is good can be mine, but that the goodness of it
cannot. He proceeds to "argue" for this conclusion, but his arguments amount to
restatements rather than adding something new to the above statement:
The good of it can in no possible sense be 'private' or belong to me; any
more than a thing can exist privately orfor one person only (Moore, 1968:
99).
It has already been shown that phenomenal qualities such as "painful", in the sense of
"experiencing pain", is something which, in a loose manner of speaking, only exists-
for-me. Something which "hurts-me" can only be described by a third party as
"hurting-him", but cannot be described by this same third party as "hurting-me". In
this sense, "hurts-me" exists only for the person being hurt. And why does "good"
exist like the "redness" of chairs, and not the "hurting-me" of pain? No answer is
given by Moore, only reformulations of the assertion that it does not (1968: 98-101)38.
There is another issue which might well occur to the reader. The traditional
formulations of hedonism have predominantly led to philosophers advocating
utilitarianism, not egoism. Yet the combination of cognitivity and hedonism cannot
imply utilitarianism, as will be shown below.
4.3. Egoism and Utilitarianism
The following seem to be the only two forms in which the argument for Utilitarianism
can be put, while staying within the realm of cognitive ethics:
1. Pleasure is good, therefore more pleasure for more people is better than less
pleasure for less people.
2. My-pleasure is good, therefore more pleasure for more people is better than
less pleasure for less people.
38 For support of the idea that there is no logical problem with an agent-relative notion of good, see
Broome (1994: 129).
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The first premise of the first argument, the statement that "pleasure", understood as
distinct from "my-pleasure", is good, has been argued to be false. This distinction
between "pleasure" and "my pleasure" was discussed above, and why it is false was
argued above. What makes pleasure "good" is irrevocably tied to a specific person,
and then it is good for that person, in the same sense as that which makes pain
"painful" is irrevocably tied to a specific person, and then it is painful for that person.
If premise 1 of the first argument is amended by substituting "my pleasure" for
"pleasure" in order to make it true, and the rest is left unchanged, the argument no
longer follows. However, if argument 2 is amended by substituting "pleasure" for
"my pleasure" throughout, the conclusion again follows from the premise. This
becomes:
3. My-pleasure is good, therefore more "my-pleasure" for more people
individually is better for more people individually than less "my pleasure" is
for less people individually.
But the above is a formulation, albeit inelegant, of egoism, not of utilitarianism. Thus
Utilitarianism must either be false (argument 1) or illogical (statement 2). If the
characterisation of pleasure in chapter 1 is accepted, then turning it into a cognitive
doctrine implies that utilitarianism becomes egoist, as shown above.
The above can be illustrated by considering Bentham. If he is interpreted as trying to
build a cognitive ethics, he can be read as making both argument one and two
alternatively:
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign
masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought
to do, as well as to determine what we shall do (Bentham, 1982: 11).
Bentham is saying that pain and pleasure are the regulators of all human conduct, and
the determinants of what should be done'", Ifby this he means "pain-for-me", this is
39 Problems with regards to whether Bentham's "ethics" can be made consistent with his psychological
hedonism will, for the moment, be ignored.
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what has been argued to be the case. But, of course, this is not quite what Bentham
means:
By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to
produce ...pleasure ... or to prevent ...pain ... to the party whose interest is
concerned: if that party be the community in general, then the happiness
of the community: if a particular individual, then the happiness of that
individual (Bentham, 1982: 12).
The case of the "community in general" does not make sense. In what sense can the
"pleasure-for-me" of a community be increased? This amounts to the formulation
"pleasure- for-me- for-the-community", a nonsensical phrase.
Of course, Bentham is not referring to "pleasure- for-me", but "pleasure- for-anyone".
But in this sense the term "pleasure" is simply no longer the arbiter of human action.
There is a profound difference between "pleasure-for-me" and "pleasure-for-him" that
allows the former to be the guidepost for all human action, but not the latter, as argued
earlier. So, in this sense, Bentham's original claims regarding "pleasure/pain" are now
false, and an instance of the argument previously identified as argument one.
Bentham tries to get around this objection by pretending that the community is a
"person", using the Hobbesian notion of the community as a body:
... The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons
who are considered as constituting as it were its members (Bentham,
1982: 12).
The metaphor of seeing a society as a "body" surely has its uses, but is only a
metaphor, apt in some cases and misleading in others. In the case of "experiencing
pleasure", it surely is misleading. The sense in which "pleasure" is good has been
argued to be irreducibly subjective. Hence the "experience of the community" can
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mean no more than the experience of the individuals composing it4o. Here exists a
disanalogy which disqualifies the use of this metaphor to establish Bentham's
principle.
Bentham's argument then boils down to an instance of what was referred to as
"argument 1". It rests on the false claim that pleasure, understood as something
distinct from "pleasure-for-me", is the arbiter of human action. Or the above can be
read as an instance of argument two, since Bentham concedes that individual pleasure
can be an ethical guidepost. But he then errs logically when trying to extend this to
society by using an inapplicable metaphor.
I would contend that the historical connection between utilitarianism and hedonism
has a psychological, rather than a logical cause. If someone is convinced that there is
something strange about pleasure that qualifies it to be the sole object of morality, it
appears to be mere common sense that no-one's pleasure should count more than
another's. This seems to be due to an uncritical application of a principle of equality
or fairness that is so basic to our ethical reasoning that it is not commonly realised that
it is in need of justification. The acceptance of this principle, combined with
hedonism, then leads to utilitarianism. It is unjustified since, what makes pleasure
"special", is always relative to the individual experiencing it.
In chapter 6 it will be claimed that one might be able to derive some sort of principle
of fairness from egoist principles. The important point, however, is that, if hedonism
is to be cognitive, this principle needs to be derived from an egoist base. Jumping
from hedonism to utilitarianism in one easy step simply won't do.
With these questions concerning egoism out of the way, it still remains to clarify the
exact relation between ethical hedonism and psychological hedonism.
40 Unless, of course, the phrase "communal experience" can be given a quite literal sense. Sprigge
manages this by combining hedonism with panpsychism in The Rational Foundations Of Ethics
(1988).
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5. Cognitive, Egoist, Ethical Hedonism
5.1. "What Should be Done"
The exact meaning of the ethical "should" has been a matter of frequent dispute in
philosophy. Many philosophers have doubted the very intelligibility of a specifically
ethical "should". The remarks above concerning the naturalistic fallacy has already
shown the essence of why this need not trouble an ethical hedonist. Some remarks
concerning the relation between the conditional and absolute "should" should suffice
to remove any confusion regarding this matter.
Kant's "categorical imperative" was intended to be a specifically ethical "should",
i.e. to be understood as distinct from the unproblematic "conditional"
("hypothetical41,,) "should". Schlick summarised one often-made'f criticism when he
stated that:
It is just as if Kant had said: "I wish to use the phrase 'to take a walk' with
such a meaning that I can say 'a walk is being taken' without anyone there
who takes it." (1962: 112).
If the "should" does not command absolutely, but always "hypothetically", then any
statement expressing a "should" is relative to the specific goal being expressed. If this
"goal" is questioned, then an infinite regress follows where this goal has to be
justified with reference to another goal, etc. But if this process is to be stopped an
"absolute should" is needed. Yet the very idea of an "absolute should" seems
unintelligible.
Ethical hedonism can offer a way out of the above predicament. If some element of
experience is found to be good "in-itself', i.e. if a valid referential use of the term
"good" can be found, then it can be said that someone should seek this "good". The
use of the term "good' here stops the infinite regress. If someone was to ask why (s)he
41 "All imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. Hypothetical imperatives ... declare
a possible action necessary as a means ... [a] categorical imperative ... as objectively necessary in
itself' (Kant, 1964: 82).
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should do what is "good", then such a question can only be asked if the person does
not understand the meaning of "good" in this context.
The "should" commands "hypothetically", but an infinite regress does not arise. If
something is "good", then it is thereby "self-justifying"; no action requires a sanction
over and above being "good". An alternative way to phrase this would be to say that
"you should do what is good" is an "absolute should", for to ask what further goal is
served by actions that are "good" is to misunderstand the meaning of the term "good".
The "should" here appears to be "absolute", but only because of the self-justifying
nature of "good".
The "value terms" under discussion, terms like "good", "should", "right", form a
cluster of mutually defining notions. If one of them gains definition, then all the
others are also thereby defined. Hence, if it is allowed that there is a referential use of
the term "good", then questions about "should", etc. are also thereby answered.
5.2. "What Is Done"
It was stated earlier that ethical hedonism, i.e. the doctrine that pleasure should be
sought, implies a form of psychological hedonism, the doctrine that pleasure is, in
some sense, what is sought. How is this possible?
Imagine a being with perfect information about her environment that has to choose
between two options, the one leading to pain and the other to pleasure. Which should
she choose? She should choose the one that is "good", i.e. the one that leads to
pleasure, as was discussed above.
Which will she choose? Again, it seems reasonable to suppose that she will choose the
pleasant alternative. To choose pain, in full knowledge of the consequences, would be
to choose to harm oneself. There can be no sufficient (self-justifying) reason for such
an action; hence a choice for such an alternative must be the result of a mistake.
42 See, for example, also Anscombe (1981: 30).
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Hence it is being claimed that people will do what they should do, this might weU
seem an "over-optimistic" view of human action.
In an ethics that is egoistically grounded this type of opposition between what is done
and what should be done seems to disappear. If the "good" is defined as something in
opposition to the wants of the individual, then there is a motive for the person to
disregard the "good". In such a case it would, indeed, be thought unlikely that all
people will automatically do what is good. However, if the "good" is defined
egoistically, i.e. the wants of the individual and the "good" overlap by definition, then
there is no reason left for a person to disregard what is good. And, since the reward of
the "good" is of an egoist nature, there is every reason for a person to act so as to
attain it.
Hence the "goodness" of pleasure means that it should be sought, and also that it will
be sought. Note that this is not to suppose that all choices are "consciously" geared
towards achieving pleasure. Neither is it hard to point out any number of instances
where people do not appear to be seeking pleasure in any sense whatsoever. This does
not falsify psychological hedonism. The reason why this is so will become apparent
from chapter 4 onwards. The essence of the explanation, however, is that such an
action is only possible if one is ignorant of the fact that pleasure should be maximised,
or are unable to do so, and hence rests on a factual mistake, or simple inability",
Hence the version of psychological hedonism in this thesis is that people always do,
in some sense, seek to maximise pleasure, except if their reasoning include a mistake
of some sort that blinds the actor to the fact that pleasure should be sought". There
43 The calculations and judgements needed in order to evaluate the pleasure that will accrue from
pursuing certain options are most definitely not under my conscious control. "Mistakes" that result
from computational processes not under my control cannot be said to count against the psychological
hedonism propounded here. In Ainslie (2001) a theory of motivations in which the reward of action is
discounted hyperbolically, instead of exponentially, is presented. Such hyperbolic discounting leads to
inconsistent preferences, but is argued to be adaptive (2001: 45-47). If desires are seen as deriving from
estimations as to potential pleasure, then this means that these estimations, "programmed" by
evolution, rely on computational processes that are biased in favour of short-term pay-offs. In chapter 6
it is argued that the agent is manipulated by evolution via preferences. If this is correct, then Ainslie's
hyperbolic discount curves form another locus of such manipulation.
44 There is an important consideration that speaks against the persistence of such a mistake. If an actor
(by mistake) seeks to pursue a goal that clashes with pleasure maximisation, then she will suffer the
"unrnistakeable punishment that is a punishment in-itself' - pain. Hence there will be an ever-present
and unrnistakeable incentive to abandon such a course of action. The converse hold true for actions that
produce pleasure, they gain the reward that is "in-itself rewarding". This loads the dice in favour of
actions that produce pleasure, and, in the long run, renders habits that do not maximise pleasure
fundamentally unstable. (This is clear enough in the case of actions like touching a hot stove-plate.
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are other considerations with regard to our actual cognitive capacities that makes the
above statement less crude, but these considerations will have to wait till chapter 5.
Hence the position taken in this thesis will be that ethical hedonism implies, yet
logically precedes, psychological hedonism.
6. Conclusion
In chapter 1 the outlines were drawn of a theory of cognitive, egoist, ethical
hedonism. This theory, in a nutshell, states that individuals should maximise value (as
defined), and adds that this statement should be understood as cognitive. In this
chapter some issues regarding the various components of this theory were clarified. It
was also argued that it stands up well against certain historically influential objections
to such a theory.
The claim that people both should and do maximise value gives rise to a bewildering
variety of questions. The rest of this thesis will attempt to examine some of these
questions, and to show how they can profitably be dealt with.
The first question that will be discussed relates to the conceptualisation of "value" in
other academic fields. No discipline stands in greater need of a conception of "value"
than economics. The next chapter will examine how economics has dealt with this
question, both historically and currently. The ways in which economics deals with
question of value will also be related to the theory of ethical hedonism being proposed
in this thesis.
Actions that cause pain less immediately and directly complicate the picture, but still leaves the
difference between them and actions that cause pain directly and evidently one of degree.)
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Chapter 3: Value and Economics
1. Introduction
Few academic disciplines would seem to have a more obvious need for a theory of
value than does economics. Trade, production, etc. are activities that try to gain
something of value, whether it be from man or nature. Hence it would appear that
some sort of understanding of value would be a logical starting place for economics
analysis.
It also makes intuitive sense to suppose that, if there is anything to the analysis of
value developed in chapters 1 and 2, this must in some sense relate to "economic
phenomena". This chapter will attempt to steer a dual course: on the one hand it will
attempt to relate the foregoing analysis to "value", as understood in academic
economics. On the other hand it will attempt to relate the "value", as conceptualised
in the previous two chapters, to a sort of rough, qualitative understanding of basic
economic phenomena. The problem with such a dual course is that it might well end
up satisfying no-one. A philosopher might well not see the point of a detailed
consideration of some economic concepts. An economist might well think an analysis
in terms of value-as-pleasure somewhat quaint and outdated. Here I ask for the
indulgence of the reader, the point of much of what is to follow can only really be
stated after the specific issues have been discussed.
It is customary, especially when discussing the classical economists, to draw a
distinction between "objective" and "subjective" theories of value. Both of these types
of value-theory identify a concept that is distinct from price, and yet determines it. In
an objective theory this concept relates to some quality of reality that is independent
of the economic agent, in the subjective theory this concept refers to something agent-
relative.
One of the key moments in the history of economics occurred when the agent-
independent theories of the classical economists was replaced by the agent-relative
theories of the Marginalists. The "Marginalist Revolution", as economic historians
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like to refer to it, played a large part in making economics what it is today'". This is
especially interesting, seen from the point of view of this thesis, since the particular
agent-relative theory of value that was typical of the Marginalists was mostly
hedonism, or something close to it. It must surely speak in favour of hedonism that its
acceptance in economics allowed for insights that would probably have remained
obscured for much longer otherwise.
But economics' allegiance to hedonism, though fruitful, was only temporary. The
theory of value became increasingly formalised, and was correspondingly purged of
psychological and hedonist elements, until only the very essence needed for
economics remained. Hedonism proved to be a Wittgensteinian ladder that, once it
had served its purpose, could be kicked away at no cost to economic theory. In this
manner the economic theory of value, or utility, is often said to have developed from
a "psychology of decision-making" to a "logic of choice".
The above did not amount to a rejection of hedonism as such. Rather than finding
hedonism to be false economists simply discovered it to be unnecessary to economic
theory. One thing that is necessary, though, is that the economic theory of value be
agent-relative. It is this notion of agent-relativity that is probably the main historical
contribution that hedonism made to economics. In this manner economics can be said
to have moved from the Classical rejection of hedonism, to the Marginalist
acceptance of hedonism, to the contemporary formalised notion that would be
consistent with hedonism.
This chapter will start by giving a rudimentary sketch of the relation between value,
as defined in chapter 1, and economics. It will then show attempt to show how vital
the difference between considering value to be agent-independent and agent-relative
can be for our view of economic behaviour. The arguments put forward by Smith and
Marx in support of their Classical agent-independent theories will then be considered.
It will be shown that these arguments are clearly inadequate.
45 Schumpeter considered Walras - one of the co-inventors of "Marginalism" - to be the greatest of all
economists. Of the Walrassian system, in part only possible because of the agent-relative conception of
value, he writes: "It is the outstanding landmark on the road that economics travels toward the status of
a rigorous or exact science, and though outmoded by now, still stands at the back of much of the best
theoretical work of our time" (1994: 857).
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The next issue to be considered will be the Marginalist and hedonist theory of one of
the originators of the Marginalist Revolution, Jevons. It will be shown how the
hedonist conception of value provides for economics to be entirely based on the
concept of value. Yet the treatment of hedonism by Jevons and his contemporaries
still contains some conceptual confusions. These will be shown and discussed.
The chapter will conclude with a consideration of the contemporary, formalised,
conception of value as used in "revealed preference theory". It will be argued that this
method can sometimes get rid of intentional description, but not always.
The first issue to be considered is the relation between the foregoing chapters and
"price".
2. Value and Price
2.1.1. Definitions - Utility and Price
The following definitions are needed for a rudimentary explication of the relation
between value and price.
ValuelUtility: "Value" is the sum-total of cardinal "values of experience" over
time. "Valuation" is defined as the subject's estimate of resulting "value of
experience" over time. While the actual resulting "value" is a fact about the world
(as argued in chapters 1 & 2), "valuation" is an estimate as to "value", as such it
can be correct and incorrect to various degrees. In accordance with economic
usage the use of "valuation" will be discontinued in this and the following chapter.
Instead the term "utility" will be employed to refer to "valuation".
Price/Exchange relation: The amount of a certain commodity exchanged for an
amount of another commodity. This amount is also then the price, as expressed in
terms of another commodity.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
58
2.1.2. Definition: The "Utility of a Commodity"
The phrase "utility of a commodity" is being dealt with separately, since it contains
certain subtleties and is central to what is to follow. If value is thought to be an
inherent quality of an object, then the phrase "value of x" presents no particular
problem. But, as was argued in chapter 1, the phrase "value of x" ("or utility of x")
can only apply in this unproblematic sense to the experience of a given subject. A
commodity, however, is not an "experience", but rather a part or element of this
expenence.
The easiest way to explain the rationale for the way in which "utility of x" will be
understood in this thesis is by relating it to the conclusion at which this chapter wishes
to arrive. This conclusion, given certain assumptions that will be stated later, is this:
If A obtained x in exchange for y, then x must necessarily have a higher utility for him
thany, at the time of exchange'".
At first glance this seems reasonable, but becomes problematic if x was not itself the
reason for the exchange. Consider: A buys a book from B for $7. It sounds plausible
to say that the book had a higher utility to B than the $7. But this is not always true if
we employ the "ordinary meaning" of such a statement. Employing the ordinary
meaning of the phrase "utility of the book" someone could say the following: B
happens to be a pretty girl, and A didn't really want the book more than the $7. A just
bought the book, because it afforded A a chance to speak to the girl. Here the
statement that A wanted the book more than the $7, is, employing the ordinary use of
these terms, simply false.
To save the above statement, one option would be to, at the cost of slight inelegance
of formulation, say that A bought both "the book" and the "conversation with the
girl". Here we are stretching the ordinary meaning of "buying", since B may now be
an "unwitting seller", but it does save the statement needed to explicate the relation
between utility and price from possible falsity. A somewhat strange consequence of
46 This roughly corresponds to what a modem economist would call the "axiom of revealed
preference", which will be discussed below.
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such a move, however, is that the content of what is "bought" must now depend on
motives of the buyer.
This difficulty, though probably not the most serious, can be avoided by employing a
second option, as I will explain. The basic difficulty is that A is not really choosing
elements of experience independently of one another, rather A is choosing between
different experiences as such. Hence any regularity with regards to such choice must,
eventually, materialise in terms of the experiences, and not their elements of the
expenences.
As a heuristic I will use the vocabulary of "possible worlds". It is easier to think of
these matters (for the author, at least) if an actor is viewed as choosing between the
worlds that it would be possible for this actor to inhabit. This is not supposed to imply
any deep points concerning modal logic, but is meant as a convenient way of writing
"an option, including its consequences, and the experience to which it gives rise".
If the terminology of "possible worlds" is employed, then the principle that I am
trying to formulate can be stated as follows: any chosen possible world has a higher
utility, to the subject concerned, than all non-chosen possible worlds. The subject
engaged in trade is now described as "choosing possible worlds" rather than
"choosing commodities". Using the above example, it can now be said that A placed a
higher utility on the possible world in which the book was bought and the $7 spent
than on the possible world in which the book wasn't bought and the $7 kept. This
applies without reference to the specific motives of the subject, the somewhat murky
notion of what was "really bought" becomes irrelevant. Thus the statement "if A
acquired x in exchange for y, A placed higher utility on x than y" should be translated
as, for instance "if A bought the book for $7, A placed higher utility on the possible
world that includes the bought book than the possible world that included the kept
$7".
The above formulation has a further implication, which will become clear as the
nature of "value", as defined in chapter 1, is considered. In accordance with this
conceptualisation, saying that a commodity has a distinguishable value independently
of a specific situation, in the same sense as saying that a tree has a certain height
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independently of its surroundings, becomes a Rylean category mistake. The only
"thing" that has "value" in this sense is "experience", objects don't have value
independently of one another or of a mental state. The only sense in which an object
can have "value" is inasmuch as it contributes to value of experience. This
contribution will be influenced by the context (thus: other objects) in which it
influences experience.
The above considerations lead to the following definition. The utility of a commodity
is the difference between a possible world in which the commodity is obtained versus
a possible world in which it is not. This difference can be expressed cardinally, as
explained in chapter 1.
Consider the utility, in this sense, of, buying a car: The value of a car for a specific
person is the difference between the sum-total of the value of experience that will
result from buying the car, minus the sum-total of the value of experience resulting
from not buying the car. The utility of the car is the estimation of this quantity.
Note that all events causally, but contingently related to buying the car, i.e. all events
occurring in the world where the car is bought, but not in the world where the car is
not bought, will now have an influence on the value of the car. The "value of a car"
now becomes the "value of the car and all events causally implicated in acquiring it".
The idea of including all events causally implicated in buying a car as determining its
value might strike one as odd, but a little reflection should show that this is the
measure behaviourally relevant to action. Imagine A is buying a car, and knows that
having a car will mean that (s)he will constantly be pestered to give lifts to friends.
Now the foreseeability of being pestered to give lifts to friends will decrease the
utility of the car, as defined above. In ordinary language the value of the car might be
distinguished from the events causally flowing from owning it. This "ordinary
meaning" can be referred to as the "decontextualised utility", this to be defined as
excluding some causally related events. The measure defined above can then be
referred to as "contextualised utility".
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To illustrate this difference, consider the following If someone says that he hates his
work, but keeps on doing it, then this "hate" can only be understood in the
decontextualised sense. In the contextualised sense of value the work stands in a
causal relation to his paycheck, and, in this sense, the fact that he keeps doing it
means that it cannot have negative utility.
It is contextualised utility that will be behaviourally relevant to action. Consider the
previous example regarding the car: the more of a problem A considers being pestered
by friends to be, the less likely he will be to buy the car, or, the less he will be willing
to pay for it. In this way the events causally related to buying the car impacts upon his
decision to buy the car. This should demonstrate the virtue of including all events
causally related to acquiring a commodity as influencing the utility of the commodity
itself.
A formulation that includes causal events also allows for the phrase "utility of money"
to be used without it being troublesome. If A buys a book for $7, as in the previous
example, that implies that the book had higher utility for him than the $7. Talking
about the "utility of $7 " might sound odd, since money does not normally have utility
in the same sense as other commodities. But, in the above example, it might as well
have been said that the book had higher utility bought than unbought. Whether the
possible world in which the book wasn't bought is referred to as the world in which
the $7 was kept, or the book unbought or A had a conversation with the girl, or
whatever, is immaterial. The fact that someone has $7 in a possible world is very
likely to impact on the value of the world, not distinguishing between commodities
and events causally related to owning commodities obliterates any relevant distinction
between money and other commodities. The amount of money/currency is now just
another element in a causal chain by which this causal chain can be named.
3.1 Simplifying Assumption
In order to simplify the discussion to follow, the following assumption will be used.
Any subject weighs the possible consequences of action in terms of their value, as
defined. This measure then determines action.
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The above might appear quite unnecessary, or a simple restatement of chapter 1. Here
a distinction should be made between the ultimate goal of action, and the strategy that
best implements it. In chapter 4 it will be argued that, while all people should
maximise value, this is, in itself, a poor guide to action. In other words, any attempt to
maximise value by consciously using the rule "maximise value" will be significantly
less effective than certain other strategies, to be discussed in chapter 4. It will also be
argued that this problem leads to quite a complicated relation between "maximise
value" and the strategy that implements it. It will be argued that this relation is
complex enough that there is a qualitative break between a value-maximiser and a
subject who follows a strategy flowing from it47. This break is of such a type that
there is one important sense in which it is misleading or even false to say that people
maximise value, or are psychological hedonists.
The above consideration, while it will prove to be vital to the rest of this thesis, will
complicate the analysis and discussion in this chapter unnecessarily. Hence, for this
chapter, it will be assumed that people are value-maximisers in the simplest sense.
There is a further, less troublesome assumption that is needed. In the examples under
discussion the value of a commodity will be treated as a function of the amount of that
commodity. Hence it is being assumed that, all else being equal, more of x has higher
utility than less of x48. It need not be assumed that this increase is uniform.
3.2 The Relation between Utility and Price
The above considerations and definitions allow for a clear explication of the relation
between value and price. Consider the case of A trading a determinate amount of a
given indivisible commodity x with B, for another commodity y. What will determine
the price (amount ofy needed to effect trade) of this commodity?
A will trade at all prices where the trade is to his benefit. Hence A will seek to be in a
possible world of higher utility than if no trade had occurred, if this situation does not
47 This forms the crux of the debate between "rational choice"-theory and "bounded rationality", it is in
these terms which the issue will be discussed in chapter 4.
48 Economists call this the "principle of non-satiation".
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obtain A will not trade. The most advantageous trade, if the commodity which is
being asked for as a price is the only variable, is one which occurs at a price of zero.
This would, in other words, be where A manages to obtain commodity x without
surrendering any of the commodity y. All trades at a price higher than this are
progressively of lower utility to A. If A would buy at a price of zero, progressively
increasing the amount of the commodity y (hence: price) would lead to a situation
where eventually A is indifferent between trading and not trading. Here the possible
worlds of trade/don't trade are of equal utility. This price in a world where A is
indifferent between trading and not trading is the maximum price, at all prices
fractionally less A would trade. In this way utility, as defined above, determines the
maximum price at which a commodity will be traded. If a trader is treated as being
both a buyer and a seller, then the converse is true of the trader qua seller. Utility now
determines the minimum price at which the seller would be willing to trade. Hence
the utility of the given commodity x sets the maximum price for the buyer, and
minimum price for the seller. This implies that utility determines a range of possible
. 49pnces .
Hence the relation between utility and price can be stated very simply: the utility of a
commodity for the buyer at a price of zero determines the maximum price for the
buyer, and the utility for the seller determines the minimum price for the seller. This
utility is the difference in estimated value between the possible world in which trade
occurred at a price of zero, versus a possible world in which trade did not occur. This
utility determines the range of possible prices in the sense that a determinate amount
of the commodity offered as price would be needed to "close the gap" between the
world in which price is zero and the world in which buy/don't buy are of equal utility.
3. Agent-Relativity vs. Agent-Independence
3.1 Trade is not Zero-sum
The above analysis renders the first objective of this chapter achieved. Value has now,
via the idea of estimated value ("utility"), been related to price. The above analysis,
49 Under extra assumption price becomes determinate, as will be discussed below.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
64
however, being a rather straightforward application of hedonist philosophy, might
well seem trivial This is, however, not the case It is important because it establishes
that trade is not a zero-sum activity. It is also of historical interest, since some major
figures in economic history (Smith, Marx) thought it to be false. These two issues will
be discussed in tum.
If value is treated as an agent-relative notion (as it is in hedonism), then both parties
to a trade can gain. If I can increase utility by buying a cup of coffee, and a
restaurateur can increase his utility by selling it to me, we both win. Indeed, such a
structure of mutual gain is the only possible explanation of any voluntary trade
whatsoever. A trade that is not in favour of both is only possible if one party had,
somehow, miscalculated.
The above is a clear consequence of having an agent-relative conception of value. An
agent-independent view of value changes the picture in a disturbing way. Now a
commodity must, in some sense, have a real value. This one real scale of value turns
trade into a zero-sum game. Here trade now becomes a game in which one party must
win, and another lose by the amount that the first gained. The only other possibility is
that the good must somehow trade at its real value, and neither gain or lose on this
objective scale'".
The contrast between the above two VIews cannot be greater. If someone has an
agent-relative view of value, then trade is a desirable activity that makes society better
off, and should be encouraged. If a commodity has an inherent value, however, it
becomes significantly less clear that trade is a virtue. Take the example of seeing a
rich person walking down the street. If I have an agent-relative conception of value,
and assuming that the person didn't steal or inherit her money, then it is prima facie
more likely that I will consider the person socially useful. If someone gets rich by
trading with people who didn't systematically miscalculate utility, then the wealth of
the person becomes a reflection of their use to society. Simply put, the person might
well be rich because an awful lot of people have found it in their own interest to have
some form of economic interaction with them.
50 Marx's distinction between the use-value and exchange-value of labour allows him to avoid this
otherwise inevitable implication of having an objective theory of value.
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The situation is much more sinister if I have an agent-independent conception of
value. Now the riches of the person must exactly correspond to the amount that others
have lost in trading with them. In this sense there is now something inherently
exploitative in the very idea of gaining from trade. Hence it would be more natural to
see the person as a drain on society, and to see wealth as a badge of shame.
What does the above show? It is not intended as a simple-minded apology for
capitalism or the rich, etc., there are a host of issues involved in such arguments that
have not been discussed here. Nor does it claim that an economist's view of value is
all that will determine her views on capitalism". What it does try and demonstrate is
how much of a prima facie difference the conception of value as "subjective" or
"objective" can make for our intuitive understanding of economic phenomena. The
idea of mutual gain is the determining feature of the one view, whereas it is a logical
impossibility in the other.
The agent-relative view of value, as developed above, permits an explanation of trade
without ever postulating the idea of the "value of a commodity", in the literal sense.
All there is, fundamentally, to economic phenomena is the agent-relative conception
of value and the different prices to which this can give rise. The phrase "value of a
commodity" is simply meaningless if it is supposed to refer to anything other than
this.
Classical economists found reason to doubt the agent-relative view of value. It is the
arguments supporting this doubt that will next be discussed.
3.3 Adam Smith's "Cost of Production" Theory of Value
Adam Smith's doctrine of the "invisible hand" (Smith, 1975: 400) relies on the
mutual beneficence of trade and thus on an implicit agent-relative conceptualization
of value. And yet he dismissed utility as a determinant of price, he separated the two
51 Smith, despite having an agent-independent theory, was pro-capitalist. Walras, despite an agent-
relative theory, was a socialist. (Smith does however, depend on an agent-relative view to explain his
idea of the "invisible hand".)
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lil order to advance a cost of production theory of value with labour as an
independenr ' determinant of price. How is this accomplished?
The word value, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, and sometimes
expresses the utility of some particular object, and sometimes the power of
purchasing other goods which the possession of that object conveys. The one
may be called "value in use", the other, "value in exchange". The things which
have the greatest value in use have frequently little or no value in exchange:
and, on the contrary, those which have the greatest value in exchange have
frequently little or no value in use. Nothing is more useful than water: but it will
purchase scarce anything; scarce anything can be had in exchange for it. A
diamond, on the contrary, has scarce any value in use; but a very great quantity
of other goods may frequently be had in exchange for it (Smith, 1975: 25).
This is the classical formulation of the diamonds-and-water paradox.", a problem that
strikes at the heart of Classical economic theory since it can only be resolved with
reference to a theory regarding the determinants of price. Adam Smith (and other
classical economists like Ricardo) uses it to divorce utility from price and clear the
way for an "objective" theory of value that assigns prime importance to labour. The
need for such an "objective" theory does not arise if this paradox can be solved and
utility related to price.
Utility has already been related to price earlier in this chapter, but how does this relate
to the diamonds-and-water paradox? Like most paradoxes, it should be shown not to
arise, rather than be "solved".
Smith denies the claim that the high price of diamonds can be accounted for by their
high utility, he states that that they have scarce any "value in use". This is a puzzling
statement, since diamonds are very useful things. They are used, both industrially and
decoratively, the latter in virtue of the great symbolic power they have in our society
(and Smith's). His declaration that they have "scarce any value" is probably best
52 In a primitive society without capital and the private ownership of land, he makes labour (quantified
as labour-time) the sole determinant of the exchange relation (price) (Smith, 1975: 42).
53 O'Brien notes that Smith "solved" the diamonds-and-water paradox in his Lectures in terms of
relative scarcity, but changed his position in The Wealth of Nations in order to advance a "cost of
production" theory of value (0' Brien, 1975: 78-80).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
67
interpreted as the result of a bias against their decorative use. Whether society should
value something is irrelevant to an explanation of the prices of objects, it is not the
task of the economist to judge the tastes of mankind.
To indulge in a bit of speculation, I think it is plausible to assert that the idea of
objects having a "real" agent-independent value might be to blame for this. One might
well be tempted, in thinking in such a manner, to draw a distinction between uses that
are only possible in virtue of the nature of the object, and the uses that "are added" on
by social custom and convention. Such a distinction would then lead to the temptation
to say that diamonds are not "really" valuable. Whether such a distinction can be
coherently maintained will not be discussed here, the important point is that it is
irrelevant to an explanation of prices in a given society. In our society diamonds are,
among other things, markers of class, status and affection. As long as they have these
functions they will be very useful things to have.
Smith's statement that diamonds have little value is, in this context, simply incorrect.
Whether utility is, in part, the result of social convention, does not matter one iota in
the determination of prices. Since diamonds have great utility, and since utility sets
the upper and lower limit for prices, diamonds constitute an instance of the claim that
price determines utility, not an exception to it. This is, in a sense, not the whole story,
for the fact that diamonds fetch high prices is not independent of the fact that they are
hard to obtain. This is the phenomenon that allowed Smith to assert that ultimately,
cost of production trumps utility in the determination of prices. The difficulty of
obtaining a commodity will be related to prices later on when the Marginalists are
discussed. For now it will have to suffice to have shown that the "diamonds" part of
the "diamonds-and-water" paradox does not present a problem.
The "water"-part is similarly unproblematic, water has a low utility and hence a low
price. The previous statement might sound paradoxical, for wouldn't we perish
without water? This issue is hard to discuss without, to a certain degree, mentioning
issues regarding the relation between utility and the difficulty of obtaining a
commodity. This topic will be discussed later, it will only now be mentioned to the
degree necessary to make the above statement seem less strange. This will be easiest
to do with reference to a hypothetical case which illustrates the principle under
consideration.
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Consider two people on an island which contains a river with fresh water. Imagine A
regularly goes to the river for water, and that B regularly trades with A in order to
obtain some of her water. What determines the value of the water for B, and hence
the amount of the items he will be willing to trade?
If utility is seen as the difference between two possible states, then the possible state
that does not materialize has a definitive influence on utility. For B the value of the
water is the difference between the possible world in which it is obtained, versus the
possible world in which it is not. Herein lies the solution to problem. If B does not
obtain the water from A, then surely nothing prohibits him from getting it from the
river himself. Hence the value of the water obtained from A is the difference between
the possible world in which it is obtained from A and the possible world in which it is
obtained from the river.
These two possible worlds do not differ with regards to the actual commodity, i.e. the
water. Since B acquires water in both worlds, the difference between the two possible
worlds, and hence utility, cannot be ascribed to any of the uses of water as such.
Rather it must be ascribed to some other elements in the causal chains which is being
named by "utility of the water". Clearly one rather sizable difference is the difference
between obtaining the water from A and going to the river. The greater the disparity
between these two, the greater the utility of the water. The utility of buying water
from A is the difference between a possible world in which it is obtained at no price
("price" here meant as the specific variable used to effect trade), and a possible world
in which B has to go to the river himself. Provided the river is close by, B is healthy,
etc, this difference will not amount to much. Hence A's water will have a low utility,
which results in it having a low price.
The key thing is again to be suspicious of Smith's of phrase "utility of water". For
matters of trade there is no such thing as the utility of water as such, there is only the
utility of this-water or that-water. And, since utility is a difference between possible
states, the this-water of a possible world is a commodity in competition with the that-
water of another possible world, and hence can influence its utility.
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It is true that, without water as such, we could die of thirst. But water as such is never
the object of trade, all that is sold is some specific amount of it. If someone could
monopolise the water-supply of the world, and hence remove the possibility of
obtaining water from the lower of the two possible worlds, then Smith would be
correct. Here the water of the person would have a great value. But the paradox would
again be averted, since it would also then have a great price.
The above way of showing that the diamonds-and-water paradox does not arise raises
the question of the relation between the conditions of obtaining a commodity and
utility. Someone versed in the history of economics will also notice that the above is
not quite the traditional solution to the diamonds-and-water paradox in terms of the
"law of diminishing marginal utility". These issues will be easier to discuss below in
the context of the Marginalists' work.
Hence the diamonds-and-water paradox rests on conceptual confusion. If stated in
terms of the measures of utility that determine price, diamonds have a high utility and
water has a low utility. Smith's reason for separating utility and price, and advancing
a cost of production theory of value, fails.
I would contend that the conceptual confusion behind the formulation of the diamond-
and-water paradox is probably due to being mislead by the phrase "value-of-a
commodity". Although such an assertion is necessarily speculative, it does seem that
Smith's intuitive conception of use-value is something that is independent of society
(diamonds) and conditions under which objects are obtained (water). Such a view
seems best accounted for by ascribing to Smith the belief that the usefulness of
objects is something inherent in these objects, and not a relation between the qualities
of the object and the needs served by these qualities'".
Another famous "objective" theory of value is the Marxian Labour theory of value.
Marx does not use the diamonds-and-water paradox to separate utility from price, but
54 In a pre-capitalist society, Smith makes labour the sole determinant of price (1975: 42). His
argument for separating utility from price was criticised above. He does not seem to really present an
argument for the next step of identifying labour with price. Smith only writes that labour controls price
because it is "natural" (page 41), that labour is the "real price" (page 26), that labour is the "real cost"
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still needs an argument to accomplish this in order to clear the way for labour as
determinant of prices. It will be shown how his argument works and why it fails.
3.4 Marx's Labour theory of Value - The Argument from Incommensurability
Marx's economics rests largely on his theory of value.", which is generally conceded
to be incorrecr". Yet the beginning of his argument is of interest in terms of the ideas
developed in this chapter.
Marx begins by distinguishing between utility and price in a way reminiscent of
Smith. He then proceeds to separate the two by saying the following:
As use-values, commodities differ above all in quality, while as exchange-
values they can only differ in quantity, and therefore do not contain an
atom of use-value (Marx, 1976: 128).
When Marx says that use-values differ above all in quality, he means that there are
different kinds " of utility, and while they can be quantitatively compared for a given
use-value (e.g. different amounts of shoes, buildings, etc.), they cannot be
quantitatively compared for different use-values. Obviously exchange-value (price) is
quantitative, and this incommensurability between utilities must mean that utility
cannot be the commensurate entity controlling prices. From here Marx searches for
this commensurate quantity, and eventually announces it to be the amount of labour-
time socially necessary for the production of a commodity. Again, as with Smith, if
we can show that the above argument from incommensurability is unsuccessful in
separating utility and price, that means that the need for Marx's "master-concept"
(page 26), the "first price" (page 26), the "original purchase-money" (page 26) and something's "real
worth" (page 26).
55 In a letter to Engels he writes; " ... (t)he best points in my book are: (1) the twofold character of
labour, according to whether it is expressed in use-value or exchange-value. (All understanding of the
facts depends upon this.) It is emphasized immediately, in the first chapter ... " (Mclelland, 1977: 525).
56 The New Palgrave: Marxian Economics, asserts the Labour theory of value to be false on the
opening page without feeling the need for argument or even the need for a citation to back up this claim
(1987: xi). (In a similar way, even the greatest admirer of Adam Smith will not locate his considerable
merits in his theory of value.)
57 Consider page 136, where he writes that" ... [with regards to use-values] it was a matter of the "how"
and "what" oflabour, [with regards to exchange-values] of the "how much" ... ". Or, page 126: " ... use-
values of one kind exchange for use-values of another kind".
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(labour-time) does not arise and that his analysis is unsupported by the time labour
gets mentioned in the first pages of Capital.
It should be reasonably clear that the argument from incommensurability is irrelevant
to the conception of utility developed earlier in chapter 1. All objects can have an
influence on the value of the experience of the subject. This influence is a determinate
cardinal 58 quantity and thus commensurate. But this does not correspond to Marx's
definition of utility, he writes that:
The usefulness of a thing makes it a use-value. But this usefulness does
not dangle in mid-air. It is conditioned by the physical properties of the
commodity, and has no existence apart from the latter. It is therefore the
physical body of the commodity itself, for instance iron, com, a diamond,
which is the use-value or the useful thing. This property of the commodity
is independent of the labour necessary to appropriate its useful qualities
(Marx, 1976: 126)59.
It seems clear that Marx views the use-value of a commodity as an inherent quality of
it based purely on objective factors. On his definition, use-value cannot be
quantitative. If we fall into the trap of thinking that the above definition exhausts the
possible conceptions of value, then we are committed to admitting that utility cannot
influence price.
But there are other conceptions of "utility" or "use-value" which do not fall prey to
the problem of incommensurability. One such conception is the hedonist one
developed in this thesis. Marx does not consider such conceptions, nor does he
present any argument against them.
58 The claim of cardinality would not be needed to defeat the idea of incommensurability. Any
conception that can give rise to an ordinal ranking of preferences will do.
59 This passage is not easy to interpret. Marx says that use-value is both "conditioned by the physical
properties of the commodity" and is "the physical body of the commodity itself'. This appears to be a
flat contradiction. Nothing can be conditioned by something else, and be identical to that something
else, at the same time. Regardless, it seem clear that Marx is trying for a conception of "use-value" that
is as "materialistic" and "objective" as possible.
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Marx's argument trades on defining use-value in such a way that it cannot be
quantitative, implicitly assuming this to be the only possible conception, and then
using this definition to dismiss use-value. This is done on the grounds of not being
quantitative (and thus commensurable). This argument says more about the
peculiarity of his definition than about the influence of utility on price.
Although it has already been argued that Marx's argument from incommensurability
is fallacious, and hence his argument for his theory of value unsupported, it is
instructive to see how this argument develops further. On the opening pages of
Capital he writes that, if two commodities are traded, this implies that "a common
element of identical magnitude exists in two different things"(1976: 127). This
"common" (commensurate) element will be found to be labour-time (128).
The idea of a "common element" has been discussed above, the idea that this exists in
"identical magnitude" should give pause. Marx does not argue for the above idea, he
asserts it to be self-evident that trade is only possible between commodities that are,
in some sense "equal". In the rather rudimentary explication of the relation between
utility and price given earlier in this chapter it was shown that the idea of equality
between traded objects is nowhere needed to explain a given trade. Indeed, if there is
anything to the idea of an agent-relative conception of value - and it has served
economists well for over a hundred years - then the idea of equality between traded
objects is not only not self-evident, but a conceptual impossibility. There seems to be
no other way to explain Marx's statement, and the careless way in which it is made, as
the result of uncritically accepting the idea that the phrase "value of a commodity" has
a quite literal sense.
With these challenges to an agent-relative conception of value having been discussed,
it is now time to look at the theory of value that supplanted that of the Classical
economists. This is the theory of Marginal utility.
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4. The Marginalists
4.1. The Basic Marginalist Idea and its Relevance
The Theory of Marginal Utility was originally proposed by Gossen in 1854. It was
mostly ignored until independently formulated by Jevons (1862 in outline, 1871 in
full), Menger (1871) and Walras (1874)60. Once accepted, it signalled the end of
Classical economics and the rise of the Neo-Classical school; the main difference lies
in the rejection of the labour theory of value and it's replacement with a "subjective"
theory of value based on an agent-relative, and hedonist, theory of utility.
The basic idea behind the theory of marginal utility is not dissimilar to the analysis
carried out earlier in this chapter. It does contain certain extra assumptions and
idealisations in order to arrive at more elegant and manipulable answers. The
following are the most important.
• The law of diminishing utility: For every added unit of a commodity, the total
utility ("pleasure") of the commodity increases, while the additional utility
decreases uniformly. In layman's terms, that means that I like the second Coca-
Cola less than the first, the third less than the second, etc.
• That trade ceases before the stock of buyer or seller is exhausted.
• The infinite divisibility of commodities.
The reasoning underlying the doctrine of marginal utility is very simple, and rests on
the fact that no person will trade at a disadvantage to himself. If A and B are trading
salt for pepper, the trade can start at some arbitrary exchange relation (price), for
instance one handful for two handfuls. If A is the person originally in possession of
salt, every unit of salt that he gives up is progressively more valuable, and every unit
of pepper that he gains is less valuable. Once the last unit of salt is equal in utility to
the last traded unit of pepper he will cease trading, since any further trade will be at
his disadvantage. Whereupon B, if he still wishes to trade, can change the exchange
60 See Kauder (1965) for an excellent account of the history of the theory. Another excellent
introduction can be found in Ross (1999). Ross also discusses the period after Marginalism in an
accessible manner.
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relation by offering more pepper per unit of salt. It is now again to A's advantage to
trade, and trade will continue until one party again finds that his last traded unit are
equal in utility. Now the other can again entice him to trade by changing the exchange
relation. This process will cease once both parties find that their last traded units are
equal in utility and thus stop at the same time. They are now said to be in equilibrium.
This means that the marginal utilities of both parties individually are the reciprocal of
the exchange relation between the two commodities, if this weren't the case then trade
would continue. This also means that a consumer buying a given product in
increments will keep buying until the last commodity bought has the same utility as
the money surrendered. Thus, at equilibrium, marginal utility is equal to price.
The above reasoning is consistent with the analysis made earlier in the chapter?'. But,
instead of utility setting a range of possible prices, price is now exactly equal to
marginal utility due to the extra assumptions. This allows for the elegant
mathematical description of the conditions under which economic systems will result
in equilibria, as well as for understanding as to the way certain factors in such an
equilibrium interrelate in order to achieve these equilibria'". This work was most
comprehensively carried out by Walras - which is why Schumpeter singles him out as
the greatest of economists.
The Marginalists explicitly conceived of utility as a real entity, to be equated with
what we call pleasure and pain'". This allowed for the construction of models and the
derivation of theorems which still, in some form or other, lie behind much of modem
economics. This, however, is not to say that modem economics is necessarily
hedonist. Economists later discovered that these ideas, discovered by way of the
hedonist approach, can also be arrived at without making any such assumptions as to
human motivation. This was done by stripping the concept of utility from
psychological and hedonist associations down to the bare minimum needed for
61 Except for differences in terminology, the analysis made earlier in this chapter is also made by
Jevons (1911: 118-127) himself. Here it is done for the special case of indivisible commodities.
62 It also marked a leap forward in the mathematization of economics. Jevons' preface to his Theory of
Political Economy is also a historically fascinating manifesto for the increased use of mathematics in
economics.
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economic theory. This achievement ranks as one of the greatest in economic history,
and will be discussed below.
First, however, it will be instructive to see to what degree the Marginalists managed to
purge themselves of the conceptual confusions regarding value that seem to lie behind
some of the statements of Smith and Marx. This will also present the opportunity of
extending the analysis made earlier in this chapter by discussing the determinants of
utility. This will be done mainly with reference to Jevons, for no reason greater than
the fact that he was, in addition to being an economist, also a philosopher. The
differences between his version and the other contemporary versions of the theory
arise at a level well beyond what is necessary for the discussion of this chapter.
4.2 The Marginalist Conception of Utility
Jevons, after explicitly stating that his work is built on Benthamite foundations
(1911:28), considers the food eaten by a person in a day, and analyses the utility of
the successive portions. The essence of his analysis is contained in the graph below,
where the y-axis represents utility and the x-axis the amount of the commodity:
63 They were, however, not all hedonists in the full sense. Some believed hedonist motivation to be true
only in "lower" matters like economic activity, but insufficient to account for all behaviour. See
Kauder (1911: 93-97).
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a
q Quantity of food
The following should be noted:
• The y-axis is not touched because the first increment has "infinite utility". This
implies that total utility is also infinite This "infinite utility" is due to the fact that
food protects from starvation (Jevons, 1911: 45).
• The utility per unit does not decrease relative to a possible world, but just
decreases "in-itself'.
• Price is determined by marginal utility, which is quite low and represented by line
aq.
• Utility IS a fundamental datum, and decreases as a function of the amount
consumed. This is due to the law of decreasing marginal utility.
The above "marginal utility curve" contains the essence of the revolutionary ideas
behind marginalism'". Yet it still contains the result of the type of conceptual
confusion found in Smith and Marx.
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Jevons' does not allow the curve to touch the y-axis, since the total utility of food is
infinite. This seems similar to Smith's idea that water has great utility because it is
needed to maintain life. It was discussed above why this is incorrect, the fact that
water as such maintains life does not confer any great utility on any particular
concrete instance of it. In a similar way Jevons' idea that the first increment of food
consumed (and hence the total food consumed) protects from starvation is, as far as
the measure relevant to price is concerned, fallacious65. For, if the consumer cannot
purchase any particular "first exemplar" of "food", then surely nothing prohibits him
from buying another "first exemplar" of "food". And, since utility is a difference
between states, the nature of the second state, and hence the possibility of other food,
plays a large role in determining the utility of any particular piece of food.
Jevons' definition of utility is a standard hedonist one (1911: 38-39), yet he does not
explicitly state that the utility of any particular commodity should be seen as a
difference between possible states. Yet the assumption that it is a "difference", and
hence that what happens if we do not get something helps to determine the value of
that something, is needed if he wishes to say that food is valuable because, without it,
we starve. But the full implication of this is not realised by this very same statement.
For if utility is a difference, and an attempt is made to determine the utility of any
specific quantity of food, then all other food in the world becomes a potential
replacing commodity. Again, as with Smith, he seems to be under the spell of the idea
of the value of food as such, yet food as such is never traded, only parts of it.
Jevons and his fellow Marginalists chastised the Classical economists for a failure to
distinguish between the total utility of a commodity and the utility of any particular
part of it. Such failure was thought to be the source of paradoxes like the one
64 Something roughly like it is still used in textbooks today for heuristic purposes, as it provides an
intuitively plausible account of the relation between the amount and utility of a commodity.
65 The false statement that the fust increment of food protects against starvation can be made
analytically true by taking "fust increment" to refer to whatever piece of food I eat fust. In such a case,
if I do not have a fust increment, then eating a second increment is impossible by definition. Here a
distinction needs to be drawn between "a piece of food which happens to be the fust increment and
hence can be replaced by another piece of food which will then happen to be the fust increment" and
the "fust increment" proper. It is possible that Jevons does not quite distinguish between the two at all
times. I am interpreting Jevons as using the fust definition throughout, since if he used the second
throughout his analysis would have no bearing on economics whatsoever. "First increments", in the
sense that would make Jevons statement trivially true, are not what are bought and sold on a market,
rather a large amount of potential "first increments" are bought and sold.
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concerning diamonds-and-water. It was already shown, above, that the distinction
between total and marginal utility is not necessary to dismiss the diamonds-and-water
paradox. Rather the problem lies with not fully realising the implication of seeing
utility to be a difference between possible states, and not a quality of an object in a
state. This is ironic, since the same conceptual confusion that led the Classical
economists to the problem involves Jevons and company in the same paradox, except
that they can solve it by relating price to marginal utility'", instead of utility.
In the great founding work of modem economics, Smith's Wealth of Nations, he
frequently interrupts his analysis for "digressions". These digressions sometimes run
over a hundred pages. There are even occasionally digressions within digressions. The
above remarks regarding Jevons and his fellow Marginalists pose interesting
conceptual questions regarding the "diamonds-and-water" paradox. Mainly because
the topic has been raised by the remarks made above, but also because they are
somewhat interesting in themselves, I ask the reader to allow me one such digression.
4.3 A Digression: The Diamonds-and-water Paradox
The diamond-and-water paradox was a central problem for the classical economists.
Smith (and Ricardo) use it to dismiss utility as a determinant of price and establish an
objective theory of value. Yet any number of authors prior to Smith had resolved the
problem by making price depend on utility and scarcity (Schumpeter, 1994: 301).
Smith himself occasionally availed himself of this solution (see footnote 8) , yet he
did not use it in the Wealth of Nations.
The problem with stating price to be determined by utility and scarcity is that this is
not a full solution. The author who uses it must still be able to explain why such
disparate elements are relevant, and more importantly, how they interrelate. In other
words a full solution needs to explain why, when there is less of a thing, it will tend to
cost more, and not just assert that it does. This was accomplished by the Marginalist
"law of diminishing utility". The idea that more of a thing will result in a lower price
was seen as the result of the common psychological observation that any additional
unit of a good will be used to satisfy a less pressing need than its predecessor. In this
66 Modem textbooks that mention the paradox tend to give the Marginalists the credit for the first
defmitive solution (Samuelson, 1989: 455).
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way, if there is a lot of something, we can be sure that the last few available units
aren't of great use relative to the first. And, since price is equal to marginal utility, it
is precisely the last few units that determine price.
The first problem with the above is that, while marginal utility is equal to price at
equilibrium, it does not determine it. There is no way of determining the marginal
utility of a good prior to and independently of a given exchange. Rather marginal
utility is itself a function of the price at which a good can be had. In this way marginal
utility and price co-determine each other. And yet this does not seem to bar the "law
of diminishing utility" from being an explanation of "why more costs less". It seems
reasonable to suppose that if two states are identical, except for the fact that all people
in one state have more of a given good than the same people do in state two, then the
good can be expected to trade for less in the first state. Such a lower price can then
coherently be ascribed to the law of diminishing utility.
I would contend, however, that while the law of diminishing utility can sometimes
explain "why more costs less", it does not solve the diamonds-and-water paradox.
This is because there is no paradox to solve, conceptual clarity can get rid of the
problem before the need for any economic theory arises. Why this is the case was
touched upon when Adam Smith was discussed earlier in this chapter. This
explanation will now be developed somewhat.
The "law of diminishing utility" is not the only explanation of "why more costs less".
Even if total utility increased as a function of amount in a rather erratic way, and not
as proposed by the law of diminishing utility, it would still be possible to show that
"more costs less".
The following passage from Bohm-Bawerk, a second-generation Marginalist and
follower of Menger, contains the basic idea behind such an explanation. Bohm-
Bawerk follows the general marginalist line by stating that price is determined by
marginal utility, but then pauses to consider certain seeming exceptions:
A coronation festival is being celebrated. Admission to this interesting
event is by card, and the cards may be obtained gratis but they are non-
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transferrable, and are issued only on application in person. I posses one of
these cards. If I lost it, I should not have to forego the pleasure of
attending the festivity, but should have to put in another personal
application for a card. What possession of the card therefore really means
for me in that case is that I am relieved of the unpleasant burden of going
to the proper office and making my request for a card (1959: 178).
In terms of the analysis carried out earlier, it should be fairly clear what is at stake in
the above case. Bohm-Bawerk considers the utility of the card, and realises that,
should he lose the card, he will simply replace it with another. This implies that the
two possible worlds, one in which he uses the old card and one in which he obtains a
new one, do not differ in any way with regard to matters intrinsic to the commodity
(going to the festival). Hence the utility of the card must vest in something else, here
the utility of the card is the result of the fact that possessing it means I do not have to
go through the process of getting another.
The problem with the above is that making utility depend on the degree of difficulty
of getting something seems to sound dangerously close to a labour theory of value.
Bohm-Bawerk opposes this interpretation emphatically (1959: 179). He states that the
value of a good always vests in its subjective utility, here this subjective utility just
happens to consist in the avoidance of "some painfulness or troublesomeness" (1959:
179). He also states that the above state of affairs which give rise to the seeming
exception will not occur very often, and that when it does it will "involve only trifling
or insignificant matters" (1959: 178).
It is here where the analysis carried out earlier in this chapter allows for an interesting
development of the above logic. Rather than treating Bohm-Bawerk's special case as
a strange exception that can be ignored, it can be shown that something similar to it is,
in fact, the general case for all commodities. Hence the logic that Bohm-Bawerk
identified above is far from trivial, rather it can be extremely useful in getting a rough
idea of how prices are determined.
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4.3.1 Performance Disutility and Utility - Statement
Some definitions are necessary before Bohm-Bawerk's example can be fruitfully
discussed. The term "performance" will be used to denote all actions necessary to
acquire a given commodity. The actions needed to acquire a given commodity are
normally actions we would choose not to perform if they didn't stand in a causal
relation to acquiring a given commodity. Or in other words, performance tends to
have negative utility or disutility, in the decontextualised sense. "Performance
disutility" then means the negative utility of a given performance. This is understood
as the difference in utility between a possible world in which a good is obtained
without doing anything (where it "falls into my lap" so to speak) and a world in which
it is obtained by whatever means.
What Bohm-Bawerk sees as an "exceptional case" can be, in a sense, generalised by
making the particular aspects of his example less restrictive. The first peculiar aspect
of his example is that the card to the coronation is obtained for free (or "gratis".) "For
free" here does not constitute "without a cost", in the economic sense. No action can
be cost-free if cost is defined as "all things given up in making a choice". To choose
any possible world is to forego all others, these other possible worlds amount to a
"cost', in this sense'". "For free" here rather means that the type of thing that is
usually foregone in acquiring a commodity, is not foregone, presumably this refers to
"money" as a numeraire for other marketable commodities. The same effect as is
achieved by Bohm-Bawerk's "gratis" can be obtained by simply speaking of a
possible world in which the commodity was obtained at no price. Here "price" again
simply refers to the type of thing that one normally surrenders in acquiring an object,
and usually constitutes one side of an exchange-relation.
The second peculiar aspect of Bohm-Bawerk's example is that an identical
replacement commodity will be obtained if the original is lost. Again, this does not
have to be a peculiar occurrence. For a wide variety of commodities it is possible, if I
67 Or, as an economist would say, all choices have an "opportunity cost".
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do not choose the original commodity, to obtain an identical68 replacement. Hence I
can simply speak of a possible world in which an identical replacement commodity is
obtained. It will not, however, always be the case that obtaining the identical
replacement is my next best option. (Indeed, this is never the case for infinitely
divisible goods.) In such cases performance disutility does not equal utility as in
Bohm-Bawerk's example. But, and this is the central point, there is still a relation
between performance disutility and utility that allows for some insight into economic
phenomena.
This relation works as follows. Consider the possible world in which the commodity
at price zero is not bought, i.e. the "second best option". This possible world can
contain an identical replacement commodity, or not. The question as to whether it will
include an identical replacement commodity or not will depend on whether the world
of the replacement commodity has higher utility than the world in which the identical
replacement commodity is not bought. For the sake of clarity, let's use the following
definitions:
World 1: The possible world in which commodity x is bought at a price of zero.
World 2: The possible world in which an identical replacement commodity (x') is
obtained by whatever means (making, finding, buying).
World 3: The possible world in which neither x nor any other identical
replacement commodity is obtained.
Remember that it has been established that the utility of x is the difference between
world 1 and the next best world, and that this utility sets the range of possible prices.
If world 2 is the next best world, then the utility of x is equal to, and determined by,
the difference in performance disutility between x at price zero and x'. Thus this
difference in performance disutility determines the maximum price.
68 Identical to mean a good of the same genus, where I am indifferent between the original and the
replacement, all else being equal. For example, most people would be indifferent between any two
particular beers of the same brand, any two cans of com, etc.
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If world 3 is the next best possible world, then it follows that the utility of x at price
zero is smaller than the difference between the performance disutilities of x at price
zero and x'. Thus this difference in performance disutility represents a maximum to the
utility of x at price zero.
It follows that, no matter which world is the relevant one to the determination of
utility, utility can never rise above the difference between the performance disutilities
of x at price zero and x'. This difference in performance disutilities represents a limit
to utility, it must always be equal to, or smaller than, this quantity.
To simplify the rule we wish to arrive at, matters first need to be complicated further.
It would be preferable to speak of the performance disutility of the identical
replacement commodity itself, instead of a difference between performance
disutilities. To arrive at this formulation, consider a possible world in which the
performance disutility of x itself at price zero becomes progressively less. It should be
clear that all this accomplishes is to increase the difference in performance disutility
between x at price zero and x'. Hence, even if the performance disutility of x at price
zero is disregarded, and we just refer to the performance disutility of x', the
performance disutility of x' will still represent a limit to the difference in performance
disutilities between x at price zero and x'.
Hence the following situation anses: the performance disutility of an identical
replacement commodity is a limit to the difference between the performance
disutilities of the first commodity and the identical replacement commodity, which is
an upper limit to utility. Or, using the simplification explained above, no commodity
can ever have a higher utility than the performance disutility of its identical
replacement.
4.3.2 Performance Disutility and Utility - Relevance
The above reasoning is useful, in that it enables one to gain some insight into the
determination of utility. There is a sense in which utility is a fundamental datum, and
questions regarding more or less utility are the province of psychology rather than
economics. But the above formulation circumvents this problem. If the utility of a
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good can never be higher than the performance disutility of its identical replacement,
then an understanding of changes in performance disutility can help towards an
understanding of changes in the magnitude of utility, and hence price.
Consider again the diamonds-and-water paradox. Neither the utility of a diamond or a
quantity of water can be higher than the utility of its identical replacement. Hence,
provided that water is plentiful and that diamonds are hard to obtain, it follows that
water cannot have a high utility, but that diamonds can. Here the paradox is resolved
without reference to any "law of diminishing utility". Utility and "scarcity" do not
factor into price as two independent elements. Rather possible price is exclusively set
by utility, and possible utility is limited by performance disutility.
This then provides a second reason why "more costs less". If the earth contains fifty
exemplars of a particular commodity in one state, and contains a hundred exemplars
of the same commodity in another state, then, all else being equal, the commodities in
the second state will tend to be cheaper. What might well happen is that the
"performance disutility per unit" of obtaining a specific instance of the commodity
will fall. This need not be for any reason deeper than the fact that the commodities in
the second state are much more likely to be close to me, i.e. I don't have to walk so
far to get them. Here this difference between the two states can be accounted for by
saying that the commodity has become less scarce, in the sense that a greater amount
is available. Or it can equally well be said that the amount of effort needed to obtain
any given instance of the commodity has fallen. The difference is merely verbal; the
important aspect is the ratio of performance disutility to units obtained.
The concept "performance disutility per unit" can account for both the intuitive
plausibility of a scarcity theory of value and a labour theory of value. If "more
suddenly costs less", then this could well be due to the fact that a fall in performance
disutility per unit has lead to a fall in utility, as explained above. If I focus on the
"unit" part of performance disutility per unit I will see this as a confirmation of the
scarcity theory of value. Simply put, the same effort suddenly produces more of the
good. If I focus on the "performance disutility" part, I will see this as a confirmation
of a labour theory of value. In other words, it is suddenly easier to obtain a fixed
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amount of the good. In this sense the phenomena is equally well "explained" by both
ideas.
Another way to state the above is by saying that scarcity is a function of "amount
available". Amount is a quantitative notion, but so is "available"; availability is
clearly a matter of degree. And this "degree of availability" will have to be a matter of
how hard any particular exemplar is to obtain, i.e. "performance disutility per unit".
Such an explanation, however, is only partial. For, although performance disutility
sets a limit to utility, it is only rarely that it will be equal to it.
The law of diminishing utility is not, then, the only possible explanation for why
"more costs less" that was available to the Marginalists. Rather there is another
explanation, this one is based on the insight that no commodity can have a utility that
is greater than the performance disutility of its identical replacement. This allows for
some rough insights into economic processes. Any factor that will systematically
change performance disutility will create the possibility that utility might rise, and
hence price. The possible factors that can cause such an increase are probably infinite.
If something takes less time to make, or suddenly becomes plentiful, or becomes less
dangerous, or the social stigma attached to a specific way of obtaining a commodity
disappears, or whatever factor is identified that has a systematic influence on
performance disutility, then the utility, and price, of such a commodity might well
fall69.
The above has been a rather involved analysis, in order to make a simple point. As
regards the measure behaviourally relevant to the determination of prices, it is
incorrect to say that water has high utility. The above analysis demonstrates why this
is not inconsistent with believing water to be a pre-requisite for life. The main point to
grasp is that supply-conditions do not enter into price independently of utility, rather
they act as a set of constraints on the utility that a commodity can possibly have. This
69 J B Say was one of the few Classical defenders of a utility theory of value. An inability to understand
the above logic, however, seriously seems to have damaged the credibility of his argument. The
Classical economists (including Say) agreed that, if the cost of production of a good were to fall, the
price would fall. Say also maintained that price is determined by utility. This seemed to lead to a
reductio ad absurdum of his argument in a dispute with Ricardo, since "Ricardo was able to object that
according to Say's treatment, if cost of production fell, utility fell" (O'Brien, 1975: 99). This struck all
as absurd, but, as shown above, is actually correct.
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insight is the result of realising the full implication of seeing utility as a difference
between possible states, and not a quality of an object. It is my contention that, while
the Marginalists took a step forward in defeating the idea that utility is a quality of an
object, they did not pursue this insight far enough. They still accepted the idea that the
total utility of the water in a given exchange is infinite, it was argued above that this
rests on a conceptual confusion that they shared with Adam Smith.
There is a sense in which the above analysis is of only historical importance. In the
Classical period the diamonds-and-water paradox played an important role in
economic theory. It gave the Classical economists an excuse to disregard subjective
theories of value in favour of cost-of-production theories of value. The Marginalist
solution to the "problem of diamonds-and-water", even if unnecessary, did manage to
tum this problem into a non-issue. This paved the way for an agent-relative
conception of value, which eventually managed to rid itself of psychological laws like
the "law of diminishing utility". In revealed preference theory, which is the modem
conception of utility, "utility" is defined in terms of behaviour. Here the need for
psychological conceptions of utility and performance disutility, as used in the
extended discussion of the diamond-and-water paradox above, does not arise. This
does, however, imply that something like the diamonds-and-water paradox, which
depends on a conception of utility distinct from behaviour, cannot even be stated.
Historically it probably does not matter that the way of getting rid of the paradox still
contained the seed of the problem that gave rise to it. In this sense the above analysis,
if correct, is of interest only to the economic historian 70.
In the context of this thesis, however, it does serve to illustrate a larger issue. This
thesis argues for an agent-relative conception of value. As such it is being claimed
that agent-independent conceptions of value are fallacious, and lead to unnecessary
problems and confusion. This idea is well demonstrated by the history of the
70 An analysis that has the same consequence with regards to the influence of changes in the difficulty
of obtaining a commodity to its price can be found in Hicks' Value and Capital (1962). Hicks manages
to derive a conclusion consistent with the above without any reference to psychological utility, by
reformulating statements regarding utility as statements regarding the exchange relation between
related goods. The conclusion above is consistent with Hicks' analysis regarding goods that are perfect
substitutes (1962: 49). The analysis in terms of psychological, cardinal utility employed above is used,
however, since the diamonds and water paradox cannot be stated without reference to psychological
utility. Hence any approach that uses behavioural utility avoids the problem, rather than solves (or
"dissolves") it.
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diamonds-and-water paradox. Here, in the case of Smith, a simple conceptual problem
lead to a theory of economic value that was very influential, and is generally
conceded to be fallacious. And, even when the problem was resolved by the
Marginalists, the solution was still somewhat fortuitous in that it did not get at the root
of the problem - the very formulation of the paradox. It also blinded them to a way of
relating supply-conditions to utility that did not depend on the "law of diminishing
utility", an idea that economists would view with increasing suspicion as time went
by7l. This way of relating supply-conditions to utility can be, as was shown above, a
rather useful way of getting a rough, qualitative grasp on the question as to "where
prices come from". If the above analysis is correct, then the Marginalists did miss a
source of possible insight. The fundamental reason for this is one that I would also
blame for some of the confusion regarding value-judgements in philosophy. This is
the inability, even when explicitly renouncing an agent-independent conception of
value, to fully liberate ourselves from the assumptions and conceptual structures that
come with it.
This has been accomplished by the modem economic conception of utility, to which
we now tum.
5. The Modern Conception of Utility
5.1 Revealed Preference Theory
As the major accomplishments of Marginalism became evident, economists
increasingly turned to its theoretical foundations in order to shore it up against
possible attack. Here the "taints" of hedonism and "psychologism" were the biggest
issues of concern. One particular problem was the cardinal conception of utility. Here
a real breakthrough was made in 1906 when Pareto, using a technique pioneered by
Edgeworth, reformulated the results of the original Marginalists without employing a
cardinal conception of utility. This did not quite constitute a definitive refutation of
the truth of cardinality, rather he showed that everything economists need to say about
71 See Kauder (1965: 135-149)
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utility can be stated in terms of ordinal utility, which is the weaker assumption and
therefore preferable 72.
The debates concerning the different assumptions of Marginalism need not concern us
here.73 It eventually culminated in the work of Paul Samuelson, who finally stripped
the psychological content from the theory of utility in 1938, rendering it purely
formal. Today this is known as "revealed preference theory", and works as follows.
Samuelson defines utility purely in terms of the behaviour of agents. If an actor
chooses A over B, then she is said to have "revealed a preference for A over B". In
this way her behaviour can be used to define the concepts of "preferring" one thing
over another or "being indifferent,,74 between two possible options. By employing
these concepts the behaviour of an agent can be used to construct an ordinal
"preference scale" expressing her preferences with reference to possible combinations
("bundles" in economicspeak) of commodities. Samuelson's great merit here lay in
showing that, if such an agent operates with a consistent preference scale over time,
then this assumption can do all the work that an economist desires from a "theory of
value".
This consistency amounts to two requirements: completeness and transitivity. A
preference scale is complete if, for any possible choice, an agent can be said to prefer
one option to another, or be indifferent between them. The preference scale is
transitive if an agent who prefers a to b, and b to c, also prefers a to c.
Hence the fundamental assumption of micro-economics becomes, not the Marginalist
"pleasure-seeking", but the consistency of agents. The question now becomes one of
72 This is done by using the idea of an "indifference curve". An indifference curve joins all possible
combinations of the two or more goods between which an actor would be indifferent. If this curve has
certain properties all the consequences that previously followed from the law of diminishing utility and
cardinality can be shown to follow. Hence cardinal utility and the law of diminishing utility no longer
needs to serve as a basis for economic theory.
73 A good summary of the different issues, and how they were discussed, can be found in Kauder
(1965: 116-175).
74 It is not quite self-evident how "indifferent" is supposed to "cash out" behaviourally, unless an actor
is suppsed to act like Buridan's ass. Samuelson's work, and the debate as such, took place within a time
when there was a general concern with behaviourism so as to render economics "scientific". More than
one economist during this time sarcastically asked exactly how long an actor must dither between
options before she can be judged "indifferent".
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justifying the assumption of consistency. One line to take would simply be to
maintain that people simply are, in this sense, consistent. This is an option which few
economists would accept, although it has been defended, as will be discussed below.
Another line to take would be to treat it as a simplifying assumption that allows for
great insight, while not being actually correct. The justification for using it can run as
follows. Actors with consistent preferences, and perfect information, would result in
markets in equilibrium. Yet it can be conceded that neither preferences, nor
information, is ever perfectly consistent or complete. But if the actual operation of the
market is studied, the economist does not find total chaos. While the data that is found
will never be perfectly regular, it is clear that there is some pattern and order. Hence
the two assumptions can be used as idealisations to understand the nature of this
order.
These two options can be used by writers who share a common assumption, namely
that there is an actual sense in which an individual can be said to "have preferences".
Here such a writer would interpret "revealed preference theory" in the following
manner: preferences are a reality above and beyond behaviour, yet can only be known
in terms of behaviour. Such an interpretation takes the phrase "revealing a preference"
literally, and not just as a reformulation of behavioural data.
The above way of reading "revealed preference theory" would not amount to the total
abandonment of "psychology". Such an interpretation would still be committed to
some account of folk psychology, or teleological description, that does not totally
"cash out" in terms of behaviour.
The third option is more radical, and can use revealed preference theory" without
taking, in any sense, a realist stance concerning teleological description. It utilises the
logic of evolutionary processes, and is known as the "money-pump" argument. It
works by considering what would happen in a series of exchanges to an agent whose
preferences are cyclical, i.e. does not meet the transitivity condition.
Consider a given market, populated by actors who have complete preferences
regarding any possible commodity-bundle on such a market. If any actor on such a
market has consistent preferences, then the goods of any inconsistent actors will
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gradually accrue to her. This is because an actor with inconsistent preferences will, in
effect, be willing to trade at erratically shifting exchange-relations that guarantees she
will, after a round of exchanges, end up with less of all marketable commodities than
she started. If this continues the actor will sooner or later end up with no
commodities, and disappear off the market. While the actor can still affect the market
by extra-economic means (stealing, begging, etc.), she will have disappeared qua
economic actor.
Here "evolutionary logic" is at work. Actors are assumed to be consistent, since, if
they are not, they won't be around for long enough to seriously upset the model based
on assuming they are.
The first point to note about the above is that it is a very elegant method of getting rid
of teleological description as an irreducible primary. It cashes out all teleological
language into evolutionary stable behaviour; hence actors are treated "as if' they are
actualising a set of goals. This is philosophically quite elegant, in that it frees
economics from any possible problem that there can be with folk psychology, without
seeming to lose anything in the process. Whether it can be applied to a given market
hinges on the factors governing the applicability of evolutionary logic in general. It
would depend on whether at least one consistent agent exists, whether the actors have
a sufficient life-span, and on whether the trades are numerous enough, etc. for the
evolutionary effect (elimination of inconsistency) to take effect. Whether this is true
will depend on what is taken to constitute the particular "market". In the case of what
common usage takes the "economic market" to be it would seem that there is a strong
prima facie case to be made for this application of evolutionary logic.
The consequence of the money-pump argument that is important for the rest of the
discussion is the following. Behaviour can either be of the type that exhibits, in terms
of marketable goods, the type of order predicted by economic theory or chaos. The
type of behaviour that will result in order must have the following property: the
behaviour of the agents must exhibit a type of consistency that forbids money-
pumping in terms of marketable goods. This will be referred to as "e-consistency".
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Behaviour can fail to be e-inconsistent, and still be consistent in a rather obvious
sense of the term. Imagine the possibility of a "gift". I wish to give A a certain
amount of money, yet I know that A will be too proud to take this. Here I can engage
in exactly the type of behaviour that the inconsistent actor who was money-pumped in
the example above engaged in. Indirectly I will manage to enrich A, yet he will not be
aware of it.
If I do this then, independently of whether it was done intentionally or not, my ability
to command marketable commodities has fallen in the same way as has that of the
inconsistent actor. If I do this thing a lot, i.e. I wish to give A a lot of goods, or have a
large number of people who I wish to enrich, I can eventually end up owning nothing.
The market cares not one jot for my motivation, I end up being unable to influence it
as economic actor in the same sense as any less altruistic actor. Yet there is an
obvious sense in which my preferences can still be consistent. Here I can be said to
buy "the knowledge that I have helped A", if this new "commodity" is introduced
then my actions can again be consistent with an ordering of preferences that includes
this commodity. The ordering of preferences that allows for this sense of consistency I
will refer to as "actual consistency", or "a-consistency".
The above point involves some subtlety, and it is vital for the discussion to follow that
it is not misunderstood. If one simply defines money-pumping as a process that occurs
when an actor is driven off the market because of inconsistent actual preferences,
then the actor who keeps giving gifts has not been money-pumped. Rather the actor's
ability to influence the market has decreased because acquiring the type of commodity
("feeling benevolent") that increases his utility, also decreases his "fitness". Rational
choice theory would have no difficulty in pronouncing his actions consistent.
The problem with the above reasomng, however, is that economists require the
consistency-condition to have certain behavioural consequences. And a-consistency,
i.e. the sense in which rational choice pronounces an actor to be consistent when
giving a gift, is too weak a requirement to lead to these behavioural consequences.
The consistency-condition is used in economics in order to deduce that certain
regularities will obtain in the market. But, if any action can be interpreted as the
expression of consistent preferences, then the consistency-condition does not exclude
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any action or occurrence whatsoever. It would be consistent with a market in which
all we can find is absolute chaos. This type of hypothetical market would also be
consistent with every single actor having wildly inconsistent preferences. If even the
most chaotic market logically possible would be consistent with both inconsistent
preferences and consistent preferences, then it follows that the consistency-
assumption cannot do what economists need it to do.
Here an extra constraint is needed in order to exclude the expression of consistent
preferences, where the behaviour resulting from such consistent preferences could
equally welll have been the result of inconsistent preferences. One way to do this
would be to state that the actor must be consistent in terms of the commodities with
reference to which the market is defined. Certain regularities with regard to this
market can then be deduced.
Note that even e-consistency would not gurantee that one cannot still disappear from a
given market. If I am consistent with reference to the commodities that exist in the
market, but keep buying commodities that cannot be traded again, and therefore
decrease my market fitness, I can still disappear as actor from such a market. But
certain market regularities would still obtain. Therefore e-consistency is here only
meant to relate to consistency with reference to commodities that, if I am consistent
with reference to them, certain regularities will obtain in the market. E-consistency
does not necessarily amount to market-fitness, but a lack of it definitely amounts to
non-fitness in a given market.
The above distinction means that an actor can, m terms of a-consistency, be
consistently maximising a set of preferences, while also, with regards to e-
consistency, be acting inconsistently and being money-pumped. Note that the
commodities with reference to which an actor's e-consistency is determined will
always be a sub-set of the commodities with reference to which his a-consisteny is
determined. What is the to stop an economist from simply including all the
commodities necessary for apparent e-inconsistency to tum into a-consistency?
Two problems emerge here. The type of commodities with reference to which an
actor can be said to be consistent might well be commodities like "benevolence",
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"prestige", "pleasure", etc. A first objection to including these commodities would be
the methodological problem that they might be hard to determine. Methodologically it
might be easier to simply assume that actors are a-consistent, where the commodities
used to define a-consistency are public objects, and to treat this as a useful
simplification.
The second objection strikes to the heart of the money-pump argument. Consider an
actor that is pronounced to be consistent with reference to commodities like
benevolence and prestige. To an objection that this is not the case, the economist can
simply use the money-pump argument, and say that actors are assumed to be so,
because, if they are not, they will disappear from the market. This is true if the objects
with reference to which one is consistent includes TV-sets, bicycles, and the like. But
it does not hold for benevolence or prestige. While we might be able to find some
examples where I can be said to be money-pumped out of prestige, it is not at all clear
that this is always the case, or that the idea of money-pumping makes any sense
whatsoever when applied to commodities like benevolence, sensual pleasure, etc. If I
constantly switch between preferring bicycles to TV-sets, then my ability to influence
the market by providing bicycles or TV-sets will diminish as I get money-pumped.
But if I constantly switch between preferring prestige to sensual pleasure, this need
not affect my ability to provide either", Simply put, the fact that I end up with less
sensual pleasure than I could have, need not influence my ability to provide it, and
thereby influence the market. Hence money-pumps do not apply.
In other words, consistency with regards to the strange commodities needed to tum
otherwise inconsistent behaviour into consistent behaviour is not a strong enough
constraint to justify anything with regards to economic phenomena. An extra
constraint is needed. This could be something to the effect that there is a uniform
relation between my position with regards to "strange" and "non-strange"
commodities, for example my amount of "prestige" is a uniform function of the non-
strange goods I own. But this would be a simplifying assumption with definite
75 This does not only apply to "strange" commodities, but also services. If the "commodities" on a
given market is, for example, "the ability to give legal counsel" or "the ability to play rugby well", etc.,
then inconsistent preferences need not destroy my ability to influence the market by delivering either.
Hence the "money-pump" argument cannot be used to justify the assumption of stable preferences with
regards to these commodities.
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counter-examples, and no improvement on simply talking in terms of e-consistency,
and skipping "strange" commodities altogether.
The fact that a-consistency allows for money-pumping in terms of a given market
means that a-consistency does not necessarily amount to e-consistency. It also seems
to mean that, since what is needed for the application of economic theory to a given
market is e-consistency, showing that apparently strange behaviour is actually a-
consistent does nothing to justify the application of economic theorems to explain the
actions of a-consistent actors. This can only be done once it has been shown that the
specific case of a-consistency implies e-consistency.
The discussion above, and the distinction between e-consistency and a-consistency,
will be of some help in understanding the claims of Gary Becker, an economist who,
as a matter of principle, never takes recourse to inconsistent preferences in order to
explain human behaviour.
5.2 Becker's stable preferences
The assumption of e-consistency amounts to a constraint on behaviour. Yet micro-
economists are often gifted at finding reason and consistency in behaviour that
violates e-consistency in the most flagrant manner. Here no-one stands taller than
Becker, where most would cry "inconsistent" or "irrational" he is always prepared to
defend the consistency of people's actions. The difficulty with this is that it becomes
unclear whether Becker's sense of consistency still places any constraint on human
action. If Becker's sense of "consistent" can be applied to any set of behavioural data,
then it does not serve any obvious purpose. It seemingly cannot be used to justify
economic theorems, since, as explained above, economic theorems do, at least
sometimes, tell us that some things will not happen.
In his justly famous essay, De gustibus non est disputandum (with George Stigler),
Becker claims that the preferences of people do not change". He also doubts whether
different people have different preferences, this doubt seems to extend across different
76 "[O]ne does not argue over tastes for the same reason that one does not argue over the Rocky
Mountains - both are there, will be there next year, too, and are the same to all men" (1977: 76).
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cultures and different times. He chastises economists who, when faced with a seeming
change in preferences, accept this as the explanation of a change in behaviour. Becker
treats it as a fundamental methodological commitment that this is never the case. He
states that to accept such a preference-shift is just to admit ignorance of the true
consistency underlying the apparent inconsistency (1977: 76).
Becker is normally read in two different ways: either as claiming that allowing a shift
in preferences is bad methodology since it gives up on the very idea of explaining a
change in behaviour, or as actually insisting that preferences are stable, period. I think
that, once one gets used to the seeming bizarreness of the idea that preferences
actually are stable, and not even varying between different people, it becomes
reasonably clear that Becker wishes to make both claims77. This is certainly the more
interesting of the two interpretations and, regardless of whether Becker consistently
maintains it, an idea that can be fruitfully discussed within the context of this thesis.
Becker's work has, predictably, been controversial. This is due, both to the above
claims, and to the fact that he does not stay within the realm traditionally reserved fro
"economics". By "economics" Becker means an approach, rather than a subject-
matter. The essence of this "economic approach" is the assumption of maximising
behaviour and stable preferences under conditions of scarcity (1976: 5). Becker uses
these assumptions to investigate areas of human behaviour not normally discussed by
economists. He states that the economic approach can be applied to any human action
whatsoever". Examples of topics that he has treated in this manner include
discrimination (titled: "Price and Prejudice"), criminal punishment, and, notoriously,
fertility and marriage",
77 He explicitly states that his assertion regarding consistent preferences is "an assertion about the
world", but does say that the choice between viewing preferences as mutable or not must be based on
the fruitfulness of the results achieved by using these assumptions (Stigler and Becker, 1977: 76).
78 "[AJll human behaviour can be viewed as involving participants who maximise their utility from a
stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal amount of information and input in a variety of
markets" (1976: 14).
79 These topics, and others are covered in his 1976 collection The Economic Approach to Human
Behaviour. The essays regarding marriage and fertility are written in terms of categories like "the
marriage market", "the optimal sorting of mates", and "the quality of children". These types of
expressions are, unfortunately, often enough to stop some writers from even considering what he has to
say.
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The resonance of Becker's work with this thesis is obvious. He views all human
behaviour as the maximisation of utility. This thesis must ultimately agree with this
statement, but add that "pleasure/goodness" is the only "true utility".
It is not, however, this side of Becker's work which will be explored here. Rather we
will try to make some sense of his claim that preferences are as constant as the Rocky
Mountains (Stigler & Becker, 1977: 76). If Becker is right in this, then surely he must
mean that people are a-consistent. For surely the rather obvious example of a "gift"
used above would make nonsense of all human behaviour being e-consistent.
Becker does refer to what was defined above as a-consistency. The exception to e-
consistency because of the gift was turned into a-consistency in the example used
earlier by introducing a nonmarket commodity, "the knowledge that I have helped A".
Becker achieves a-consistency by continually introducing these type of commodities
when faced with an apparent shift in preferences. Indeed, when it comes to
"commodities", Becker is almost scornful of "ordinary commodities":
That preferences are assumed to be stable do not refer to market goods
and services, like oranges, automobiles, ..[but to] fundamental aspects of
life, such as health, prestige, sensual pleasure, benevolence, or envy, that
do not always bear a stable relation to market goods and services (1976:
5).
5.3 Relevance of Becker
5.3.1 Intentionality
An evaluation of Becker's work falls outside this thesis (and is beyond my
competence). Below an attempt will be made to make it appear less strange, and to
relate e-consistency to a-consistency. One initial point should, however, be clear.
Becker is fully committed to teleological description, he cannot merely be talking
about actors "as if' they pursue goals. As such the flight from "psychology" and
teleological description that seems to reach its peak in the work in Samuelson has now
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come full circle. Becker views an agent pretty much as Bentham would have viewed
him, except that he uses actual preferences as a base rather than pleasure and pain'".
If Becker does not think that there is an actual sense that an actor can "have a
preference", above and beyond mere behaviour, then all his arguments would be
circular. For any "seeming" problem can be made to fit without even trying to be
clever about it. No two choices will ever, if we are prepared to go into minute detail,
have the exact same content. The most minute detail in the specific content of the
choice of an actor can merely be stated to constitute to a "new commodity", and
victory declared.
I wish to make it clear that the above concern is related to more than the truism that an
infinite number of (increasingly bizarre) utility-functions can be constructed that
would be consistent with any specific set of behavioural data. If Becker is not
claiming that there is a matter of fact, over and above behaviour, in virtue of which an
actor can be said to be consistent or inconsistent, then the controversy surrounding his
work makes little sense. For if he is not assuming that preferences are irreducible to
behaviour, then he is only claiming that, for any behavioural data, a reasonable
simple, analytically useful and consistent utility-function can be constructed. This is a
much weaker claim than the claim that there is a sense in which people actually are
consistent, and it is hard to see that this claim could have generated the same
controversy. It also seems clear that Becker does not understand his own work in this
way. When he compares preferences to the Rocky Mountains (1977: 76), he is
presumably not claiming that the Rocky Mountains are a useful theoretical construct
that can be used to explain certain data. Hence Becker's work only makes sense if he
is interpreted as relying on the idea of "truth-conditions" for his claims, above and
beyond mere behaviour.
5.3.2 A-consistency and e-consistency
There need not be anything but a verbal disagreement between someone who asserts
behaviour to be inconsistent, and Becker's insistence that this is never the case. When
80 Becker cites Bentham with approval (1976: 8).
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dealing with e-consistency, we are dealing with a specific market. The assumption of
consistency within this market means that the preferences of actors within this market
can only be given in terms of the things allowed to count as "commodities" within
this market. There can be good reason for restricting the definition of "market", the
best is surely that the definition of a market and the actors in it allows for the
assumption of stable preferences based on the money-pump argument. In other words,
the market is of such a kind that evolutionary logic can take effect. Such an approach
can, surely, be useful.
If an action is pronounced inconsistent in such a market (in terms of the behavioural
standard), then, as explained above, the analyst need not deny that there is another
sense in which the behaviour is consistent. It might have been a case of "surreptitious
gift-giving", or some other "strange" commodity being acquired. A Becker-style
analysis would make the action consistent by adding a commodity, the "joys of gift-
giving" or whatnot. This would be a complementary analysis, not something in
conflict with the first analysis. These analyses must ultimately be judged by the
fruitfulness of their results, not any dogmatism about the stability of preferences.
There is, however, a downside to expanding the definition of "market". If a market is
defined so as to include pretty much anything as either a possible "good" or a possible
"price / shadow price", the money-pump argument no longer works. The logic of
money-pumps can destroy someone in terms of e-consistency, and yet this person
remain a player on Becker's market. As long as any action of mine can influence the
utility of another actor - and a situation where this is not the case is almost
unintelligible - I can use this as leverage. Hence I can still "trade", in the widest
possible sense.
Again the upshot of this, in the context of this thesis, is that teleological description
can then no longer reduce to "as if' -talk. Hence the folk psychology that was so
suspect in economics earlier in the century reappears.
E-consistency is always relative to a specific definition of a market, where this
definition excludes some elements of reality from being either commodities or
influencing the budget-constraint. A-consistency refers to the actual preferences of an
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actor. If there is such a thing we certainly have no grounds for the a priori exclusion
of anything from counting as a commodity or price in terms of it. This also implies
that showing a set of actions to be a-consistent does justify a treatment of such an
action by using economic theorems, etc. It does not justify using the theorems for
markets that have been specified in terms which exclude the use of the goods needed
for a-consistency. But it does justify the use of the theorems to study the same actions,
but using a different definition of market that includes these commodities.
5.3.3 Are Preferences Stable?81
5.3.3.1 Hedonism
Can preferences be said to be stable? In terms of the position of this thesis (and any
hedonist position), the answer is yes. Hedonism basically amounts to saying that,
ultimately, pleasure is the "real good" which is always bought and sold. More
pleasure is always preferred to less pleasure (or: better is preferred to worse) and
hence preferences are transitive.
The more interesting question concerns the relation between pleasure and all the
commodity-bundles in the world. If a "state" is all the true facts at a particular time,
and this is taken to be the ultimate commodity-bundle, then the question can be asked
whether these commodity-bundles are transitively ranked. This would seem to depend
on a claim of supervenience. If the pleasure obtained in a state is a strict consequence
of the state, and the state alone, then the relative pleasure in two states cannot change
without a change in the states themselves. This change in the states would then be the
explanation of the changes in pleasure. If such a supervenience-relation holds, then
hedonism implies that all possible states are transitively ranked, and that this ranking
is fixed82.
81 A slightly different way of going about this would be to simply defme an "agent" in terms of stable
preferences. This is proposed in Ross (2002). Such a conventionalist move would lead to rephrasing the
above question as the question "are people agents?". Ross answers this question in the negative, and
states that people are, at best "sequences of economic agents" (2002: 101).
82 A strict claim of supervenience would even seem to erase the problem concerning intersubjective
utility-comparisons if all phenomenal qualities are taken as strictly supervenient on the non-
phenomenal. The very notion of a "subject" disappears, the non-phenomenal difference between two
people simply simply becomes different facts of different states. The non-phenomenal is always
commensurate, if the phenomenal supervenes upon the non-phenomenal then no "added element" can
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
100
In the above two states preferences, ultimately expressed in terms of states that
include all true facts, are stable. Can the same be said about Becker's "stable
preferences"?
5.3.3.2 Becker
Presumably Becker would not wish for the a priori exclusion of any possible
elements of reality as a possible commodity or shadow-price. If all these possible
elements of reality are again spoken of as states, then it is apparent that a claim of
supervenience would imply again that he is correct. I'll define "wantedness" to be the
"whatever" that causes one state to be chosen over another, regardless of whether this
is one element (hedonism) or a complicated set of interrelated factors. If
"wantedness" is supervenient on the rest of a state, then this amounts to saying that
the wantedness of a state is fixed, unless some other element of reality changes. This
change then serves as the explanation of the change in wantedness. If this is correct,
then there is a fixed ordering of possible states.
The above would seem to suggest one way of interpreting Becker which can remove
quite a bit of confusion, especially where charges of circularity, etc. are involved.
Rather than treating the central distinction as one between stable preferences and
shifting prices, his statements can be "translated" into statements concerning stable
"possible states" and shifting "reachable states".
Consider the following: An economist has defined a market in terms of a given set of
commodities, and has assumed stable preferences in terms of these commodities. This
has been justified by using a money-pump argument. Let two of the commodities be
"hours spent mountain-climbing" and "hours spent bike-riding". If someone suddenly
reveals a preference that contradicts her earlier preference, and the budget-constraint
(defined in terms of the commodities that were specified to constitute the market)
hasn't shifted, then the economist will pronounce her inconsistent. If Becker should
be introduced to suddenly destroy this commensurability. If this is correct then all possible states of all
possible people form one transitive ranking.
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dispute this and say that prices have, somehow shifted, this need not be any more than
a verbal disagreement. The economist might admit that there might be a "shadow-
price", but that it is not one of the things which can be a price in his analysis, and that
he has good reason for having excluded it from his definition of "price".
Assume that the person in the above example (call her Active) has suddenly gotten a
bad case of vertigo. Now Becker might simply say that mountain-climbing has
acquired a shadow-price - the fear experienced while climbing. Now a bigger, more
complex market can again be defined, in terms of which she has always been
consistent.
The above has been cursorily explained before, but the example was created to answer
a question, namely: does Becker only have a verbal disagreements with those who
have made him controversial? Is there a matter of fact at stake here?
I would argue that there is, and that this can best be shown by drawing a distinction
between possible (logically possible) and reachable (physically possible for the actor)
states. In the above example, Becker can say that Active still prefers the state in which
she climbs mountains and has no fear to the state in which she rides a bicycle. But the
vertigo means that "climbing-without-fear" is no longer a reachable state for her.
Rather the state in which she rides a bike is now preferable to the state in which she
climbs a mountain while afraid.
In this way Becker's position can become the claim that all possible states are
transitively ranked, all that ever changes are the states that it is possible to reach. An
"explanation" of a "shift in preferences" now becomes an explanation of why a
formerly reachable state is no longer reachable, or vice versa. A "commodity" can
now be defined as any element of reality that enables one to reach a higher state than
without it. A "price" or "shadow-price" can be defined as any element of a state that
impedes one from reaching a wanted state.
In this version there is, if one accepts intentional description, a matter of fact at stake.
This is the claim that there is a fixed ranking of possible states. This saves Becker's
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claim from meaninglessness or circularity. I would also contend that it makes it a
good deal less strange than the formulation in terms of "prices" and "preferences'Y.
There is a methodological problem in that it seems difficult to determine what would
decide the issue regarding whether possible states are transitively ranked. There is the
related problem that it seems hard to determine, even if they are so ranked, whether a
given explanation of behavioural changes is true or false. A state can become
reachable or unreachable due to a change in brain chemistry or matters similarly hard
to determine. Hence assertions regarding specific behaviour might be, practically
speaking, non-falsifiable. This problem will not be considered here. For now it will
have to suffice to have shown that what Becker is asserting is not a mere tautology.
5.4 Relevance of the Discussion of Revealed Preference to this Thesis
The above discussion, despite its twists and turns, was guided by a single question:
can the economic conception of value get rid of intentionality? The answer seems to
be that it can, but only partly. It can inasmuch as the teleological idiom can get cashed
out in terms of money-pump arguments. It was shown above that such "cashing out"
is limited by two factors. The first is that the specific market under discussion might
not have the particular qualities that enable evolutionary logic to take sufficient effect.
The second limit is, in a sense, a special case of the first. This is were the definition of
"commodity" becomes so wide that it starts to include commodities that fall outside
the logic of "money-pumps". This would be commodities like Becker's "prestige", or
"sensual pleasure", etc84.
Hence economics can avoid intentionality, but not if they wish to say all the types of
things that economists wish to say. The occupation with a behaviourist standard and
extensional description does not seem to be taken all that seriously anymore. In this
sense it can be said that, while economics managed to, in principle, strip away the
psychology at one point, they didn't wait all that long before coming back to it. It
83 On this formulation it must surely be apparent that Becker's refusal to allow for a shifting of
preferences amounts to no more than the assertion that explanation of a change in behaviour is always
possible. His assertion that preferences are stable is basically the assertion that there is a type of
"principle of sufficient reason" for economics.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
103
should be noted, however, that the psychology it came back to is of a considerably
minimalist type. Instead of dubious stuff like cardinal utility or the law of diminishing
utility, it seem only committed to two claims. The first is that teleological description
is, in some sense, okay to treat as an irreducible datum. The second is that preferences
are stable, or at least stable enough to form useful models.
The issue of intentionality has been extensively discussed in philosophy. Although it
is by no means clear that realism about intentionality is wrong, it is clear that such a
position is not self-evidently sound. But it would surely be churlish and "overly
philosophical" for a materialistically inclined philosopher to chide economists for
their reliance on this idea85. Within the context of this thesis, however, such reliance
takes on added relevance. If economists need intentional description, then, I would
argue, hedonism is back.
The economist, if he is a realist about preferences, is basically taking the position that
was referred to in the first chapter as "treating wants or needs as fundamental data,,86.
It was argued that the category "want" cannot be logically fundamental, rather it is
derived from the category "good". If this argument is correct, then, in committing to
"wants", an economist is committed to "good". It was also argued tat this "good" is
what we often refer to as "pleasure". If this is correct then the economist is committed
to hedonism.
I do not wish the above claim to be misunderstood. It would be silly (or at least
unnecessary) for any economist to call himself a hedonist (qua economist) based on
the above concerns. The arguments advanced in chapter one, while I would contend
that they deserve consideration, are not definitive proofs. They depend on tricky
notions like "primary", "qualia", intentionality", etc. that are far from rock-solid. It
would also serve no purpose for an economist to become a hedonist. Whether "wants"
84 Another way of formulating this would be to say that the distinction between "actor" and "economic
actor" gets obliterated.
85 It would seem almost akin to asking economists to give up the perfectly serviceable distinction
between a definition and a statement because of Quine's attack on analyticity. This has been done. See
Hutchison (2000: 204-207) for an argument against this type of philosophical intrusion.
86 "Money-pumps" are, off course, not the only way to "cash out" teleology into something else. One
could also talk about taking the "intentional stance" toward a system, a la Dennet. This option is not
explored in this chapter, both because irreducibility of teleology is an assumption of this thesis and
because this is not how Becker and company understand their own statements.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
104
are treated as pnmary or derived would have no impact on the theorems of
economics, so accepting only the weaker assumption would seem to be the merest
common sense. Hence I would say that, while economists might well be committed to
hedonism if the arguments regarding the unintelligibility of "want" as primary is
correct, they won't in any obvious sense be served by taking cognisance of this
possibility'".
This does not quite apply to any user of the modem economic conception of value.
For the position in this thesis does have one major advantage - preferences can be
judged. Preferences, or, the specific things that are wanted, are not irreducible
primaries for the hedonist. Rather they are the result of some conception regarding
what type of things will lead to pleasure. As such the question whether wanting a
specific thing will lead to pleasure concerns a matter of fact; preference are
"cognitive". This has one very important consequence. The economic conception of
value does not allow for a person to "act against his own best interests", except where
actions are based on mistaken beliefs regarding the world. But if someone was to, for
example, systematically "reveal a preference" for cutting themselves with knives the
economist cannot declare this bad or even irrational. A hedonist has an extra option,
since a person's preferences are themselves "cognitive". The hedonist can, if it is
indeed true, declare the person to be acting against his own interests.
According to the way academia tends to split things up we would not think this type
of judgement to be the job of an economist. Hence the assertion that the economist
need not be hedonist can be saved by a conventionalist move. This would be to say
that, if an economist does pronounce preferences irrational for the above reason, she
is not acting as an economist. This type of thing is largely arbitrary, what is important
however, is that the hedonist position would avoid the possible quietist consequences
that would come from having only the modem economic conception of value.
87 The economist Richard Layard has recently come out in favour of hedonism in economics. In a set of
papers given at LSE he portrays pleasure as a measurable cardinal quantity in the brain, and actors as
pleasure-maximisers. This is done in order to make the claim that economic growth, while a laudable
goal, does not necessarily result in increased happiness (La yard, 2003).
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6. Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to give an overview of the main historical conceptions of
value, and to relate these to the position developed in this thesis. It was firstly shown
that the notion of value can be related to economic phenomena in a rather simple way,
and that this way is basically similar to the one employed by the Marginalists. It was
argued that both the Marginalists and their predecessors suffered from some
conceptual confusion regarding the conceptualisation of value that lead to
unnecessary problems. The greatest of these were the so-called "diamonds-and-water
paradox".
It was argued that the major move in economic history, with regards to the theory of
value, was a move away from an agent-independent to an agent-relative conception of
value. Hedonism was the historical catalyst for this change, yet it ultimately served as
a Wittgensteinian ladder that was cast off at no cost. This "casting off' even went so
far as to be able to cash out all intentional talk into evolutionary terms. This type
argument is not, however, always used by economists to justify the assumption of
stable preferences'", Economists still need intentional talk for certain types of
explanations and analyses. If the argument in this thesis is correct, then this
intentional talk brings economics straight back to hedonism.
I wish to note a final point before proceeding to the next topic of discussion. This
thesis is trying to argue for a meta-ethical position that has, as one implication,
hedonism. Hence it needs to, at some point, attempt to argue that all human actions
can, in some faint sense, be seen as expressions of egoism. This is not a new position
in philosophy, but the task of making such an argument is quite daunting. Here I think
it justified to claim that the history of economic analysis does give such a claim an
element of plausibility.
Economic interaction is perhaps the area of human behaviour that we are most
comfortable with describing in selfish terms. Economists who definitely viewed man
88 The money-pump argument does not dominate discussions regarding the stability of preferences. It is
unclear exactly how large a role economists view it as playing, some standard economic reference
works do not even mention "money-pumps" (or "dutch books", etc).
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as more than selfish (e.g. Menger) had few qualms about studying man's least
edifying activity in terms of self-interest, but maintaining that outside the economic
market he is frequently altruistic in a qualitatively different sense. As such it is natural
that the assumption of maximising behaviour89 first took its firmest root in economic
theory. The concepts developed, however, and the approach as such did not stay
confined to economics for long. "Public choice" theory, "social action" theory, and
the myriad uses that have been found for various decision theoretical concepts testify
to this fact. These uses all, in some sense, are the result of considering what happens
when two self-interested individuals engage in economic trade.
This is not to say that the above theories have always swept all before them, nor to
deny that there are areas which are at present intractable to such analysis. I would,
however, contend that the refusal of "maximising behaviour" to stay within the realm
of "economics", narrowly construed, is something from which the defender of egoism
can take heart. Since Becker is here the undoubted hero, this chapter will end with his
summary, in economicspeak, of part of what is being defended here.
The heart of my argument IS that human behaviour IS not
compartmentalized, sometimes based on maximising, sometimes not,
sometimes motivated by stable preferences, sometimes by volatile ones,
sometimes resulting in an optimal accumulation of information,
sometimes not. Rather, all human behaviour can be viewed as involving
participants who maximise their utility from a stable set of preferences
and accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a
variety of markets (1976: 14).
With that said, I now wish to claim that there is an important sense in which people
are not maximisers. This will form the topic of the next chapter.
89 It might be doubted whether "maximising behaviour" really amounts to egoism. This would largely
be a matter of defining "egoism", but I would contend that there is an important sense in which it does.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
107
Maximising behaviour has to, in some sense, relate all actions to the interests of the actor, even if these
interests can include the interest of others as object.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
108
Chapter 4: Towards Ethics: from Calculations to Rules
1. Introduction
Chapter 1 and 2 explained and defended the idea of cognitive, ethical, egoist
hedonism. It was argued that this doctrine presents an elegant solution to
epistemological problems regarding value, and that it can overcome the traditional
objections to the idea of a cognitive ethics. Itwas also explained that ethical hedonism
results in a variant of psychological hedonism. Chapter 3 related this conception of
human action to economic phenomena. It also attempted to show that economics has
historically been well-served when it has employed this assumption (or parts thereof)
to explain human behaviour.
There are two unfortunate (or counter-intuitive) implications of the theory of
cognitive ethics that is defended in this thesis. The first is that ethics is hedonist.
Hedonism has a long philosophical tradition, and though it is unpopular nowadays'",
is not totally unrespectable. Yet I would guess that, if you asked philosophers what
ethical theory they would like to be valid, i.e. if their wish could magically change the
metaphysics of the universe, I do not think you would find many hedonists. Hedonism
as an ethical criterion isn't quite as inspiring as the categorical imperative or
"universal harmony" or the "inevitable dictatorship of the proletariat", etc. If it were
up to me I would choose a criterion that is less worldly and transient than hedonism.
Yet, if ethics is cognitive, as is being argued here, it isn't up to me in the same sense
that the law of gravity isn't up to me.
The other unfortunate (or counter-intuitive) implication, one that is infinitely worse, is
egoism. If one were to ask most people what they consider the very antithesis of
morality or "ethical action" to be, the answer would probably be egoism. Or, rather,
"selfishness". Ethics is sometimes even loosely defined in terms of its supposed
opposite - egoism - so that egoist action is "unethical" by definition. If the definition
of ethics used in chapter 1 is employed, and ethics is defined as an attempt to answer
90 A survey among contemporary philosophers will not tum up a lot of hedonists. It is probably fair to
say that a lot of people who would have been hedonist-utilitarians in an earlier age are preference-
utilitarians today. Here the way economic theory has developed from Marginalism to modem micro-
economics has clearly had a large influence.
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the question "How should l/we act?", then this rather seems like an attempt to do by
definition what needs to be done by logic. The egoist implications of the theory under
discussion are the direct consequence of classifying "the good" under qualia. This
idea, ifthere is something to it, is again as unalterable as the law of gravity.
The news, however, isn't all bad. The next three chapters will attempt to argue that, in
fact, the ethical consequences of the meta-ethical view adopted in this thesis might not
be nearly as unfortunate as one might suppose. Rather there is reason to believe that
our intuitions regarding the forms that egoist action will take are radically
untrustworthy.
In order to construct such an argument the question that needs to be asked is the
following: how should a hedonist egoist act in order to maximise value? This question
is surprisingly complex. The next three chapters will only scratch the surface in its
attempt to answer this question. This chapter will attempt to argue for a first, and vital
link between egoist hedonism and what is commonly understood as "moral action". It
will be argued that an egoist hedonist should, in an important sense, be a rule-
following creature rather than a calculating creature. Chapters 5 and 6 will then
concern some of the rules that such a creature should follow.
The first step in this argument is to discard the simplifying assumption used in the
previous chapter. This assumption was that people can directly calculate the value of
the different options open to them, and then choose the best one. This entire chapter
will be an attempt to explain why no egoist hedonist should try to do this.
Note that this chapter will, in the first instance, be concerned with all human action,
not just those we consider "ethical". "Ethical,,91 action is a subset of human action as
such, and the former can best be illuminated by considering the latter.
91 On the definition of ethics used above, any attempt to direct any human action counts as "ethics".
This is congruent with the main claims of this thesis which, at base, only recognise one standard for all
human action. Sometimes, however, I will use the word "ethics" in a narrower sense. This is a sense in
which advice on how to eat a sandwich does not count as "ethical", but advice on whether to save a
drowning man does. I trust that context will clarify usage sufficiently so as to prevent confusion.
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Also note that, if the reader did not find the arguments in chapters 1 and 2 convincing,
that nothing of substance in this chapter depends on the arguments made there. If
those arguments are correct, then the next logical step is to determine what an egoist
hedonist should do. Hence this question will be considered in the present chapter. But
an egoist hedonist is just one species of utility maximiser'". And the topic of this
chapter is substantially the same as the question "how should a utility maximiser
act?". This is an interesting question in-itself, regardless of the work it is doing in the
context of the thesis. The general points in this chapter - regarding the relation
between rational choice theory and bounded rationality - has no need of a hedonist,
egoist base.
2. Definitions
The mind is an information-processing mechanism that allows a utility-maximiser to
attempt to maximise utility. The decision-rules according to which information is
processed by the mind can be distinguished based on whether all relevant and
available information is used, or whether some relevant information is ignored. I will
refer to a decision-rule that uses all information as calculation, and one that does not
as rule-following. In this chapter it will be argued that man is a rule-follower in a
sense more basic than he is a calculator.
The above definitions need to be explained so as to prevent confusion:
- Calculation: To calculate is to follow a decision-rule that uses all available
information relevant to a specific problem.
The following is the type of thing that counts as a calculation: Take it as a given that I
know I want the cheapest meal on the menu at a restaurant. If I look at every price on
the menu, identify the cheapest meal and choose it, then I have calculated. Hence I
have calculated relative to the finite set of options on the menu and the standard of
pnce.
92 This seems to be why Broome states that "expected utility theory [i.e. rational choice] describes the
structure of good" (1994: 138).
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- Rule-following: A rule is here used to denote any decision-rule that does not use all
the available information relevant to a specific problem.
Consider, again, the situation of being in a restaurant if one has very little money.
Imagine the menu is extremely long, so that going through the whole menu in order to
determine the cheapest item wastes too much time to be practical. I am trying to eat as
cheaply as possible, but, since the menu is too long to read, I follow the following
decision-rule: read from the beginning of the menu, and choose the first dish that
costs less than R30.
Note that, according to the above definitions, the above rule only counts as a rule
because of the specified goal of action. If the goal of action had been to order the first
item on the menu under R30 in price, rather than to eat as cheaply as possible, then I
would have been calculating when I looked at the menu in order to determine the first
item under R30 in price. Hence the above action can be analysed as follows. In order
to eat as cheaply as possible, I followed the rule: "choose the first option under R30 in
price". This rule can now be treated as a sub-goal. In order to achieve this sub-goal, I
calculated by looking at the menu and choosing the first option that satisfied this
criterion.
If information-processing can be said to be a calculation with reference to a sub-goal,
I will refer to this as relative calculation. If information-processing can be said to be
calculation with reference to an ultimate goal, i.e. with reference to maximising utility
as such, this will be referred to as absolute calculation.
A first implication of the above definitions is that a being with a constrained decision-
making capacity can never be an absolute calculator. Man's decision-making capacity
is constrained by the fact that decision-making takes time, and that time is a finite
resource. Furthermore, the possible options at any given time in life is infinite. Here a
typical "economic" problem, namely how to optimally distribute finite computational
capacity over infinite possibilities, arises. This thesis will argue that an examination of
this problem can go a long way towards giving an account of what we call "moral
action". For now let it be noted that the possibility of calculation concerning
everything I do while doing it is almost unintelligible. For a start, a creature that could
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do this would need instantaneous information-processing capacity. In other words,
such a creature would have to be able to perform an infinite amount of calculations,
without any of them even taking any time. Hence an absolute calculator, as defined
above, seems a mere logical possibility.
This leads to a crucial issue with regards to the relative status of calculation and rule-
following. Rule-following ignores certain information relevant to a specific problem,
hence it is computationally cheaper. Since information-processing capacity is a finite
resource, it is preferable to follow a rule than to calculate, all else being equal. Often,
off course, all else will not be equal. Rather the following of a rule is likely to lead to
a loss of accuracy that negates the saving in computational capacity. This chapter will
consider the nature of this trade-off in detail.
Note that no assumption is being made in any of the above definitions about whether
a specific act of calculation or rule-following occurs consciously or unconsciously.
Whether a specific act of information-processing occurred consciously or not is
irrelevant to the main points being made in this chapter, except where explicitly stated
otherwise.
With these categories defined the question as to how a hedonist egoist should act so as
to maximise value can now be investigated.
3. Three Sources of Rule-following
3.1 Ignorance as Source of Rule-following
It will be argued that there are four mam sources of rule-following, i.e. four
conditions that, when they obtain, imply that rule-following will be preferable to
calculation. The first three can be understood as operating on the same logic, and can
be illustrated in the following manner.
Imagine a benevolent being has twice hidden gold coins, in a hundred clearly marked
holes each time, on two different planets. The being had used a pseudo-random
number-generator to decide whether a given hole should contain a coin. The standard
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used was of such a nature that, for any particular hole, there is a 99% chance that it
will contain a coin. Imagine these coins are valuable, and that digging them up takes
no great effort.
Now imagine that one being populates each of these planets. The first is omniscient
and has instantaneous decision capacity; i.e. it takes the being no time to make a
decision'", This being we shall call Perfect.
The second being has roughly the amount of information and computational capacity
that would usually be expected of an average human being. Let's call this being
Normal. Assume that the mathematics of pseudo-randomness is something that is
simply beyond Normal's ability to understand.
How will Perfect act? Perfect, being omniscient, will dig up only holes with coins in
them. Holes that do not contain coins, if any, will be left untouched. Being omniscient
she will be able to calculate what "decisions" the use of the pseudo-random number-
generator would have resulted in. Perfect's actions in digging up these holes can be
explained solely with reference to the notion of calculation. Since it is intrinsic to a
rule that some potentially relevant factor is not considered, Perfect can in no sense be
said to have followed a rule.
Normal will dig up all hundred holes. This example was constructed in such a way
that the chance of digging up a hole unnecessarily is far outweighed by the chance of
a benefit derived from finding a coin. Normal will know that at least one hole is
probably empty, yet this should not change his actions one bit. His knowledge that at
least one hole is probably empty is useless to him.
Did Normal's actions constitute following a rule or calculating? The answer is that
Normal's actions in digging up a hundred holes could have been the result of both. It
is possible that, vis-a-vis the action of digging up a hole, and in terms of finding a
coin as a standard, Normal calculated afresh each time he saw a hole. In other words
93 It is questionable whether this possibility is really intelligible. For the purposes of the above example
it wouldn't really matter if the being was alternatively thought to have the fastest computational
capacity conceivable.
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he saw the holes, each time considered the possibility that it might contain a coin or
not, and each time decided to dig. But it is also possible that Normal could have
followed a rule. He could have calculated right at the beginning and, vis-a-vis the
possibility of it containing a coin or not and with the desirability of finding a coin as
choice-criterion, decided to dig whenever he finds a hole. Hence, when Normal saw
his second hole, he decided to dig right after identifying it without running through
the calculation again.
Hence Normal's action can be the result of a hundred acts of calculation, or one
calculation and a series of acts best described as rule-following. The above example
might seem somewhat fanciful, but it does illustrate a first important point. This is
that ignorance can lead to uniformity of action. Normal's ignorance of the workings of
the pseudo-random number-generator's workings results in a situation where he has to
dig up each hole. This was not the case with Perfect; she only dug up the holes with
coins in them.
The difference between calculating and rule-following lies in the fact that, in rule-
following, a possibly relevant factor is ignored. Normal can ignore the possibility that
any particular hole might not have a coin, considering this possibility will not change
his actions. Hence ignorance can result in a situation where calculation and rule-
following have the same result. This leads to the conclusion that ignorance (or:
informational constraints) is the first potential source of rule- following.
3.2 The Cost of Information as Source of Rule-following
In the above example Normal simply cannot determine which holes have coins in
them, as the mathematics of the pseudo-random number-generator is beyond him.
Now imagine that the situation changes. Every time a hole is dug, a sign is placed a
hundred meters from the hole. This sign indicates whether the hole contains a coin or
not. Now Normal can walk to the sign, read it, and decide to dig based on what the
SIgn says.
Yet it would not be in Normal's interest to do so. The cost of the time spent walking
might well outweigh any gain in accuracy. The only saving that such a course of
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action would result in is to prevent him from occasionally digging up a hole
unnecessarily. The example was constructed in such a way that this effort is minimal.
Hence Normal can continue to ignore a potentially relevant factor when it comes to
digging up holes. He could still follow a rule rather than calculate, and with no ill
effect. This time, however, he is not ignoring a possibly relevant factor because it is
beyond his ability to know it. This time he is ignoring it because the cost of
determining it, i.e. the time invested in walking, is too high. This leads to the second
important point that can be illustrated with the above story. This is that the cost of
information can be a source of rule- following.
3.3 Computational Cost as Source of Rule-following
The third source of rule-following is really a subspecies of the second. This is where
the cost of information is again too high to justify calculation, but for a very specific
reason. This is that the high cost is specifically due to the cost of computation.
To illustrate, consider the following. Normal encounters all of the holes, but they are
all encountered on the same day. Normal knows that he has to take the coins on the
given day. The next day they will be gone. Also assume that the coins are buried a bit
deeper this time, so that the cost of digging rises.
Next imagine that the cost of determining which holes have coins has been lowered.
The being that placed the coins there had left markings to indicate which holes have
coins. These markings are in a code that can easily be deciphered by Normal. Imagine
that the relative pay-offs of Normal's options are such that he is best served by
quickly figuring out the code each time he finds a hole, rather than digging. Hence
Normal is now not digging up any holes unnecessarily.
But also imagine that Normal has some proj eet that he is working on, and that he
needs to come up with a fairly detailed plan of action regarding this project. He can
do this in his head while walking, but needs all his concentration in order to keep
things straight in his head. Stopping to figure out the codes in order to determine
whether to dig breaks his concentration repeatedly. Not only the time incurred in
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figuring out the codes is responsible for this, but also the fact that it takes a while to
recapture the "mental grip" he had on his plan before his concentration was broken.
Normal can abandon the coins, and simply concentrate on his plan. Or he can abandon
the plan, and collect the coins. But his computational capacity is of such a type that he
cannot figure out his plan, and acquire the coins by cracking codes.
Fortunately Normal has another option available to him. He can simply follow the
rule of digging whenever he sees the hole, and dig up all the holes. Assuming that he
can concentrate while engaged in physical labour, his mind is now free to concentrate
on the plan'".
The above example illustrates an important point with reference to computational
power. A rise in the computational cost, namely that these computations were
breaking his concentration, can again lead to uniformity of behaviour. Hence
computational costs are another possible source of rule-following.
There is also a more subtle matter with regards to computational costs, and
informational costs in general, which is quite important. Imagine the cost of
determining whether a given hole contains a coin is less than the (decontextualised)
cost of digging a hole. It might still be optimal to forego the information, and dig up
all the holes regardless. This is because Normal will have to incur this information
cost one hundred times. Yet there is only a one percent chance that it will cause him
not to dig up a hole. If Normal incurs the information cost, then, in retrospect, this
was optimal with regards to any hole that did not contain a coin. Yet, this cost was
incurred at all holes that did contain a coin, without any corresponding saving to
counteract this rising cost. Hence, in judging the price of the information, all instances
where it is gathered need to be considered, not just the instances where it changed
behaviour.
94 In the language of economics, this could have been expressed by saying that computational power is
a finite resource that needs to be distributed over infinite needs ("options"). For Normal the opportunity
cost of code-breaking rose, hence he redistributed this resource.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
117
This reinforces the main conclusion reached above with regards to information cost in
general. It might well be optimal to follow a rule that will occasionally result in
unsuccessful action (i.e. digging unnecessarily) than to simply act so as to prevent
unsuccessful action.
4. Conditions under which Rule-Following is Optimal
The main advantage of rule-following lies in the fact that it saves computational
power, which can then be used elsewhere. It does this by telling the actor what criteria
to act on. In doing so it tells the actor what to ignore. Itwas argued that there are three
factors that serve as a rational base for rule-following. The first concerns the case
where the information that can change my action is unobtainable, i.e. ignorance. The
second is if the information that can change my action is too expensive, i.e.
information cost. The third, which is really a special case of the second, is if the
information that can change my action comes at too high a computational cost. Hence
a utility-maximiser should follow a rule under the following conditions:
1. A choice recurs that is alike in a certain respect. Example: Normal has to
decide whether to dig or not dig.
2. Consistently choosing one option is demonstrably superior to consistently
choosing the opposite. Example: Normal is better off always digging than
never digging.
3. The instances where the option that is not consistently superior is actually
superior either cannot be known in advance, or are too expensive to determine.
Example: Normal was portrayed as unable to figure out the workings of the
pseudo-random number calculator, or this would have been too much effort,
etc.
In the following chapter I will attempt to show that certain choices in ordinary life
satisfy the above three conditions. Hence, with regards to these choices, a utility-
maximiser should follow certain rules.
But first the account of rule-following needs to be extended to the fourth possible
source of rule-following. This source is, in many ways, the most fundamental. It also
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delineates a realm of action where rule-following is superior to calculation, but does
not stop there. It will be argued that this factor does not only demonstrate the
optimality of rule-following vis-a-vis calculation, but actually shows the impossibility
of being anything other than a rule-following being. This argument can be made by
arguing for a specific understanding of the relation between rational choice theory and
bounded rationality.
5. Rational Choice and Bounded Rationality
The essence of rational choice theory is that it views actors as maximising utility. This
means that actors consider the different options available to them, and then choose the
one that maximises utility (Monroe, 2001: 153).
In a series of classic papers starting in 1948, Simon developed his conception of
"bounded rationality" as a critique of, and corrective to, the theory of rational choice.
Bounded rationality emphasises the constraints on human decision making'" in order
to show that people develop certain strategies for dealing with these constraints. One
such a strategy is what Simon called "satisficing".
A decision maker who chooses the best available alternative according to
some criterion is said to optimise; one who chooses an alternative that
meets or exceeds specified criteria, but that is not guaranteed to be either
unique or in any sense the best, is said to satisfice (Simon, 1997: 295).
The dispute amounts to the following: According to Simon an actor will often act
once she finds an alternative that meets a given criterion, according to rational choice
an actor will act after choosing the best option.
It is here that the pnor discussion regarding calculation and rule-following is of
relevance. A "satisficing criterion" is a criterion that tells an actor to act once she
finds an option that has a certain characteristic. Hence the above discussion of rule-
95 Simon notes that economics has never been oblivious of the ideas behind bounded rationality. Both
Lucas and Keynes can only introduce business cycles into their theories by assuming that the labour
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following was also a discussion of satisficing. A rational choice-maximiser is an actor
who chooses the best option relative to a choice-criterion. Hence the above discussion
of "calculation" was also a discussion of rational choice "maximising". Simply put,
rational choice is concerned with what was defined as calculation, bounded rationality
with what was defined as rule-following.".
What is the relation between rational choice and bounded rationality? The view that is
most often taken is that bounded rationality can be seen as an instance, not a
refutation, of rational choice. In other words bounded rationality can be seen as
rational choice under informational and computational constraints'". It is easy to see
how this conclusion can be reached. Consider Normal's choice to simply dig up all
holes in the above example concerning computational cost.
Normal was following a rule ("satisficing"), but this rule was not followed without a
reason. He calculated the difference between following a rule and calculating, and
decided to follow the rule. Or, simply put, he calculated and discovered that he should
stop calculating. But his rule-following did not represent the final word with regards
to an explanation of his action. Rather the rule was the result of calculation, and it is
only when his initial calculation is taken into account that his actions are fully
explained. In this way it can be said that his rule-following was the result of
calculation, which is the primary explanation of his action. Or, in other words,
satisficing is an instance of maximising, and explicable in terms of it.
Below I will argue that, while the above analysis is not without merit, there is an
important sense in which it is wrong and/or incomplete. I will argue that, when it
comes to the relation between rational choice and bounded rationality, the above
analysis has things exactly backwards. Instances of bounded rationality cannot be
force (Keynes) and businessmen (Lucas) have limited knowledge and decision-making capacities,
causing both to suffer a variant of the "money illusion" (Simon, 1997: 294).
96 This is not one of the standard definitions of rule-following and calculation. Nothing substantive
depends on such stipulations. The definitions of rule-following and calculation were specifically
chosen so as to correspond to the fundamental difference between rational choice and satisficing.
97 Simon seems somewhat ambivalent about this interpretation of his work (1997: 296). See Elster
(1986: 25-27) for a discussion of, and argument against, this interpretation. In contemporary writings of
bounded rationality theorists this interpretation is often explicitly rejected. Gigerenzer and Selten, for
example, explicitly call the view that bounded rationality is optimisation under constraints
"inappropriate and misleading" (2002: 5).
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explained with reference to an earlier case of rational choice. Rather all instances of
rational choice are to explained with reference to earlier instances of bounded
rationality. Itwill also be argued that the above reversal is more than a case of "six of
one, half-dozen of the other". In other words it will be claimed that there is a sense in
which rules are more fundamental than calculations.
One way that the argument can be made is with reference to the difference between
the way human beings play chess, and the optimal method of playing chess.
6. Rules and Calculations: Kasparov versus Deepest Blue
6.1 The Game
Consider the differences between the way in which a human expert (call him
"Kasparov") plays chess, and the way in which the greatest conceivable computer
(call it "Deepest Blue") would play chess. The amount of possible moves in chess is,
at any given state of the game, finite. The amount of moves resulting from any
possible move is similarly finite, etc. This means that the amount of possible games
is, while incredibly huge, finite. Imagine that Deepest Blue has a computational
capacity that allows it to run through all possible moves within the given time
constraint, and that this is the method it uses in playing chess. Deepest Blue is, simply
put, the ultimate lightning calculator.
Kasparov cannot possibly play chess solely by using lightning calculation. The human
brain, while an impressive information-processing device'", does not have sufficient
computational capacity to make this possible. Rather he would have to use his
"expertise". Simon describes the "expertise" of brilliant chess players as consisting of
"selective heuristics" (1997: 185). In terms of the above analysis this amounts to
following a complex set of rules. The difference between the way Deepest Blue plays
chess and Kasparov plays chess allows for a good illustration of the relation between
calculation and rule-following, and hence rational choice and bounded rationality.
98 The average processing rate of the brain, according to Dennet (1987: 328), is orders of magnitude
faster than the fastest supercomputer. Even this is not sufficient to play chess by calculations, as the
hypothetical Deepest Blue does.
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If the "intentional stance" is taken towards Deepest Blue it can be treated as an agent
with the following characteristics. All choices made by Deepest Blue are attempts to
maximise utility, where utility is something like "chance of winning". It does this by
considering all possible options, and chooses the one which best maximises utility.
Assume that Deepest Blue does not make the stupid type of computational mistake
that we all fall victim to from time to time. In other words, it functions perfectly, and
knows this with absolute certainty. Hence it never needs to go back and verify the
result of its calculations.
Deepest Blue gives content to the idea of a perfectly rational actor. He is, as the term
was defined earlier, an absolute calculator. In this sense he is similar to the
hypothetical Perfect that was used to illustrate some points above. Deepest Blue does
not have instantaneous computational capacity like Perfect, yet this does not matter.
Deepest Blue has, at bottom, only one goal that decides all his actions - to win at
chess. Time is not a factor, Deepest Blue is indifferent between winning within an
hour and winning in two months' time. The possible courses of action open to
Deepest Blue are the possible moves in chess, and hence are finite. Perfect was
assumed to view time itself as a valuable commodity, and to have infinite options.
This necessitated instantaneous computational capacity in order for Perfect to be an
absolute calculator. Dropping these two requirements means that Deepest Blue can be
a perfect calculator without having instantaneous computational capacity.
Deepest Blue is also operating in an environment where, with reference to the factors
he cares about, changes are interspersed with periods during which his environment
stays constant. Simply put, the pieces are moved and then remain static until they are
moved again. This was not the case with Perfect. It was assumed that she is operating
in a constantly changing environment.
Hence Deepest Blue is the ultimate rational actor, or absolute calculator. How will
Kasparov's method of playing differ from that of the perfectly rational actor?
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6.2 Kasparov's Method
The central way in which Kasparov differs from Deepest Blue is that he does not have
the computational capacity to run through all possible games in the time allowed for a
move. There is no reasonable time-constraint that will make this a possible option for
Kasparov, unless we stipulate that he is not immortal. Rather he will have to explore
the consequences of the moves that, based on his considerable expertise, appear most
promising. Presumably Kasparov will look for options that have certain properties,
and if he finds these properties, explore the possibilities of utilising the option'". The
properties or criteria whereby the notion "most promising options" is defined will be
one or more satisficing-principles, or, in other words, rules. Hence Kasparov will
satisfice in choosing which options to explore.
The exploration of these options will, however, take time. Time spent exploring a bad
option is time stolen from exploring a better option. Kasparov will again, based on his
expertise, "know what to look for" in a potential move. In other words there is a set of
properties that guide him in deciding whether to continue or stop the exploration of a
given option. Again this "set of properties" can be viewed as a satisficing principle, or
rule.
Kasparov will follow rules, or satisfice, in choosing which options to explore. He will
also follow rules ("search-rules" as Simon calls them) in choosing whether to
continue or discontinue his search. It is also possible, within a game, that Kasparov
can doubt the rules that he is using, and try and determine whether any given rule or
criteria might not be misleading. For the vast majority of the complex set of rules he
is following, however, this cannot be the case. Rather these rules are something he
brings with him to the game, rather than something he decides to use during the game.
Hence there are at least three important senses in which Kasparov will follow rules.
He will not explore all options, but pre-select from them. He will use search-rules.
And these rules themselves will simply be something he brings with him to the game,
99 In a study that asked chess grandmasters to describe their thought-processes while solving chess-
problems it was found that they considered eight likely moves, and progressively "played out" five of
these to see what possibilities they opened up (Klein, 2002: 115).
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not Issues decided during the game. It will only be within the context of rule-
following that he will calculate. In other words, once he has committed to the most
promising moves, and once he has decided how far in advance to plan, and once he
has decided how to judge the merit of the promising moves, only then will he
calculate vis-a-vis these options and criteria.
This illustrates an important principle. Calculation is only possible once the options,
choice-criteria, and evidential-criteria whereby it is judged which option is most likely
to fulfil the choice-criteria, have been fixed. These are all matters that, with reference
to a specific case of calculation, factor in as something the actor is already committed
to, i.e. a rule.
6.3 Relevance of the Difference Between Kasparovand Deepest Blue
A defender of rational choice theory might well wish to defend it in the following
manner. It was already observed that a rational actor who can incur computational
costs would sometimes decide to follow a rule so as to avoid computational costs.
This presents the possibility that all the rules followed by Kasparov can be interpreted
in this manner. In other words all his instances of rule-following can be seen as
flowing from cases of calculation. In this manner bounded rationality becomes a
special case of rational choice.
This will not work, for at least two (related) reasons. Any prior calculation that
resulted in the decision to follow a rule will again be based on other rules. This does
not result in a "chicken-or-egg"-situation. The possibility of starting with a "pure"
calculation devoid of rules is unintelligible for any being with finite computational
capacity.
Imagine a being had to, based on an effort to avoid computational costs, try to
calculate which rules to follow. In doing so it is trying to calculate whether to
calculate. But this calculation is one that he himself might be better off not making.
This means that the rational actor would now have to calculate whether to calculate
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whether to calculate 100. Here an infinite regress anses, for each of the actions of
calculation need to be justified as flowing from a prior decision to calculate. This is
logically impossible. Rather the actor would start with a commitment to some
calculation, and work from there. This means that whatever is taken to be the "first
calculation" would have to start from within a context of rules that are already
followedlol.
The second, and not unrelated, problem with the idea of reducing all rules to
maximising calculations concerns the issue oftime102•
Imagine a being that is not, because of the self-referential problem discussed above,
excluded from being an absolute calculator. But her calculations do take time. While
she is trying to make her "first and absolute calculation" the clock will be ticking
away. If this being is sufficiently like a human being, so that the options confronting
her are infinite, she will never get around to the first decision.
It can even be granted that the above problem is, somehow, overcome. Imagine that
the above being has somehow found a legitimate means to reduce her available
options to a finite set. Now she has to calculate the utility of the remaining
possibilities. Even grant that during this process she can somehow hit upon search-
rules and evidential criteria that can be related back to pure calculations. Meanwhile
the clock is again ticking away, with opportunities fading as new ones arise. In
refusing to "blindly" enter a state she is already in a state - a state of dallying. This is
surely not an optimal way of acting. If she had simply seized some option that seemed
okay based on one criterion, e.g. "satisficed", utility would probably have been
100 Or, as summarised in Gigerenzer and Selten (2002: 5): "[T]he cost-benefit computations are
themselves costly, and demand a meta-level cost-benefit computation, and so on".
101 The above problem arises with reference to deciding whether to decide. It also seems to arise for the
related problem of how to decide. The question as to how to decide has been recognised by some
authors as resulting in regress problem. In an article that attempts to overcome this problem for a
special case, Smith (1994) mentions Raiffa, Rawls, Elster and Resnik as among the authors who feel
that the infinite regress also arises when deciding how to decide. Russell Hardin is specifically
mentioned as attempting to overcome this problem by starting with the idea of satisficing, as opposed
to maximising (1994: 196).
102 These problems do not arise for Deepest Blue, despite the fact that his computational capacity is not
instantaneous. This was due to a number of factors peculiar to himself, the most important of which is
that time is not a commodity or price to him. The other factors were explained above. The case of
Deepest Blue is sufficiently unlike that confronting a human being with regards to all these factors that
I am excluding it from further consideration.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
125
optimised much more efficiently. If it is agreed that economists are correct when
asserting that five-dollar bills are rarely left lying on the side-walk, i.e. that obvious
opportunities are rarely missed, it must also be agreed that she would have satisficed.
The point that the above seeks to illustrate is that a being with finite computational
capacity must be a rule-follower before it can be a calculator. The idea of calculation
"all the way down" falls apart on grounds of coherence, when the influence of time is
considered, etc. Even if the idea of starting out as calculator can, in some sense, be
saved, it can be a decidedly sub-optimal way to act. The reasons explained above all
point to the implication that all instances of rule-following cannot possibly be seen as
the result of prior calculation.
6.4 Can Rule-Following Become Calculation?
The above argument against a being with finite capacities starting as rational actor
does not necessarily result in the conclusion that such a being cannot become a
rational actor. Rather a somewhat intriguing possibility presents itself. What about a
being that starts out as a rule-follower, but becomes a calculator? Is it possible for
satisficing to become a rational choice?
Consider the following. "Boring" is a being with only one goal. This goal is to win at
tic-tac-toe. For whatever reason Boring is not allowed to figure out the rules of the
game prior to playing his first match. Rather he is just thrown into playing tic-tac-tce,
and has to figure out the rules as he goes along. In other words, Boring starts as a rule-
follower.
Tie-tac-toe is a rather simple game. Once one has figured out a few simple
"strategies", it loses its appeal because one can no longer lose. Assume that Boring
figures out these strategies. Also assume that Boring's opponent makes moves that are
random, so that Boring cannot, even in principle, outwit it. Boring can only make the
best move allowed by the game. Itwill win some games and draw the rest.
All the information needed for any given choice is either freely obtainable by Boring,
or impossible to gain because of randomness. Hence he will simply choose the best
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
126
option consistently. In doing so Boring will move from being a satisficer to being a
rational actor.
It does seem that, despite starting out as a rule-follower, it is possible to become a
rational actor. But, I think it reasonable to suppose that this is not the case with homo
sapiens. Just consider the number of ways that we differ from Boring. For a start, life
is, at any moment, infinitely more complicated than tic-tac-toe. Matters are made even
more difficult by the fact that the world, in contrast to tic-tac-toe, is constantly
changing. Furthermore, our "utility" can be affected by an inexhaustible number of
factors, i.e. we care about an inexhaustible number of things. Boring was assumed to
only care about winning at tic-tac-toe. Simply put, life simply does not become that
much easier that quickly, in the sense that tie-tac-toe does.
The same point can be made with reference to Kasparov. Kasparov, despite his
intelligence and concentration, will never reach the point where he can play chess by
calculation. There is simply a difference of orders of magnitude between the amount
of computational power possessed by Deepest Blue and the amount possessed by him.
It is probably fair to say that the average person, in ordinary life, is even more orders
of magnitude below Kasparov-playing-chess than Kasparov is below Deepest Blue.
The amount of concentration and intelligence that Kasparov brings to chess probably
represents the zenith of possible human computational ability, or something close to
it. So any satisficing that Kasparov needs to do will be magnified tremendously for
the average person confronting life. Kasparov has to choose from a set of possibilities
that are, in principle, finite. The average person has, at any given point in time, an
infinite number of possible actions. In choosing between these he does not have
nearly the intelligence or concentration that Kasparov exhibits in playing chess. In
fact, neither will Kasparov. It is probably correct to guess that, while playing chess, he
devotes nearly none of his intellectual resources to any problem other than winning.
Kasparov is further helped by the fact that chess is a game with defined rules, where
the pieces are only moved occasionally. Metaphorically speaking life is probably best
described as a game where the rules can change at any moment, and the pieces never
hold still. Hence the idea of learning what rules of action are optimal, and then
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retroactively judging them, as done by Boring, has limited application to human
action.
Rational choice theory attempts to start with calculations, and then accommodate
rules as a special case of a prior calculation. This can be a useful way of looking at
action, as will be discussed below. But, as a description of human action, this seems
to be the wrong way around. Rather the idea of rule-following seems to be the most
fundamental category of human action. This is however, not an a priori truth about
the nature of a possible actor. Rather it is the direct result of human beings having
finite computational capacity, infinite options and having to make all our decisions
while the clock is ticking.
Until now, nothing much in this chapter has depended on any particular theory
regarding how the mind works. All the conclusions reached above are supposed to
follow logically from the assertion, surely uncontroversial, that human computational
power is a finite resource that needs to be distributed over potentially infinite needs. It
was argued that any being that needs to do this cannot possibly be a rational actor,
because of the infinite regress problem, etc.
But there is another factor besides cognitive constraints as such that speaks against the
idea that man can be a rational actor. This will become apparent if it is considered
how we came to have the minds that we do.
7. Evolutionary Psychology and the Modular Mind
7.1. The Evolved Mind
It has already been stated that the mind is an information-processing mechanism that
allows a utility-maximiser to attempt to maximise utility. Logically it follows that, if
computational capacity is unconstrained, the best mind to have would be a generalised
information-processor that is constantly following the following decision-rule:
"Determine which action will maximise utility and then choose it". The best logical
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possibility would be a mind with infinite computational capacity, always following
the above decision-rule.
However, the constraints of the physical world make this impossible. Computations
take time; this fact by itself has some interesting implications that were discussed
earlier. Rational choice tries to get around this problem by picturing the subject as a
constrained maximiser. In other words, the mind is, fundamentally, only following
rules because they are the result of earlier calculations that determined these rules to
be optimal. It was already argued above that there are some fundamental problems
with this view. The greatest of these problems is that this idea is logically incoherent
because of the infinite regress problem. There is, however, another objection to this
idea that I consider to be equally devastating. This is that the type of mind needed for
rational choice theory to be an accurate description of human action cannot possibly
have evolved.
The next part of this chapter rests on the empirical claim that the mind is the result of
evolution. This claim is taken to be common knowledge in evolutionary psychology,
and will not be defended here103. The claim that will be defended, however, is that an
evolved mind is extremely unlikely to belong to a rational actor. This can be
explained by considering the type of actor that evolution can be said to be.
7.2. Evolution as Bounded Rationality Decision-maker
Evolution can metaphorically be viewed as a designer that attempts to maxmuse
utility, where utility is defined as "differential reproductive fitness". However,
evolution as a designer can only work according to a very simple decision-rule. It
follows the satisficing criterion that any change, arising from mutation, that increases
relative reproductive fitness, is selected.
103 For an excellent introduction to evolutionary psychology, see Badcock (2000). For a consideration
of the evidence for the "modular mind", see, for example, Gigerenzer and Selten (2002: 83-102).
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This constrains decision-making in several ways. Firstly the potential options that can
be decided between are pre-selected. A mutation, no matter how beneficial, can only
be selected after arising through the chance process of mutation. Hence a situation
arises that is similar to Kasparov's pre-selection of alternatives, explained above.
There are also some options that cannot be utilised by evolution. If a potential
mutation would decrease fitness, but, in conjunction with a subsequent mutation
enhance fitness a great deal, then such an "enabling" mutation cannot be selected.
Design-processes that consist of more than one step can only be selected if each
individual step is beneficial.
In other words, evolution is an extremely myopic actor that can only see one "move"
ahead - and then only those "moves" determined by a random process. This view of
evolution as a boundedly rational actor explains the seemingly perverse nature of
much biological design. Where efficient human design is normally characterised by
simplicity and elegance, evolutionary design tends to be intricate and complex, yet
effective. This has lead several authors to compare evolution to a "backwoods
mechanic" that makes ingenious use of seriously limited materials through sheer
cunning rather than elegant design principles.
Consider, for example, the eye. On the one hand it is an ingenious device, our
" ... experience of the colours of objects depends on a process of visual analysis that,
though largely unconscious, must be highly sophisticated and complex" (Shepard,
1992: 495). On the other hand, it seems to be built the wrong way round. The "blood
vessels and nerves are on top of the light receptors and this not only obscures the
view, but creates a tendency for the retina to become detached ... An altogether better
design would be the obvious one of having the wiring and plumbing behind the retina,
which is what is found in molluscs like the squid and octopus" (Badcock, 2000: 19).
This peculiar design exists for no better reason, probably, than the historical fact that
"the light-sensitive skin cells from which the vertebrate retina originally evolved were
under the surface of the skin, rather than on top of it" (2000: 19).
This seemingly incongruous mix of genius and perversity is often the distinguishing
mark of evolutionary design as such. And, if it is granted that the mind is the product
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of evolution, then it should be characteristic of the information-processing rules
implemented in the brain as well.
7.3. The Modular Mind
Taking their cue from the nature of evolutionary design, evolutionary psychologists
have proposed a view of the mind that sharply contrasts with the unified, all-purpose
general calculator that is often assumed in writings about the mind. This is replaced
by the "Swiss army knife" model, also known as the "adaptive toolbox" or, simply,
the modular mind. The following is a fairly standard description of the main tenets
behind the idea of the "modular mind".
The picture that is emerging from both noninvase studies of normal brain
function and from clinically defined syndromes resulting from brain
damage from strokes, injury, and neurodevelopmental disorders is one of
different neurological substrates serving different cognitive functions.
This picture has provided philosophers a glimpse into the possibility that
Descartes was mistaken about the unity of consciousness. The
neurological divisibility of mind also provides the key to understanding its
evolution. The Cartesian view of a seamless whole makes it hard to see
how such a whole could have come into being, except perhaps by an act of
divine creation. By recognising the modularity of mind, however, it is
possible to see how human mentality might be explained by the gradual
accretion of numerous special function pieces of mind (Cummins and
Allen, 1998: 3, my italics).
The idea behind the modular mind, is, simply, that evolutionary design would
be incapable of providing us with an all-purpose general calculator. Rather
genetic mutation influences the design of the brain, and this effectively creates
different decision-rules. These decision-rules are then selected by evolution
based on their effect on the reproductive fitness of the individual.
These decision-mechanisms tend to be an "adaptive toolbox", i.e. context-
specific information-processing rules that get the job done. These mechanisms
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relate to a specific function that can be seen as sub-goals of an effective
maximiser of reproductive fitness. For example the landmark collection The
Adapted Mind (1992), edited by Barkow, Tooby and Cosmides, discusses
different "mental modules" related to, among others, social exchange, sexual
attraction, language and our aesthetic sense that can be seen as specific
adaptations in response to certain evolutionary pressures.
This "adaptive toolbox" view of the mind has fascinating implications that fall
outside the main ambit of this thesis. The main point relevant here, and one that
follows from the assertion that the mind was designed by evolution, i.e. a
boundedly rational actor, is that we have no reason to expect biology to agree
with logic. In other words, the optimal solution to a specific problem, given by a
mathematician or logician, will only agree with the satisficing solution,
provided by evolution, by sheer fluke104. Hence, for the most part the innate
information-processing mechanisms provided by evolution will be rules, and
not calculations.
Two reasons why rational choice theory cannot be the final truth concerning
human action have now been discussed. The first is due to the fact that
computational capacity is a finite resource that needs to be effectively
distributed over infinite needs. This implies the existence of certain trade-offs
between accuracy and computational costl05 that gives rise to a sense of rule-
following irreducible to rational choice. The second is that the mind is partly
composed of innate decision-mechanisms, and that these have been
programmed by evolution. Evolutionary design is constrained in such a manner
that optimal results are highly unlikely.
104 The same point is made by Dennet (1987: 51): "But not only does evolution not guarantee that we
will always do what is rational; it guarantees that we won't. If we are designed by evolution, then we
are almost certainly nothing more than a bag of tricks, patched together by a satisficing Nature ... The
demands of nature and the demands of a logic course are not the same .... [T]here has probably been
some positive evolutionary pressure in favour of "irrational" methods".
105 How much accuracy can very simple rules provide? In Gigerenzer et al. (1999) one-criteria
decision-making and other simple strategies are matched against complex decision-making strategies
like multiple regression. The counter-intuitive conclusion reached is that vast savings in computational
cost can come at very little loss in accuracy (and sometimes even a gain where "noisy" data is
encountered and phenomena like overfitting occurs). This is due to "ecological rationality", simple
strategies exploit the structure of information in a given environment to do rather well. For instance,
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These two reasons are independent, but mutually supporting reasons why
rational choice theory is mistaken. It now remains to briefly relate these ideas to
the hedonism being defended in this thesis.
8. The Learned, the Innate, and the Evolution of Preferences
It is surely uncontroversial to assert that some of our information-processing
mechanisms are learned and that others are innate. The innate mechanisms were
argued to be the result of a boundedly rational actor (evolution) trying to
maximise reproductive fitness. The learned mechanisms were argued to be the
result of a boundedly rational actor (homo sapiens) trying to maximise utility.
Innate information-processing rules can either determine a process completely
(be "hard-wired" into the brain) or increase the likelihood of it occurring by
utilising some proximate mechanism. Most innate decision-making rules surely
belong to the first category in that they operate automatically, but this is not the
case with those rules most directly linked to human action.
An evolutionary explanation will normally explain the adaptive significance of
a certain mutation. This does not, however, give the full story when it comes to
evolutionary explanation. An explanation also needs to be given of the
proximate mechanism involved, i.e. of the way in which the evolutionary goal is
accomplished. By what proximate mechanism can evolution get a utility-
maximiser to do its bidding? The answer that suggests itself is the manipulation
of preferences. Those preferences that maximise reproductive fitness can be
expected to evolve at the expense of those that do not. In previous chapters it
was argued that preferences are ultimately to be explained with reference to
pleasure-maximisation. If this is the case, then evolution controls behaviour by
letting those beings evolve that gain pleasure from activities that happen to
maximise reproductive fitness'".
simple one-criteria decision strategies will do well in environments where data is "skew", i.e. has an L-
shaped distribution (1999: 124).
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This implies that there are two distinct ways of potentially explaining the
actions of a utility-maximiser. One would be an examination of the actions that
would, given cognitive constraints, best satisfy his preferences. The other would
be with reference to an account of the evolution of these preferences. Hence,
while economists treat preferences as a given, evolutionary psychology can go
beyond this. This is an opportunity that I will exploit in chapter 6 when the topic
of "altruism" is discussed.
In this chapter it was argued that man, necessarily, is a rule-following creature
in a sense much more basic that the one in which he is a calculator. In the
following chapter I will try to formulate one such rule that should be followed
by any utility-maximiser with our cognitive constraints.
One question still remains to be discussed. If man is a boundedly rational actor,
does this imply that rational choice theory is useless? Below I will give an
argument for why I believe that rational choice theory still has a place in the
explanation of human action.
9. The Status of Rational Choice-Explanation
9.1 Applicability of Rational Choice
Rational choice theory can still, despite its shortcomings, serve as a useful device to
explain and predict human action. This can be illustrated in the following manner.
Imagine a group of beings with the intellectual capacities that are expected of
intelligent people. They know the rules of chess, but are complete novices at the
game. Now imagine that they playa round-robin tournament against each other in a
game with extreme time-limits, where only 10 seconds is allowed per move. Further
imagine that there is practically no time between games, and that they do not get tired.
In other words these novices are playing what amounts to continual chess. What can
be expected of their quality of play?
106 The idea that evolution influences behaviour through pleasure/pain as proximate mechanism can be
found in Darwin, Spencer, William James and others. For a discussion see Badcock (2000: 125-129).
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The novices would start by following extremely simple strategies, and with widely
differing results. Those who happen to hit on a good strategy early on will be very
successful, those who do not will lose badly. It is unlikely that any of the strategies
will be, at the start of the tournament, very good.
Over time, however, the logic of any evolutionary process will take hold. The bad
players will learn from the good players so that the quality of strategies will become
less stratified. The quality of the winning strategies will increase as time elapses. If
this goes on long enough the games will reach a point where the chess that is being
played is, considering the time constraint, rather good. It will probably progress to a
point well beyond the strategy of a being with much greater computational power
who was forced to start playing in a similar manner, but who has not had the
advantage of having his strategy improved by evolutionary trial-and-error.
If it is known that the above had occurred, then there are two methods of determining
the strategies that will eventually be followed. One method can be realistic, and take
the capacity of the players, the amount of games, etc. into account. The drawback to
such a method is that it needs an awful lot of information regarding such detail in
order to produce useful results, and will be incredibly complicated.
The other option would be to simplify the question in the following manner. It can
simply be asked: If a utility maximiser has to play one game of ten-second chess,
what strategy will produce the best results? This question attempts to relate a set of
rules (the strategy) back to an original maximising decision. There is every chance
that the answer to this question will be very close to the strategies produced by the
evolutionary process. It does not matter that the ability to come up with such a
strategy as a matter of rational decision is beyond the cognitive limits of the actors in
the round-robin tournament. Procedurally it would not be an accurate description of
the process that led to these strategies, but the outcome would be similar'Y'.
107 This distinction between "procedural rationality" and "rationality of outcome" is due to Simon.
Procedural rationality refers to the process by which decisions are actually made. Rationality of
outcome (or, "substantive rationality" as Simon refers to it) refers to the outcome that best maximises
utility. (See Simon 1997: 25-26).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
135
This leads to the conclusion that rational choice theory has two main uses. It can,
firstly, be used as a descriptive tool where an actor was performing relative
calculation. In other words it can be used where it is reasonably certain that an actor
had pre-selected certain options, criteria, etc. so that the decision was, within this
context, the result of calculation. Here it applies, both as an account of procedure and
to predict the outcome of a decision. Secondly, it can be used to predict the outcome
of a process that, due to its logic, will tend to converge on the most rational outcome.
Here it is procedurally incorrect, but can be a useful predictive tool. It has the
advantage that it need not take cognisance of the complexities regarding actual human
decision-making.
It should be possible to give an account of the different factors that determine when,
and to what degree, the above method will be accurate. This would include factors
like time, rate of learning of the actors involved, etc. This chapter will not attempt to
present such an analysis. What is important to note, however, is that the applicability
of rational choice is not an a priori matter for analysing all decisions. Rather it would
depend on the existence, in a specific situation, of the qualities that would be the
subject of the analysis referred to above. Whether it would get the answer right would
also depend on the usual intricacies of evolutionary processes of the type mentioned
earlier, i.e. path dependence'I", the possibility of falling into local maxima'", etc.
9.2 Example of Applicability of Rational Choice - Hobbesian Contractarianism
Below I will discuss an example of how rational choice can be used in the explanation
of human action. This will be done with reference to some of the objections
traditionally made against Hobbesian contractarianism 110.
108 A process is path dependent if the possible outcomes are highly sensitive to the initial steps in the
process.
109 Sometimes it is necessary to take two steps backward in order to take five steps forward. A process
that cannot "backtrack" in this way can get stuck in a "local maximum" - a state that is sub-optimal,
yet optimal compared to all states reachable in one move. This is precisely the problem with
evolutionary biological design explained earlier.
110 I wish to insert the disclaimer that the choice of Hobbes as an example has nothing to do with the
main aims of this thesis. While Hobbes's egoism fits in well with what is being argued for here, I do
not wish to defend contractarianism in this thesis as such. Hobbes is chosen here only because I think
that some of the criticism against him misses the point in a way that illuminates the relation between
rational choice and bounded rationality.
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Hobbes views society as the rational creation of self-interested individuals who wish
to avoid the state of nature. These individuals cede their freedom to defend against
aggression to a sovereign who then exercises this power on behalf of the individuals
who ceded it. This agreement then constitutes the Hobbesian "social contract", which
is presented as the notion upon which society is founded.
One objection to Hobbes that is often encountered is that the idea of a "contract"
cannot be an accurate account of how a society actually comes into existence.
There never was such a contract because there never was a time when
men lived [without] a society of some sort (Campbell, 1981: 85).
Language ... is a rule-based activity requiring rule-based learning and
authoritative standards, and yet men cannot make contracts without using
language; therefore it must be nonsense to think of contracts being made
in the state of nature (Campbell, 1981: 86).
The above objections concern both the actual history of contracts and the logical
coherence of presenting it as a founding notion. "Contract" didn't serve as the basis of
society historically, nor can it logically serve as the basis of society. These two
objections correspond to the objections made in this chapter to seeing bounded
rationality as a special case of rational choice. Historically it is not the case that there
ever was a time when man was not already acting, i.e. already a rule-following
creature. In similar way it is not the case that there ever was, according to the above
objection, a Hobbesian "state of nature". Logically the idea of founding all rules upon
previous decisions is incoherent because of the self-referential nature of
computational costs and the infinity of possible options. In the same sense the idea of
founding a society on the notion of a "contract" is incoherent, since a contract already
presupposes social institutions like language.
I would contend that Hobbes can be partially defended against these objections in the
same way that the use of rational choice theory was defended above. In fact, the
above considerations must make it reasonably clear that Hobbes is giving a type of
"rational choice" explanation of society. The above objections point out that
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"contract" cannot have served as the historical basis of society. Hence the analysis
Hobbes gives is, in terms of the earlier discussion, procedurally inaccurate. But the
portrayal of procedural rationality is not the only possible use of the theory of rational
choice. It can be a useful shortcut for identifying the most rational outcome of a
process. And, provided the actual process whereby a society comes into existence has
the type of qualities that allow for the evolution of the nature of society, the answer of
the rational choice method might well be close to the outcome of the actual process.
There is, as pointed out earlier, good reason for using such a method. The actual
process of how a society comes into being is no doubt filled with very complex
processes, depends on historical contingencies, and is inordinately complicated. No
doubt there are a lot of the historical facts regarding this process that we will simply
never know. The procedurally accurate way of portraying this process would probably
have to include something like a large number of rule- following beings that interact in
situations that can be modelled as games with certain equilibria, with external factors
often changing the possible outcomes, or the game itself. This type of analysis would
be extremely difficult to give in full!!!.
Here rational choice proves its worth by determining the most rational outcome of the
process. Such a reconstruction can have valuable predictive and explanatory power.
Predictive power in that it can give a good approximation of the eventual outcome.
Explanatory, in that, if a certain outcome is observed, and if this outcome is also the
one predicted by rational choice, it is reasonable to suppose that the actual process
operated under the constraints of evolutionary logic.
Hence Hobbes can be defended if his claims are understood as a reconstruction,
according to rational choice theory, of a process that lead to an outcome that matches
the one predicted by rational choice. This means that his analysis, even if it is
conceded to be procedurally incorrect or incoherent, is far from being without value.
III The closest thing to such an analysis that we have is probably the magisterial, two volume Game
Theory and the Social Contract, by Binmore (1994; 1998). Yet this is, for obvious reasons regarding
the necessary gaps of our knowledge in areas like history, psychology, etc., still a massive
simplification of the actual process.
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9.3 Relevance of the Debate between Rational Choice and Bounded Rationality
Above it was argued that an understanding of the issues involved in adjudicating
between rational choice and bounded rationality allows for a deeper understanding of
some of the traditional objections to Hobbesian contractarianism. This should come as
no great surprise, whenever one deals with human decision-making or action in any
way the topic will probably be implied somewhere. This issue is often relevant in the
most surprising ways. I will give one more example of this debate's relevance, and
from a field that does not seem to have much use for the writings of economists or
biologists.
It was argued above that realising time to be a finite resource has certain direct
implications for our view of human action. It is probably no accident that there are
certain parallels between viewing man as a habitual satisficer and the view of man put
forward by the philosopher most famous for his writings regarding the relation
between human existence and time - Heidegger. Below I will briefly touch upon
some similarities between Heidegger's criticism of traditional notions of subjectivity,
and the bounded rationality criticism of rational choice theory.
Heidegger rebels against the idea of man as a being who can make decisions, and only
then engage in the world112. Rather he speaks of "man" as Dasein, literally "there-
being", in order to emphasise that man is always already an inhabitant of the world.
As such man does not encounter entities, which subsequently acquire meaning. Rather
"the world presents its significance to Dasein" (Gelven, 1970: 53). In terms of the
analysis contained in this chapter this seems analogous to saying that I am always
already interpreting my world according to a set of rules, i.e. it already has a meaning
to me. I am not encountering the world, and then deciding how to interpret it.
It is within the above context that Heidegger distinguishes between the "ready-at-
hand" and the "present-at-hand". If something is "ready-to-hand" it appears in terms
of its "equipmentality", i.e. the functional relationships it has relative to a particular
situation. If something is "present-to-hand" it appears in its "thinghood". An example
112 "The question of existence never gets straightened out except through existence itself' (Heidegger,
1987:33).
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of Gelven's (1970: 199-200) can clarify this distinction. A heart-surgeon trying to
save a life sees a heart in terms of its capacity to sustain life. This is not necessarily
the case with a theoretical biologist. She will see the heart as a "thing with
properties", rather than as a set of functional relations 113.
Inour everyday encountering of objects they are generally viewed as "ready-at-hand".
This only changes if an object suddenly does not satisfy the conditions that allow me
to deal with it in such a pre-reflexive manner. In other words, if my key breaks in the
lock I will suddenly cease to see it in terms of "opening a door", and start seeing it in
its "thinghood" in order to find a way to view it that will work in this new situation.
This type of view seems consistent with the view of rule-based activity developed in
this chapter. We are always already interpreting the world, different non-contradictory
ways of looking at things are weighed in terms of the goals of the actor. These
interpretations are useful in that they suggest a way to deal with objects, i.e. "a key is
something that opens a door". In this way our perception of the world already
suggests certain possibilities and make others (like: "the key can help steady an
uneven table") less likely to occur to us. These habitual ways of interpreting will tend
to be upset only once something goes radically and obviously wrong. Here the object
is consciously considered in terms of a wider array of qualities, until a new way of
looking is found that again allows for it to be dealt with in a manner that requires little
or no conscious attention. To summarise: people are always already following
interpretive rules in dealing with their environment ("ready-at-hand"). They only
introduce a degree of contextual calculation ("present-at-hand") in order to find a new
rule when the previous rule is obviously failing.
I do not wish to make any ambitious claims regarding the relationship between the
claims of this thesis and Heideggerian philosophy. What I wish to claim is modest,
but not uninteresting. The rational choice view of human agency, i.e. the view that
human action springs from consciously calculating the best option and then acting
I I3 It might be objected to Gelven's example that a theoretical biologist is even more likely to see the
heart "functionally" than a surgeon trying to save a life. Functionalism is, after all, a dominant tradition
in biology. Whether the specific example that Gelven cites is correct does not really matter, the
important point is that the thing will present itself differently in different situations. In other words, we
are always already interpreting the world in accordance with rules to which we are committed.
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upon it, sounds remarkably like the VIew of human subjectivity that Heidegger
rejected. Rather his view insists that man is a being, "thrown" into the world, who is
always already acting and coping in a pre-reflexive manner with things that have
already acquired meaning. This is not at all dissimilar to the view propagated in this
chapter, i.e. man as habitual rule-follower before he is a calculatorl14. It is also
suggestive that these views were the direct result of his considerations regarding the
influence of temporality on human life. In similar manner the conclusions reached in
this manner were largely the result of considering the fact that human life occurs in
time, as this implies computational costs. For these reasons I think that there are
strong parallels between Simon's critique of the "rational choice" view of human
agency and Heidegger's critique of overly rationalistic conceptions of human
subjectivity.
10. Conclusion
The first two points made in this thesis that are crucial to the argument can both be
seen as the inversion of a traditional view. In chapter 1 it was argued that ethical
hedonism is logically prior to psychological hedonism. In chapter 2 it was argued that
this enables a lot of the traditional objections concerning hedonism to be overcome.
This chapter attempted to argue for a similar inversion. It argued, against the
predominant view of the relation between rational choice and bounded rationality, that
man is a rule-follower before he is a calculator.
This was done by firstly considering the conditions under which rule-following can
become optimal, i.e. ignorance and information costs. Itwas then argued that the fact
that human beings can incur computational costs implies that, all else being equal,
rule- following is superior to calculation since it saves on computational costs. Several
hypothetical examples concerning chess and other games were then used to argue that
rule-following cannot be seen as an instance of a prior calculation. Rather calculation
is, for a being with constrained cognitive capacities, something that can only happen
once a context has been specified by the prior adoption, or inheritance, of rules.
114 Calculation was portrayed as a secondary activity in way similar to Heidegger's portrayal of
"theory" (calculation par excellence) is a derived activity arising from praxis ("rule-following"). See
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This conclusion becomes even more pressing when one considers the fact that the
mind has certain innate decision-rules. This means that the mind has been partly
"programmed" by evolution, a notoriously "bounded" designer. This implies that the
information-processing rules of the mind, while effective, will tend to be the type of
thing that would make any self-respecting mathematician blush.
The above arguments lead to seeing rational choice theory as procedurally inaccurate,
but as a useful tool of simplification. It was argued that this view presents an
interesting angle from which to view Hobbesian contractarianism. It was also argued
that there are striking parallels between the rational choice / bounded rationality
dispute and Heidegger's critique of traditional philosophical conceptions of
subjectivity.
What does this imply with reference to the main topic of this thesis? The first part of
this thesis argued for cognitive, egoist, ethical hedonism. The question that this
chapter started on is simply the question "How should an egoist hedonist act?". This
is an instance of the more general question "What actions will maximise utility?".
The first main conclusion of this analysis has been reached. Normatively, this is that a
utility-maximiser with the normal human capabilities should be a rule-following
creature who occasionally calculates. Descriptively, it was shown that, as far as
human beings go, we do not really have any other option available to us.
There are two main ways in which such a conclusion, if correct, will help to advance
the argument in this thesis. This thesis argued for egoism based on the ontological
nature of value. It argued that both ethical and psychological hedonism followed as
the direct consequence of this argument. As such it has to, at some point, try and
explain all human actions as expressions of egoism.
The view that all human action is egoistically motivated in some sense is not new in
philosophy. The task of explaining particular actions as instances of egoism is a
Gelven (1970: 198-201) for a characterisation of how Heidegger views the relation between theory and
practice.
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daunting one, and has been undertaken with varying levels of success. There are great
prima facie difficulties with making the acceptance of such a wildly counter-intuitive
thesis a rational matter. Although egoists have stuck to their guns with vigour, it is
probably fair to say that the balance of the evidence has weighed against them.
Hobbesian contractarianism represented a real break-through in making the argument
for egoism less outlandish. Hobbes' argument that rational egoists would work
together to establish society gave the idea of egoism more rational credibility than it
previously had. Yet the evidence was by no means definitive. It is probably fair to say
that only those who value the parsimoniousness of an explanation very greatly, or the
very cynical, would be persuaded by Hobbes.
A similar breakthrough in rendering the argument for egoism less irrational came in
this century with the study of iterated prisoner's dilemmas. This showed that
cooperation can evolve without the need for a central authority (Hobbes'
"sovereign"). This is a topic that will be discussed in chapter 6, where a host of other
explanatory devices will also be employed in order to make the idea of egoism less
strange.
I would contend that, if the argument in this chapter is correct, it helps to make the
case for egoism similarly less implausible. As such it strengthens the case for egoism,
though obviously not to the same degree as the two examples mentioned above. It
helps the case for egoism in the following manner.
Traditionally authors have tried to show that, by starting with self-interested
calculation, one can end up with a world in which the "moral phenomena" are
accounted for. In this way they have tried to show that the following of ethical
guidelines does not, in general, constitute a violation of egoism. Rather it is an
instance of it, and can even serve as a normative base for it. This is the way the
problem was conceived by Hobbes and others and, while they have had their
supporters, this approach has not been generally accepted.
If the argument in this chapter is correct, then the above way of conceiving of the
problem is incorrect. The problem is not to relate calculating egoism to altruistic
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rules, but one of relating rule-following egoism to altruistic rules. In other words, one
does not have to show that someone who is, in principle, a calculating egoist would
be, in practice, a rule-following altruist. Rather one must show that a rule-following
egoist would be, in practice, a rule-following altruistll5. Or, at least, will exhibit a
certain proportion of the actions we normally refer to as "altruistic".
Surely the task of showing that altruistic rules are an instance of egoist rules is
somewhat easier than showing that altruistic rules are an instance of egoist
calculations. Here there is one problem to be overcome, namely egoism to altruism,
rather than two, namely egoism to altruism and calculations to rules.
This by no means clinches the case for egoism. It still needs to be shown that our
intuitive expectation as to what egoist action looks like is wildly mistaken or
untrustworthy. The argument for such a contention will be made in chapter 6. There,
to be honest, everything but the kitchen sink will be thrown at altruism in order to tum
it into egoism. But one point should already be clear. This is that, if the conclusions of
this chapter are accepted, the idea of relating all human conduct to egoism has
become slightly less strange, i.e. slightly more rational to accept.
There is another important implication of this chapter that needs to be mentioned.
This one pertains to the version of hedonist egoism that is being defended here. It was
stated at the start of this chapter that egoist hedonism isn't nearly as bad as it sounds,
nor as anathema to traditional "theories of ethics as is commonly supposed. Rather it is
the case that the nature of the correct applications of these doctrines are counter-
intuitive. The way human decision-making was portrayed in this chapter must already
give the reader some indication of why this is the case.
I would venture that a large part of what is odious in our uncritical conception of
hedonist, egoist action stems from the following view. An egoist hedonist is someone
who considers the different possibilities, calculates the one that will give greatest
pleasure to herself, and acts upon it. This is an extreme "rational actor" view of
us Strictly speaking, one must show that a rule-following egoist will be a rule-obeying altruist. Since a
rule that is followed is also obeyed, showing that a rule-following egoist would be rule-following
altruist is a way of also achieving this primary objective.
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human agency, one that this chapter argued to be false. The form of hedonist egoism
that is defended in this thesis is a much weaker one. It states that people are rule-
following beings, i.e. attempt to achieve a bewildering array of objectives other than
egoist hedonist ones. In fact, a human being is never a hedonist egoist in the strong
sense portrayed above. A human being can only calculate which option will produce
the most personal pleasure within a very restrictive context. This context will be the
result of rules that determine which options are pre-selected and which rules of
evidence are to be heeded. In other words, egoist pleasure can only function as a
choice-criterion within a wider context of rules (or "norms", or "values"), which are
being followed.
Is there still any sense in which people can be said to be egoist hedonists? I would
contend that, despite the fact that egoist hedonist concerns only rarely influence our
choices explicitly, and then only partially, that there is. Any given utility-function that
is best implemented by satisficing will, over time, be the deciding factor in
determining the nature of the satisficing criteria. In a similar manner the degree to
which a learned rule implements hedonist, egoist concerns will always either reduce
or increase the chance of it being retained or rejected. Any other principle can, if the
argument in chapters 1 and 2 are correct, only function as a criterion for the rejection
or retention of a rule contingently. In this way the logic of the evolution of learned
rules will tend to favour those rules which best implement egoist, hedonist concerns.
In this extremely weak sense pleasure is still "behind it all", and in this sense people
should be, and are, egoist hedonists.
The next chapter will examine one specific "rule" that we are capable of following.
This is the rule that tells us to adopt "truth" as a norm of inquiry. As such it will serve
as a demonstration of how an ethical principle can be derived from the imperative to
optimise utility, here conceived egoistically and hedonistically.
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Chapter 5: Cognitive Ethics - The Value of Truth
1. Introduction
In chapter 1 and 2 an argument was presented for the contention that ethical
imperatives can be true or false in the same sense as "factual statements" are taken to
be true or false. In the previous chapter it was argued that, under certain conditions,
these imperatives, expressed as rules, maximise utility. This chapter will attempt to
combine these two insights and inquire as to the content of one of these rules. In
doing so it is a first attempt to determine the type of ethical imperatives that can be
derived from the meta-ethical considerations defended at the start of this thesis. It will
also serve as a demonstration of the methodology that is appropriate for establishing
that an ethical rule is true or false.
In the previous chapter man was painted as a rule-follower that occasionally, and in a
specific context, calculates. Given that man has certain criteria by which to judge
beliefs, certain rules that assess the evidence, and a limited set of possible beliefs,
man will judge these beliefs against the criteria, i.e. calculate. This is, however, a far
cry from calculation "all the way down". Again, as in all matters, the criteria,
evidential rules and decision as to which options to include will be a result of rules. It
is only within the context afforded by an adherence to these rules that calculation is
possible.
This chapter will attempt to determine the criteria by which beliefs should be judged.
It will ask what rule a rational actor with the normal amount of computational
capacity and informational constraints will use to judge beliefs, if indeed it should use
a rule at all. It will be argued that a rational actor should indeed use a rule, and that
this rule will instruct him to use "truth" as criterion for belief-formation. This rule is
simple enough to recommend it to a satisficer with the normal human capabilities. In
other words I wish to defend the claim that "truth" should be a norm of belief-
formation. If the argument presented in chapters 1 and 2 is correct, then this claim is
true or false according to the same logic that "snow is white" is true or false.
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The chapter will begin by defining the idea of truth. Itwill then argue that this should
be the ultimate criterion of belief-formation. The chapter will end by taking advantage
of the perspective developed within to look at some traditional ethical doctrines.
These share the peculiar quality that they rest on the normative assumption that truth
is valuable. Yet the authors treat it as obvious enough not to try and justify this by
argument. It seems possible that they do not fully realise they have made a value-
judgement, since the works under discussion all dismiss "value-judgements" from the
realm of rational discussion.
2. Definitions
2.1 "Truth"
The exact definition of "truth" has been a matter of frequent dispute in philosophy.
Fortunately such disputes can be avoided in this chapter. "Truth" will be defined in
terms of only one property. This property will surely be granted to belong to "true"
statements, regardless of what one's full definition of truth is.
This property is based on the following: if one's expectations with regards to the
empirical consequence of believing a specific statement are upset, this means that the
statements giving rise to these expectations were false. If one has expectations with
regards to the empirical consequence of true statements, these expectations cannot be
upset in the same radical manner. Simply put, true statements do not lead to surprises
in the same way that false statements do.
This forms the base for the characterisation of "truth" that will be used in this chapter.
Most of our actions are based on a mixture of true and false beliefs. If our
expectations are upset, or the consequences of a specific action is surprising, then this
is normally ascribed to false beliefs that the actor had. We will not call any statement
to which we can ascribe such a "surprising consequence" a true belief. Hence "truth"
can, for the purposes of this chapter, be defined in the following way: a "true"
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statement is one that will not lead to surprises, in the sense of upset expectations'I".
The assertion that true statements have this property would seem to be consistent with
just about any conceivable definition of truth.
As a brief example to illustrate the above, consider the following: A walks to the bank
at 16hOOto deposit some money. A has the false belief that the bank is still open at
16hOO.A's expectations will be upset when she is faced with a closed door at the
bank. This surprising consequence can be ascribed to the false belief that the bank is
open at 16hOO.This would not have been the case if A had acted on the true belief
that the bank is still open at 15hOO.The consequences of acting on such a true belief
would have been unsurprising, i.e. A would have passed through the door of the bank
and been served.
2.2 "Holding a belief'
In this chapter I wish to argue that people should hold beliefs that are true. It might be
objected that to "hold a belief' and to "hold a belief to be true" is the exact same
thing. This would reduce the argument in this chapter to a confused tautology.
For the above reason a behaviourist definition of "holding a belief' will be used in
this chapter. On this definition, "to hold a belief', is to act in a certain way when the
belief becomes relevant to action. In this way believing that one should stop at red
lights can be defined as a disposition to stop at red lights.
The range of beliefs being dealt with in this chapter will also be restricted in order to
simplify the argument. Only beliefs that are relevant to action will be discussed.
Hence any belief, of which I can believe the negation without it changing my actions,
is excluded from the discussion.
Note that the question asked in the chapter concerns the situation where it is a given
that someone will have beliefs about something. The only remaining issue is with
116 Whether there is a matter of fact as to which belief a "surprise" can be specifically ascribed to, or
whether a degree of convention enters the picture is not relevant. What matters is that we will not call
the statement we "blame" for the surprise "true".
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regards to the standard used to select these beliefs. The question whether someone
should have beliefs at al!, and about what, will not be directly discussed. Hence tricky
issues regarding situations where uncertainty is part of the "thrill" or mystery of the
situation will be avoided.
3. The Value of Truth - The True and the Good
The main question being asked in this chapter is "What type of beliefs should an
Egoist hold?". The deceptively simple answer must be that an Egoist should hold
beliefs that will lead to the highest value of experience over time. Hence it must be
asked "What type of belief will lead to the highest value of experience over time?". It
is with reference to this question that the value of "true belief" will be assessed.
"Beliefs that lead to the highest value of experience over time" will be referred to as
"good beliefs", and it will be asked whether "true beliefs" are necessarily "good
beliefs".
Are "true beliefs" always "good beliefs"? The answer to this must be an unambiguous
"no". Many situations can be constructed where someone would have been much
better off if his beliefs had been false. Imagine someone going to the cinema as the
result of a false belief that a certain film is showing. Now imagine that the person
discovers his mistake, turns to leave and is surprised to find an old friend standing
behind him. This chance meeting leads to them renewing their friendship, and proves
very beneficial to both parties. Here there is a clear case of an action based on false
belief that is most definitely advantageous to the person. It is quite possible that
renewing the friendship might not have occurred in a possible world where the person
had not acted on this false belief.
Is the opposite then true, i.e. are "true beliefs" always "bad beliefs"? Again the answer
must be an unambiguous "no". A true belief that the brakes on one's car need to be
replaced before it will be safe to resume driving can leave you considerably better off
than if you had incorrectly believed the opposite.
"True beliefs" can be "good" sometimes, "bad" at other times. In the vast majority of
cases, however, "true beliefs" will also be "good beliefs". To justify this statement it is
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sufficient to consider the vast number of beliefs that are relevant to most human
conduct. Consider the number of beliefs that are necessary if someone is to, for
example, build a house. Any mistake regarding the needed materials, method of
construction, relevant engineering principles, etc. could result in the project being
unsuccessful. The idea of successfully building a house if most of our beliefs about
the relevant actions are false is almost nonsensical. A well-built house is not
something that can be delivered by chance alone. Hence, while it is sometimes true
that a "false belief' can be a good belief, "false belief' is always unlikely to be "good
belief'.
The argument thus far can be summarised as follows: "The True" will tend to coincide
with "the Good", but will not always coincide thus. This leads to viewing "truth" as
the fundamental norm of inquiry, as will be discussed below.
4. The Value of Truth - "Truth" as a Norm oflnquiry
4.1 An Argument for Truth as Norm of Inquiry
It often seems "obvious" or, indeed, tautological to state that "truth" should be the
norm of inquiry. It is not, however, as obvious as it is often taken to be. Beliefs can
have many different qualities apart from their truth-values. We can distinguish
between beliefs based on whether they are true or false, useful or useless, whether
they are held by another or not, whether they can be expressed in ten words or less in
a given language or not, etc. It is by no means obvious that only true beliefs should be
held, for it is logically possible to adjudicate between beliefs based on an infinite
number of other criteria.
I now wish to argue that we should, once we have judged it necessary to have beliefs
concerning a given subject matter, use "truth" as our explicit guide in choosing which
beliefs to hold. I will proceed by stating a fairly straightforward, and, indeed, popular
argument for the instrumental value of holding true beliefs 117. This argument,
however, stands in need of some qualification because of the human capacity for self-
117 For example, Joyce (2001: 178-179) gives an argument similar to the one given below, and
interprets James and Peirce as having given versions of the same argument.
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deception. It will then be argued that the capacity for self-deception has some
limitations that allows a slightly weaker version of the argument for viewing "truth"
as a norm of inquiry to succeed.
The simple argument, in terms of the method of analysis outlined in chapter 4, runs as
follows: An Egoist should aim at holding good beliefs. To do so she needs a criterion
to distinguish "good beliefs" from "bad beliefs". How can it be judged whether a
belief is "good"? This is a matter of determining the consequences of holding a belief.
An Ideal Egoist would investigate the consequences of holding a belief before
deciding whether a belief should be held. It is here where we run up against the limits
of our knowledge and computational abilities. None of us have the ability to predict
the future with any certainty.
The simple argument that I wish to present is designed to reach the conclusion that
people should habitually use "truth" as a criterion by which to decide whether a belief
should be held or not. In terms of the method discussed in chapter 4 it needs to be
shown that this can be formulated as a rule that meets the three criteria for rule-
following outlined in the previous chapter. Such an argument would normally start by
showing that it is almost impossible to know when it is beneficial to hold a false
belief. In the case of "truth", however, it is not necessary to make this argument in
order to show the necessity of rule following. In the case of truth it is not almost
impossible to know when a false belief is better than a true belief, but always
impossible.
When the case of belief is considered an extra factor enters the equation. This is the
fact that a positive outcome based on a false belief is always an unforeseen outcome.
For if such an outcome was foreseen it means I had a "true belief' about it, and then I
could have chosen this outcome based on this "true belief'. As such the false belief
would no longer be causally necessary to bring about the positive outcome. It can be
brought about by choice based on true belief.
Hence, when it comes to the matter of "true belief', an Egoist should follow a rule,
rather than judge cases individually. This can be made fully evident by using the
criteria for rule following stipulated in the previous chapter:
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1. A situation recurs that is alike in a certain respect: An actor has to choose whether
to hold true or false beliefs.
2. Consistently performing one action IS clearly preferable to consistently
performing its opposite: In the vast majority of cases true belief is also good
belief.
3. The actor has no way of knowing when it is better to perform the opposite of the
action, and/or the cost of obtaining this information is prohibitive: The case where
a false belief is preferable cannot be foreseen, since foreseeability presupposes a
true belief about the situation which could be used to bring about the
advantageous state independently of the false belief.
From the above it should be clear that, since an Egoist should aim at good belief, this
implies that she should aim at true belief. If inquiry is defined as an attempt to
determine good belief, then it follows that "truth" should be a norm guiding this
process. Or, to use the metaphor explained in the previous chapter, "good belief' is
the gold coin to be found at the bottom of most "true beliefs".
4.2 Objection Based on "Self-deception"
The above argument stands in need of some qualification. Above it was stated that
any positive consequence based on a false belief could also have been achieved by
some other true belief. And, if I know that the false belief has a certain positive
outcome, then I also know the true belief that will guarantee this outcome. Hence I no
longer need the false belief, and can disregard it. Mostly this is the case; if I know that
the false belief that a film is showing at eight will, by blind luck, cause me to meet a
long-lost friend, then I also have the true belief regarding where I can meet the long
lost friend. This implies that the positive outcome need no longer depend on the false
belief.
There is, however, a class of actions where there is no true belief that can bring about
the same beneficial outcome. Imagine I am nervous about presenting a paper, but the
false belief that the audience likes me gives me the confidence to do a good job. Here
the false belief is causally necessary in order to bring about a positive outcome. This
positive outcome cannot necessarily be brought about by a true belief. The fluency of
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one's speech, the confidence one projects, etc. are not, sadly, under one's full
conscious control. I might well try and guess what I would do if I had the false belief
that the audience likes me, and then try and imitate this hypothetical me. But it will
surely be uncontroversial to assert that, when it comes to confidence, there is often no
substitute for the real thing, no matter how misguided.
In the above example it would be in the person's interests to deceive himself about the
nature of the audience's attitude towards him. And, to the degree that this is
psychologically possible, it would seem an inescapable conclusion in terms of the
main argument of this thesis that such a course of action is to be recommended.
4.3 Relevance of Self-deception
Self-deception IS a phenomenon that has been of interest to philosophers,
psychologists and others for quite some time. The phenomenon is well
documented 118, and, in terms of the analysis made in chapter 4, its existence need not
be particularly surprising. If a great number of the information-processing
mechanisms in the modular mind are the result of evolution, then there is no reason to
suspect that these mechanisms were selected solely with reference to their ability to
discover truth. Rather they were selected based on their contribution to the
reproductive fitness of the individual. And if, in cases like assessing the confidence
one should have in oneself, it would be advantageous for these rules to be set so as to
be slightly biased towards an overly positive evaluation of oneself, then such rules
would be selected.
The above type of situation, namely one where I can sometimes not bring about a
positive result based on a false belief in any other way, has frequently been cited as
providing an evolutionary rationale for the existence of self-deception. For instance,
Trivers (1981)119 pointed out that being able to deceive others can be highly adaptive.
But people are not perfect liars, for whatever reason people do tend to unintentionally
signal the fact that they are lying. This would give rise to an evolutionary pressure in
118 Some interesting case studies can be found in a collection, entitled The Multiple Self, edited by
Elster (1985).
119 For a discussion, see Badcock (2000: 132-134).
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favour of people who are very good at detecting lying, and thereby negate the
advantage offered by deception. However, if one does not know that one is lying, i.e.
if self-deception is possible, then the usual methods of lie-detection would fail. In
other words, "the organism is selected to become unconscious of some of its
deception" (1981: 35)120.
What does this imply for the argument made above to the effect that a rational egoist
should be a truth-seeker? Firstly, it implies that any given person might hold a lot of
beliefs that aren't true, but are useful at maximising reproductive fitness. And, since
reproductive fitness and utility maximisation are often overlapping goals it might not
necessarily be a good idea to try and change them.
For the above reason I will restrict my claims for the virtue of truth to beliefs that we
do not yet hold. In other words I wish to restrict the above "simple argument" only to
cases where I have ascertained that I need beliefs concerning a topic on which I do not
yet have any detailed beliefs. This is not to argue that I should not, perhaps, try and
correct beliefs that I already hold. Rather I will exclude such cases from this
discussion.
This analysis will also be restricted to cases where I have to consciously decide
whether a given belief should be held. Itwill surely be uncontroversial to assert that I
am somewhat constrained when it comes to self-deception. I am pretty sure that, no
matter what I do, I cannot now consciously decide to believe that, for example, I
owned a Porsche when I was thirteen years old. In other words I am claiming that it is
psychologically impossible or prohibitively difficult to believe that I did own a
Porsche, realise that it would make me happier if I did believe this, and therefore to
decide to believe this.
If this is the case, then a qualified version of the "simple argument" given above can
be defended. Consider a situation where I have already decided to acquire beliefs
about a topic, regarding which I now have none. There will be some false beliefs that
120 Such a logic seems well-suited as a partial explanation for "hindsight-bias", i.e. the documented fact
that people tend to overestimate the accuracy of their past predictions. For another justification based
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would have outcomes more positive than the true beliefs. These outcomes can now be
distinguished into two groups based on whether these outcomes could also be brought
about by true belief, or not. If the positive outcome in question could also be brought
about by true belief, then this presents no obstacle to arguing that one should always
aim at true belief.
If the outcome could not have been brought about by true belief, then this still does
not amount to an argument against the notion that, when consciously weighing belief,
one should aim for true belief. This is because of the claim that our capacity for self-
deception is constrained in such a way as to make a conscious choice to believe
something you know to be false impossible.
The claim that truth should be a norm of inquiry can now be defended in the
following, weaker form: When attempting to consciously acquire beliefs concerning a
given topic, try to achieve only true beliefs 121. For the rest of this thesis I will refer to
the claim made here as the idea that truth should be a norm of inquiry.
This renders the mam objective of this chapter achieved. This objective was to
illustrate the methodology of a cognitive Egoist ethics with reference to a concrete
example. It has been argued that the rule "If you have to consciously decide which
beliefs to hold, then you should attempt to hold true beliefs" is true. The fundamental
point of the argument was the part that was always implicit. This is that, due to the
arguments made in chapter 1 and chapter 2, the above rule can be judged as true (or
false) in the same sense that "Snow is white" can be judged to be true or false.
The next chapter will concern the form of interaction that is egoistically rational. First
I wish to take advantage of the view afforded by the preceding discussion to look at
certain ethical doctrines. These seem to depend on the value of truth and yet do not
explicitly admit this.
on computational savings, one that need not contradict the view proposed here but can complement it,
see Hoffrage and Hertwig (1999: 191-208).
121 Note that I am not claiming that the opposite is the case concerning already existing beliefs, beliefs
irrelevant to action, etc. Rather I am simply excluding them from this discussion.
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S. The Moral Condemnation of the Denial of Truth
Certain ethical doctrines, which will be looked at below, can be cast in the following
mold:
1. A certain fact is asserted to be "manifest truth".
2. A certain action is then asserted as being an implicit denial of this "manifest
truth".
3. This denial of a manifest truth is used as a basis for moral condemnation.
What is missing from the above reasoning? It needs to explain what is so bad about
denying, or hiding from, a manifest truth. For, even if someone concedes that a certain
action is tantamount to the implicit denial of a manifest fact, the person can still
maintain that there is no reason to suppose the denial of such a fact to be morally
wrong. In short, what is missing is an explanation of why truth is valuable, and why
manifest truth should be admitted. This explanation is what this chapter has attempted
to provide. Arguments of the above form are incomplete, since they fail to state why
actions should be guided by true belief.
For a famous version of this argument, consider Sartrian "bad faith", as stated
according to the form outlined above (Sartre, 1981: 626):
1. Moral principles are not independent of subjectivity.
2. To act in the "spirit of seriousness" is an attempt to hide this fact from oneself; it
is to be in bad faith 122.
3. "The principal result of existential psychoanalysis must be to make us repudiate
the spirit of seriousness" (1981: 626).
The argument is as follows: To act in a spirit of seriousness is to act as if there are
values independently of subjectivity. Sartre denies that there are any such values.
From this he draws the conclusion that one should not ("must...repudiate") act in such
a manner.
122 "Man pursues Being blindly by hiding from himself the free project which is this pursuit" (1981:
626).
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Such an argument is incomplete unless it has been explained why one should not
attempt to deny such facts to oneself, and unless this argument contains a self-
justifying element'<'. What is lacking is an explanation of the value of truth, i.e. an
explanation of why one must reject what isn't true. Without such an explanation it is
unclear how Sartre can generate the ethical "must" in the above argument.
Wittgenstein's most famous pronouncement operates according to the same logic:
1. There are no ethical facts 124.
2. To speak about ethics can only be possible in denial of this fact.
3. "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" (1983: 189)125.
Above the "fact" that there are no ethical facts is used to generate the imperative that
one "must be silent". Presumably this self-undermining pronouncement was
Wittgenstein's conscious demonstration of the hopelessness of ethics if we accept his
premises. It does, however show how natural it is to assume that truth is valuable. For,
even after "proving" - conclusively to his mind - that there can be no ethical
pronouncements, he cannot quite refrain from justifying his silence on matters of
ethics by including one self-undermining imperative.
Further examples could be enumerated without really gammg any clarity with
reference to the main object of this thesis, i.e. meta-ethics 126. One extract from
Bentham needs to be included, however, to show how far the above type of reasoning
can be stretched.
We have one philosopher (Woolaston), who says, there is no harm in any
thing in the world but in telling a lie: and that if, for example, you were to
murder your own father, this would only be a particular way of saying, he
123 Sartre would deny the possibility of such a self-justifying element: "Ontology itself cannot
formulate ethical precepts" (Sartre, 1981: xiii).
124 "The good is outside the space of facts" (Wittgenstein, 1984: 3).
125 Note that "cannot" here means "cannot sensibly", not "cannot" in the absolute sense.
126 Cilliers (1998: 139) makes an argument of the same type: "To fall back on universal principles is to
deny the complexity of the social system we live in, and can therefore never be just." Here the implicit
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was not your father. Of course, when this philosopher sees any thing that
he does not like, he says, it is a particular way of telling a lie (Bentham,
1982: 27).
6. Conclusion
This chapter tried to determine a specific instance of rule-based behaviour that can be
recommended to an Egoist. Itwas found that "truth" should be employed as a norm of
inquiry. In other words, the rule that, when consciously trying to acquire beliefs, one
should aim at truth, was argued to be a valid ethical rule. This is such a basic intuition
for many philosophers that it is sometimes used to generate ethical conclusions by
authors who claim to have given up on the idea of ethical conclusions.
The next chapter will concern the objection most easily made against egoism. This is
the objection that the existence and desirability of altruism amounts to a refutation of
egoism, both as a descriptive and normative doctrine. The next chapter will try and
argue that our intuitions as to what egoist action should look like are radically
mistaken.
denial of the complexity of the social system is a "manifest fact" that is denied if one falls back on
illusory principles. This denial is false, and hence concluded to be unethical.
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Chapter 6: The Possibility of "Altruism"
1. Introduction
The first chapter of this thesis presented an argument for cognitive, ethical, egoist
hedonism. It was claimed that there is an element of our experience, often referred to
as pleasure, that can count as the ultimate referent of axiological claims. It was also
claimed that this ethical hedonism implies a weak form of psychological hedonism.
This argument, by itself, is not yet sufficient to generate any specific claims as to how
an ethical hedonist should act. Such claims are only possible once an account of the
decision-making mechanisms used to generate action has been given. This account
was given in chapter 3. There an argument was presented for the contention that,
given the cognitive constraints and design history of the human mind, human beings
can only ever be boundedly rational. In other words, human beings can only ever be
rule- followers, not calculators.
This then raises the question as to which rules an ethical hedonist should follow. The
previous chapter gave a defence for a qualified version of the rule that truth should be
a norm of inquiry.
This argument marked the end of the constructive part of this thesis. This thesis is an
attempt to outline a coherent meta-ethical position that allows for a cognitive ethics. It
was explained why people should follow moral rules, why these rules can be viewed
as objectively true or false, and an example was given of such a rule. This chapter will
attempt to defend this general outline of meta-ethics against the most counter-intuitive
implication that it has. Or, at least, against the most counter-intuitive implication that
it would seem to have.
This implication regards that which most people would consider to be the very
epitome of ethical action, namely altruistic action. It would seem that there is nothing
in this thesis that provides for a commendation of altruism, or even an explanation of
its existence.
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Can anything in this thesis be used so as to justify actions that we would normally
regard as altruistic? It should firstly be noted that a defence of altruism need not, as a
matter of logical necessity, be a part of any treatment of ethics. It is not logically
impossible to suppose that there exists a valid meta-ethical system that condemns
altruism, or, for that matter, violates our main ethical intuitions in any manner
conceivable. Such a violation would merely be a counter-intuitive implication on a
par with the counter-intuitive implications to be found in just about any other
academic discipline. If it can be shown that ethical rules have truth-conditions in the
same sense that assertions in physics have truth-conditions, then implications with
regards to ethics that condemn altruism are logically no more strange than
implications in physics that profoundly violate our intuitions with regards to space
and time.
The above reasoning does not, however, justify disregarding the topic of altruism as
merely a counter-intuitive implication of the meta-ethical theory. For, although the
existence of altruism cannot logically serve as a knockdown argument against such a
theory, it does raise several questions. If indeed, a meta-ethical theory condemns
altruism then it needs to explain why our moral intuitions are so flagrantly false and
why these falsehoods are so widespread'r". This responsibility falls to any theory that
upsets long-held beliefs.
In physics an explanation of why our intuitions are false is relatively easy. Our view
of space and time is quite adequate to deal with the everyday world. The phenomena
that call this view into question only arise when distances and magnitudes are
encountered that are of no relevance to what we normally describe as everyday life.
127 Certain basic ethical rules that justify altruistic action seem to almost be cultural universals.
Consider the rule "Do unto others as you want done unto yourself'. The following religious documents
all include a version of this rule as a basic ethical teaching (taken from Harris et al (1995: 167)):
Christian version: "Treat others as you would like them to treat you". (Luke 6: 31, New English
Bible.)
Hindu version: "Let not any man do unto another any act that he wisheth not done to himself by
others, knowing it to be painful to himself' (Mahabharata, Shanti Parva, cclx.21).
Confucian version: "Do not do to others what you would not want them to do to you" (Analects,
book xii, #2).
Buddhist version: Hurt not others with that which pains yourself' (Udanavarga, v. 18).
Jewish version: What is hateful to yourself do not do to your fellow man. That is the whole of
the torah" (Babylonian Talmud, Shabbath 31a) (continued next page).
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No such answer, however, suggest itself with regards to the position of altruism in
ethics.
This chapter will present the evidence for the contention that our view regarding
altruistic action is not radically false. In other words, it will present the case for
supposing that an egoist ethics could still recommend a lot of actions that we would
normally consider to be "altruistic".
At this point it is necessary to clarify exactly what will be argued in this chapter. It
will be claimed that our intuitions regarding the actions that an egoist hedonist should
commit are untrustworthy. It will not, however, be claimed that they are definitely
false. In order to claim that a large number of actions that an egoist hedonist should
commit are of the type that we would normally call altruistic, a very complex
argument needs to be made. One would have to present an argument regarding the
preferences of humanity, the decision mechanisms that implement these preferences
and the game theoretical structure of human interaction. Such an argument would
presuppose great expertise in evolutionary biology, very specific knowledge regarding
human cognitive mechanisms, and an expert knowledge of psychology, sociology and
game theory. It is certain that there is no one person who has all the knowledge that is
necessary for such an argument. In fact, I think it is safe to say that even the sub-parts
of such an argument, i.e. the specific parts relating to one of the specific disciplines
mentioned above, are beyond the knowledge that humanity currently possesses.
For the above reason the best that can currently be done is to give an account of some
of the different ways in which an egoist ethics could possibly be made consistent with
the existence of altruism. This will not amount to a conclusive argument for altruistic
action, but will be an attempt to demonstrate that it is far from certain that most of the
actions that we normally call altruistic constitute an exception to egoism, rather than a
manifestation thereof. In other words, this argument will try to undermine the
justifiability of "altruism" qua objection to the idea of an egoist ethics.
Muslim version: "No man is a true believer unless he desires for his brother that which he desires for
himself' (Hadith, Muslim, imam, 71-2).
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2. Outline of this Chapter
There are four main ways of trying to show that an apparently altruistic act does not
constitute an objection to the idea of an egoist ethics. Firstly, it can be shown that the
altruistic act itself is caused by the altruistic preferences of the actor. Or, in terms of
the view argued for in this thesis, it can be shown that the actor derives pleasure from
the apparently altruistic act. Secondly, it can be shown to be the result of the game
theoretical structure of human interaction. In other words, it can be claimed that the
situation in which the actor finds herself is misleading to our intuitions in such a way
that an apparently altruistic act can actually be shown to be self-interested. Thirdly, it
can be argued that the apparently altruistic act, while not directly caused by the
preferences of the actor, is the direct result of the bounded rationality of the actor. In
other words, it can be argued that the act is the result of a given set of preferences, in
conjunction with our cognitive constraints. The fourth way of turning apparent
altruism into egoism is by arguing that the action rests on some factual mistake. In
other words it can be argued that an apparently altruistic act rests on some error made
by the actor, and that this error is a causally necessary condition for the occurrence of
the act.
This chapter will proceed by explaining each of the above four methods in tum, and
present evidence for supposing them to be relevant to human action.
3. The "Altruistic Preferences" Defence
3.1 Introduction
The easiest way of making apparently altruistic action consistent with egoist
hedonism is to claim that the actor derived pleasure from performing the actions. This
type of defence of maximising behaviour in the face of apparent altruism is most
familiar to economists. Any action that does not serve the obvious self-interest of the
actor, and is not the result of any factual error is normally taken to reveal something
about the utility function of the actor. The uses and pitfalls of this approach have been
discussed in chapter 3. Since hedonist egoism is a form of maximising behaviour, and
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specific preferences can be reinterpreted as causes of pleasure (as explained in chapter
1), the following discussion also directly concerns economics.
Preferences affect behaviour, and behaviour affects the reproductive fitness of the
individual. This means that preferences can be viewed as a proximate mechanism
whereby evolution influences action. This presents a standard for judging the
likelihood that a certain preference commonly exists. If it is claimed that a certain
preference is commonly found among human beings, then an account of how such a
preference provides an evolutionary advantage is prima facie evidence that the
preference does exist. This type of reasoning is not uncommon; it is precisely why we
commonly assume that most people care greatly about self-preservation and sex. The
opposite is the case with preferences that detract from evolutionary fitness. If
someone claims that most people throughout history had a taste for fatally poisonous
food we would not seriously entertain such a claim. Any such behavioural trait would
be too strongly selected against for such a claim to be at all worth considering.
3.2 Evolutionary Altruism and Psychological Altruism
The discussion to follow depends critically on what is meant by "altruism". Since
preferences will be portrayed as having been shaped by evolution, it is necessary to
draw a distinction between the evolutionary concept of altruism, and the everyday or
psychological concept of altruism.
Evolutionary altruism is commonly defined as action that would decrease the fitness
of an individual relative to the group that he is part of, while increasing the fitness of
another individual in the group128. The evolutionary concept of altruism radically
differs from the psychological notion of altruism. It only relates to the consequences
of behaviour, and says nothing of the proximate causes of behaviour. Hence an
"actor" can be an altruist in the evolutionary sense without having a mind, without
having any intentions, and even despite having selfish intentions (Sober, 1998: 460-
462).
128 I am here following the treatment of "evolutionary altruism" and "vernacular altruism"
("psychological altruism") to be found in Sober (1998: 459-487) and used by Sober and Wilson (1998)
in their defmitive treatment of the modem theory of group selection.
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In contrast to the evolutionary notion of altruism, the psychological notion only
applies to creatures with minds, and therefore intentions. To judge an act as
psychologically altruistic is to say that it was based on an ultimate desire that had
irreducibly other-directed propositional content, and aimed at the welfare of another
(Sober and Wilson, 1998: 199-231). An altruistic desire needs to be ultimate in the
sense that it cannot be derived from a more fundamental egoist desire. It must have
propositional content that is irreducibly other-directed in the sense that the
proposition expressing the desire must include reference to someone else. In other
words, it must be something like "I want Jones to have the apple". It must also
concern the welfare of another so as to exclude cases of spite or malicious intent. For
example, the desire "I want Jones to suffer social embarrassment", while other-
directed, would not count as altruistic.
One matter needs to be clarified before proceeding. In chapter 1 it was argued that
"preferences" or "desires" cannot be the ultimate causes of action. It was claimed that
they fail to be self-justifying in the sense that a cause of action needs to be in order to
be ultimate. Yet I will continue to speak of preferences, since it is in terms of
preferences and desires that the academic debate relevant to the argument being made
here has mostly been conducted. In accordance with chapter 1 all reference to
preferences can be interpreted as talk of the causes of pleasure. In other words, to say
that I have the altruistic desire that Jones should have the glass of water can be
interpreted as saying that the possible world in which I know that Jones has the glass
of water has greater value to me than the possible world in which he does not. Hence,
when it is claimed below that a desire that contributes to evolutionary fitness is
altruistic, this should be reinterpreted as meaning that an egoist hedonist derives
pleasure from certain states of the world because they are to the benefit of others.
3.3 Kin-selection
In terms of the above definition, the task of this chapter can be reformulated as trying
to explain why a hedonist egoist will have some ultimate desires that are irreducibly
other-directed, and concern the welfare of the other that it is directed at. The first
source of altruistic desires is an idea known as kin-selection.
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In 1963 WD Hamilton published a paper entitled "The Evolution of Altruistic
Behaviour" that shed great light on problems in evolutionary biology that had
previously appeared unsolvable. Essentially it is an elegant way of explaining why
altruistic actions towards related individuals constitutes an instance of survival of the
fittest, and not a refutation thereof. Hamilton adopted the "gene's point of view,,129
and compared the fitness of two hypothetical genes. One of these cause altruistic
behaviour towards genetically related individuals, while the other does not. If the
disadvantage to the carrier of the altruistic gene is small enough not to outweigh the
advantage to the helped individual (weighted by the degree to which they are related),
then the altruistic gene will be more likely to leave copies of itself in the next
generation.
Here the increase in the relative fitness of the gene will cause it to be selected, despite
the fact that it decreases the fitness of its owner. In other words, any gene that causes
helping behaviour to related individuals will have greater fitness, all else being equal,
than genes that do not, as long as the cost of helping does not outweigh the benefit to
the helped, as weighted by relatedness 130.
3.4 Kin-selection and Altruistic Preferences
Kin-selection is a powerful idea that gives an elegant explanation of why beings that
care for their genetic "families" will tend to be favoured by evolutionary processes
over beings who do not. As such it is a natural starting place for showing how
altruistic preferences can evolve.
Note that the proximate mechanism whereby kin-selection is facilitated need not
necessarily be psychologically altruistic, in the sense of being other-directed. A being
that was born with the desire to optimise the inclusive fitness of his genes would
display all the helping behaviour needed for kin-selection to operate, without any
altruistic desires being required. No one, however, will seriously contend that a being
with such an ultimate desire has ever existed. Rather the proximate mechanisms
129 This idea of adopting the "gene's point of view" formed the basis of "selfish gene theory", as
popularised in Richard Dawkins' The Selfish Gene (1976).
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whereby evolution would implement such an agenda is likely to consist of one or
more other-directed desires that do a passable job of carrying out a kin-selection
agenda (Joyce, 2001: 136). This could be anything from a general desire for the
welfare of a sibling to more specific desires like wanting siblings to be healthy, live a
long time, have families, etc.
Also note that the actual desire is unlikely to make any reference to actual genetic
relatedness. Rather the environmental cue that the desire is directed at is likely to be
something that is merely correlated with genetic relatedness. For example, a general
concern for people that one is brought up with could be used to implement a kin-
selectionist agenda (Joyce, 2001: 136).
Kin selection presents a first method for arguing against the idea that egoists will be
people who only commit the type of acts that are normally labeled as "selfish". Rather
people can, when genetically related individuals are concerned, be expected to have a
set of preferences that are altruistic. In chapter 1 it was argued that an altruistic desire
must be reinterpreted as an egoist concern for pleasure deriving from the object of the
altruistic desire being realised. The argument presented there, in conjunction with the
idea of kin-selection, implies that a general concern for parents, siblings, cousins, etc.,
cannot be used to object to a characterisation of people as egoist.
3.5 Group Selection and the Problem of Evolutionary Altruism
Kin selection can help to explain exceptions to individual fitness maximisation
because the individual is not the unit of selection. Rather the gene is the unit of
selection, and this has implications for the behaviour of the individuals'<'. A similar
130 A being that does this is said to maximise "inclusive fitness", where "inclusive" is understood in
opposition to "fitness" as classically conceived.
131 There is a large literature on what should count as the fundamental unit of selection in evolution.
Some argue for the gene as fundamental unit of selection, some for the individual and some argue for
multi-level selection. In this thesis I will mostly use the multi-level view argued for in Sober and
Wilson (1998). This should not be taken as an important commitment of this thesis, since all the
substantial claims made in this chapter can be explicated in terms of other views. For example, even the
group selection argument can be rewritten in terms of selfish gene theory, should one wish to do so.
Alternatively, kin selection could be rewritten to appear to be an instance of group selection (Sober and
Wilson, 1998: 55-100). Hence the partial use of Sober and Wilson's conceptual frame is based on ease
of use, rather than some substantial commitment. For a good introduction to the unit of selection
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situation obtains with regards to "group selection", where the group, and not the
individual, is the unit of selection.
Kin selection is one of the recognised triumphs of twentieth century evolutionary
biology. This is not the case with group selection. A layman who is used to thinking
of evolution in terms of "survival of the species" would be surprised to discover that
"survival of the species" is an explanation that biologists view with great suspicion.
But reports of the death of group selection are greatly exaggerated. Long viewed as a
last resort for the softhearted (and possibly soft-headed), it has recently gained in
credibility as a method of explaining evolutionary change.
The apparent impossibility of group selection is a direct result of the apparent
impossibility of evolutionary altruism. Evolutionary altruism was defined earlier as
the behaviour that lowers the fitness of an individual relative to that of the group. At
first sight it might appear that this constitutes the very paradigm of behaviour that
could not possibly evolve. One might try to defend group selection by supposing that
certain behavioural traits, while decreasing the relative fitness of the individual within
the group, could still increase the fitness of the group as such. This does not, however,
seem to matter. For any behaviour that decreases the relative fitness of the individual
within the group will be selected against, no matter how much it helps the group. All
individuals in the group will be benefited by behaviour that helps the group, whereas
only individuals who actually commit the relevant actions will pay the cost. This
creates seemingly insuperable "free rider" problems that seem to make evolutionary
altruism a terribly fragile thing.
The situation changes somewhat if different groups, rather than different individuals,
are compared. For now individuals that commit the altruistic acts that favour the
group can potentially be more fit than individuals who are in groups where no such
acts are being committed. The "free-rider" problem, however, still remains. Groups
where altruistic acts are being committed are always vulnerable to "subversion from
within". "Free riders" in altruistic groups are fitter than altruists in the altruistic group,
and hence evolution will, inevitably, favour the "free riders".
problem, see the section on "Units of Selection" in Ruse and Hull's (eds.) collection of readings The
Philosophy of Biology (1998: 147-220)
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3.6 Group Selection, Evolutionary Altruism and Simpson's Paradox
The above logic can, given certain conditions, be overcome. In order to understand
how this is possible it is necessary to understand an apparent statistical paradox
known as Simpson's paradox.
Consider the following scenario. A group of people, composed of a hundred men and
a hundred women, are separated into two groups. The groups each contain at least one
woman and one man, and each group consists of one hundred people. Assume that, as
is often the case, the men are, on average, taller than the women. Simpson's paradox
relates to an odd possibility that can arise with regard to the average height of the
members of the different groups. It is possible that, despite the hundred men being
taller than the hundred women, the average woman may still be taller than the average
man within each group, considered separately. In other words, women are taller than
men within each group, but men are taller than women if we average across groups. In
this case what is true of the particular groups need not be true of the whole.
The above might appear to be impossible at first glance, but can be rendered intuitive
by a simple example. Imagine one hundred men and women that vary according to
height as one would commonly expect, so that the men are, on average, taller than the
women. Now separate them into two groups. Let the one group be composed of the
three tallest women and the ninety-seven tallest men. Let the other group be
composed of the shortest ninety-seven women and the three shortest men. If the group
we are considering roughly have the height-distribution that one would commonly
expect, Simpson's paradox would probably arise. The two same-sex groups of ninety-
seven will only marginally differ from the average of their sex. But the three shortest
and longest probably deviate significantly from the average; there will be very tall
women and very short men. Hence the three tallest women will probably be, on
average, taller than the average of the ninety-seven tallest men. And the three shortest
men will probably, on average, be shorter than the ninety-seven shortest women. In
other words women will be taller, on average, within groups, while men will be taller,
on average, if we average between groups.
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It is important to note that Simpson's paradox depends on the distribution into groups
resulting in a strong correlation between a characteristic of the group and the
characteristics of the members of the group. The correlation in the above example was
between group height and individual height; tall women were in the tall group and
short men were in the short group 132.
This decoupling between the characteristics of the specific groups and the
characteristics of the group as a whole can be used to explain how it is possible for
evolutionary altruism to evolve. The following example (adapted from Sober (1998:
772-473)) shows how this is possible.
Consider two groups, both with one hundred individuals. Let the one group ("S -
group") consist of one altruistic individual (an "A") and 99 selfish individuals ("S' s").
Let the other group ("A - group") consist of 99 A's and one S. Remember that an
altruistic trait is one that decreases the fitness of an individual relative to the group,
but also increases the fitness of another individual in the group. Take the benefit from
altruistic action to be a uniform function of the number of individuals performing the
altruistic act. Imagine that, initially, an S in the A-group can leave 4 offspring, an A in
the A-group 3 offspring, an S in the S-group 2 offspring and A in the S-group 1
offspring in the next generation.
The above figures were chosen so that an instance of Simpson's paradox is obtained.
In both the A-group and S-group an S will be more fit than an A, yet A's are fitter
overall than S' s. Hence the trait of "being an A" will be selected for in the next
generation. This arises because of the strong correlation between the type of
individual and the group that the individual is likely to belong to.
The above, while helpful, does not tell the full story of how group selection can
evolve. For, in both groups, the relative fitness of A's is declining. Each succeeding
generation will also see a decrease in the absolute fitness of A's, until this becomes
132 An interesting instance of Simpson's paradox occurred at Berkeley in the 1970's. The university
was suspected of discrimination against women in its graduate admissions, because the percentage of
women admitted was less than the percentage of men. However, a closer look at the facts showed that,
in any given department, the percentage of men and women who were admitted was roughly similar.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
169
negative. As evolution proceeds the A's will become extinct and S's will survive.
Hence, ultimately, individual selection will triumph over group selection.
The above problem can, however, be counteracted if there is some assortative
mechanism that counteracts the above process. If the groups are resorted after each
generation so that like has a high enough chance of living with like, then this can
counteract the evolutionary force operating at the level of individual selection'<. The
strength of group selection will then be a function of the efficiency of the assortative
mechanism. If this assortative mechanism is foolproof, i.e. if all A's group together
and all S's group together, then the only evolutionary pressure with regards to the SlA
trait will be group selection. In other words, the A's will evolve and the S's go
extinct. If the efficiency of the assortative mechanism is beneath a certain threshold
then individual selection will outweigh group-selection and the A's will go extinct.
In the above model one can expect the usual evolutionary "arms race" to occur. Great
ability at spotting A's or S's can be expected to evolve. This leads to an evolutionary
pressure in favour of being able to cheat by pretending to be an A, while actually
being an S. This leads to an evolutionary force in favour of an increased ability to spot
cheaters, etc 134.
It has now been shown that evolutionary altruism can, because of between group
selection, evolve under certain specific conditions. The ability of group selection to
explain human preferences rests on the existence and efficiency of assortative
mechanisms that have existed in our evolutionary past. Sober and Wilson (1998),
whose formulation of group selection was used above, are scrupulously circumspect
about making inflated claims for the importance of their model of group selection.
The apparent paradox was resolved when it was found that women tended to apply to departments with
low acceptance rates, thereby giving rise to Simpson's paradox (Sober and Wilson, 1998: 25).
133 The same effect can also be achieved if all groups fragment randomly once they have achieved a
certain size. These fragmentations then need to happen often enough, and groups composed of selfish
members only must be sufficiently unfit (qua group) so that they eventually go extinct. Provided the
numbers are right, altruism will be selected for in such a case. See Sober (1998: 474).
134 It is within such a context that an ability to deceive oneself, if it leads to an increased ability to
deceive others, will be selected for, as was explained in chapter 5. It is also within such a context that
blushing, as a signal of an inability to deceive, and, hence, as a signal of being trustworthy, will be
selected for. See Joyce (2001: 144-145).
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Yet they conclude as follows:
The factors that can make group selection a strong force in the absence of
genealogical relatedness seem to be abundantly present, especially in the
small face-to-face societies that existed for most of our evolutionary
history. Human groups do not invariably function as adaptive units ...
[nevertheless] most traditional human societies appear designed to
suppress within-group processes that are dysfunctional for the group, and
as a result natural selection has operated and adaptations have
accumulated at the group level (1998: 192).
At the behavioural level, it is likely that much of what people have
evolved to do isfor the benefit of the group (1998: 194).
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to present an argument for the correctness of the
conclusions cited above. It seems clear that group selection, as defined, can occur.
The historical frequency of its occurrence, however, is difficult to determine. It is part
and parcel of an evolutionary process that it will tend to destroy evidence of its
history as subsequent adaptations outreproduce previously advantageous adaptations.
For this, and other reasons, Sober and Wilson make it clear that the conclusions cited
above are based on partial evidence, and are not beyond correction by subsequent
research. It does, however, seem to be a fair interpretation of the currently available
evidence. And, for this reason, it must have a large impact on the current justifiability
of any claims as to the type of preferences people are likely to have.
3.7 Group Selection as Cause of Psychological Altruism
The existence of evolutionary altruism does not necessarily imply anything with
regards to the existence of altruistic preferences 135. A being could, in principle, gain
all the reproductive advantages to be had from group selection by having a desire to
act so as to maximise the absolute "between-group" fitness of his genes. This would,
135 The positive implications of group selection vis-a-vis altruism should not be overstated. It also has a
dark side. While it will favour intra-group "niceness", it can also favour between group "nastiness"
(Sober and Wilson, 1998: 9).
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given sufficient computational capacity, have been the optimal design for evolution to
hit on. In chapter 4 it was explained, however, why evolution cannot be expected to
produce optimal design except by accident. Evolution is a boundedly rational designer
that can be expected to be inelegant and intricate, but effective.
Group selection does help to build the case for the existence and prevalence of
altruistic preferences because it is easy to see how a group selectionist agenda can be
partially implemented by such preferences. Any altruistic preference that is to the
benefit of the group, but not to the evolutionary benefit of the individual, could, in
principle, be an instance of group selection. This could take the form of an all-purpose
concern for the group of which one is a part, or a specific concern for some of the
individuals in the group, or a distaste for harming the interests of others within the
group through specific actions like stealing, lying, etc 136.
These preferences would then need to be complemented with preferences that allow
the assortative mechanism needed for group-selection to operate. Here other-directed
desires for the welfare of other altruists would be one mechanism whereby evolution
can partly get the job done. The concern for the welfare of others will, presumably,
result in interaction with them that is to their benefit. And, since "group" is defined in
evolutionary biology in terms of fitness-altering interaction, and not in terms of some
other criterion like spatial proximity (Sober and Wilson, 1998: 93), this interaction
already helps to make me part of the other altruist's group:".
Hence group selection gives reason to believe that evolutionary altruism might well
be a historical reality. This provides support for the idea that a considerable number of
altruistic preferences exist. And, since altruistic preferences can be reinterpreted as
causes of pleasure, this implies that apparently altruistic preferences that have evolved
via this mechanism cannot be used to object to the idea that people are egoist
hedonists.
136 A general concern with, for instance, honesty, might not count as psychological altruism, as the
phrase was designed above, since it need not be an other-directed propositional attitude. Yet it might
still have evolved through group selection. This demonstrates something important, namely that
"altruism", as defined, is only one type of "niceness" that can be explained in terms of the processes
outlined in this chapter.
137 In order for the assortative mechanism to operate one could also have some decidedly un-altruistic
preferences with regards to irredeemably selfish individuals.
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The next argument in favour of believing people to have altruistic preferences derives
from the way in which human interaction is structured. These structures are of such a
type that they result in an evolutionary pressure in favour of other-directed, altruistic
desires.
3.8 The Structure ofInteraction as Cause of Psychological Altruism
3.8.1 The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and Tit-for-tat
The term "structure" will be used to refer to the relation between the different possible
outcomes, calculated in terms of fitness, that an interaction, or series of interactions,
can have for the parties involved in an interaction. The structures of some social
interactions can result in outcomes that can be highly counter-intuitive. One of these
counter-intuitive outcomes is that they can result in situations where "nice", or
partially "nice" action can be surprisingly effective. This method of accounting for
other-directed altruistic desires will be explained with reference to the most famous
structure of interaction of them all- the prisoner's dilemma.
"Prisoner's dilemma" is the name commonly used in game theory to refer to a certain
structure of social interaction, or "game", that has the following characteristics. Two
participants have to make a choice without information regarding what the other party
is going to do. Both parties can either "co-operate" with the other or "defect". The
pay-offs of a prisoner's dilemma is its main defining characteristic. The possible pay-
offs are of such a nature that the maximum gain for each party lies in the possibility of
defecting, while the other party cooperates. Conversely, the worst possible outcome is
to be a cooperator if the other party is defecting. For both parties it is better to
cooperate if both are doing so, than for both to defect. What makes the prisoner's
dilemma an interesting game is that, for each party, and no matter what the other party
does, it is better to defect than to cooperate. However, both parties know this, and if
they are rational, they will choose to defect. This, however, is a sub-optimal outcome
as it would have been better for both ifboth parties had cooperated.
The peculiarity of the prisoner's dilemma is that the rational outcome, i.e. to defect,
leads to sub-optimal outcomes. It is easy to construct examples of it. Consider, for
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
173
example, two people who decide to trade items the next day by, for example, leaving
them at different places at the same time. Assume that there will be gains from trade if
both parties actually keep their promise to leave the traded article. Assume both have
to decide whether to trust the other without knowing what the other has done. Now,
strictly in terms of material self-interest, it is apparent that, no matter what the other
does, both parties are better off if they break their promise. But both sides are likely to
realise this, break the promise, and the gains from trade are lost.
A similar situation occurs with the so-called "mortarmen's dilemma" (Ullman-
Margalit, 1977: 30). It concerns the situation of two mortarmen in war who are under
enemy attack. If both stay at their post when the enemy attacks they have a fair
chance of warding off the attack and surviving. If both desert their posts then nothing
stops the enemy from breaking through, and both have a low chance of surviving. But
if one of them deserts, and the other stays to fight, then the deserter has an even better
chance ofliving than if both had stayed to fight. In other words each of the mortarmen
are better off deserting as long as the other stays to fight, but if both desert then they
are each worse off than if each had stayed to fight138.
The prisoner's dilemma was traditionally thought to teach us a very bleak lesson.
Under some circumstances, the structure of interaction is of such a type that
individual rationality leads to social loss. This changed greatly when Robert Axelrod,
a political scientist, did a study concerning the optimal way to behave when two
individuals playa series of prisoner's dilemmas against one another.
Axelrod's The Evolution of Cooperation, which included a chapter on the
applicability of his ideas to biology by WD Hamilton of "kin-selection" fame, sparked
an explosion of interest in the study of the iterated prisoner's dilemma as providing a
basic model of some social interaction'?". Axelrod's study showed that cooperation
could evolve between self-interested parties, even if they are antagonistic.
138 This type of problem is not uncommon in war. A technical solution mentioned by Ulmann-Margalit
is the German practice in World War I of chaining soldiers to their guns. What is interesting is that
soldiers would volunteer to be chained as long as their fellow-soldiers are also chained, thus assuring
solidarity in battle (1977: 32).
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Axelrod invited academics whose work was related to prisoner's dilemmas, to submit
entries for a computer tournament where these entries would repeatedly "play"
against each other in a round-robin tournament. These games were structured to have
the same pay-off scheme as the standard prisoner's dilemma'Ï". The counter-intuitive
result of this game was that "tit-for-tat", an entry submitted by Professor Anatol
Rapoport of the University of Toronto, was the clear winner. What was counter-
intuitive about this is the fact that "tit-for-tat" does not attempt to exploit any other
player. It is also laughably simple in comparison to the other entries.
"Tit-for-tat" begins each match by cooperating, and thereafter simply mimics the
actions of the strategy it is playing against. If the other strategy is "nice" and keeps
cooperating, then "tit-for-tat" cooperates in a like manner, and both strategies score
highly. But if the other strategy is not "nice", then to such a strategy "tit-for-tat" is
also not "nice", and both strategies get a low score. "Tit-for-tat" can never "win" in
any individual match, it is designed to either get a draw or to lose by a slight margin.
And yet it proved a decisive winner at the end of the round-robin tournament.
This was because of the inherent limitations of strategies that are "nice" and not
"nice". A "nice" strategy will fare well against other "nice" strategies, but fare very
badly against a strategy that is not "nice". A strategy that is not "nice" will do well
against "nice" strategies, but poorly against strategies that are also not "nice".
Whereas "tit-for-tat" is above all consistent, it either does well or loses marginally,
this consistency allows it to win at the end of the day.
Axelrod repeated this tournament by inviting entries for a second round. All those
invited to enter were given full details of the results of the first round. And here,
surprisingly, the winner was again Rapoport, who simply resubmitted "tit-for-tat".
Axelrod also held a tournament in which strategies played several rounds, but where
each strategy's score in a preceding round determined how many copies of it
("offspring") would be in the next round, hence determining which strategies will be
139 Thirteen years after publication this interest was still strong enough for Axelrod to declare the
iterated prisorier's dilemma to be the "E. coli of the social sciences" (Axelrod, 1997: xi).
140 It is important to note that these games did not specify a specific number of games to be played. In
such a case reverse induction problems arise. Rather strategies "knew" there was a high probability that
they would meet again.
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dominant if passing through an "evolutionary" process. Here "tit-for-tat" again proved
remarkably successful, "[b]y the one-thousandth generation it was the most successful
rule and still growing at a faster rate than any other rule" (1984: 53).
How can the success of "tit-for-tat" be accounted for? Axelrod highlights four main
features of successful iterated prisoner's dilemma strategies. They are "nice",
meaning that they start by cooperating. They are "retaliatory", meaning they are
willing to retaliate if they get exploited. They are "forgiving", meaning they will re-
establish cooperation after mutual defections if the other is willing to cooperate. And
they are "clear,,141,meaning that it is easy to identify what they are doing.
Axelrod uses these results to make certain recommendations to persons involved in a
situation that has the structure of a prisoner's dilemma (1984: 110-123), and to
recommend certain ways of transforming the setting of situations so as to encourage
cooperation (1984: 124-141). These aren't of fundamental concern to the present
inquiry. What is important to note is the following: cooperation can occur between
antagonistic parties as a function of the durability and structure of interactions, if each
party has a stake in the reactions of the other. Simply put, parties that don't like and
don't trust each other might cooperate if they have a clear conception of their own
interest.
3.8.2 The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, Tit-for-tat, and Psychological Altruism
If the prisoner's dilemma is considered from the perspective of evolution, so that the
structure is defined in terms of evolutionary fitness, then a surprising fact emerges.
The discontinuity between the actor as maximiser of evolutionary fitness and the actor
as maximiser of preferences actually enables certain optimal outcomes to be achieved
that would be otherwise impossible. A being that is in a prisoner's dilemma qua
evolutionary actor need not be in a prisoner's dilemma qua fitness maximiser.
141 Axelrod's use of "anthropomorphic" terms like "nice", "forgiving", etc. is criticised by FA Beer
( 1986).
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Consider a being that has to decide whether to cooperate in a series of encounters, and
imagine the evolutionary pay-offs to result in a typical prisoner's dilemma'Y. Imagine
this being to have the psychological traits that Axelrod identifies as the main reasons
for tit-for-tat's success. In other words it is "nice", and this "niceness" is an altruistic
desire to be similarly nice to cooperative others. It is also "forgiving", and this
character trait takes the form of an altruistic desire to reward those who have made
amends for past "defection". Also assume that it is easy to observe their actions
("clearness") and that they have an aversion to defectors that causes similar defections
("retaliatory"). If the altruistic desires that could result in being "nice" and
"forgiving" are built into their preference structure, then they are not, qua, preference
maximisers, III a prisoner's dilemma at all. Rather they are maximising their
preferences by being cooperative. As long as this preference for cooperative
behaviour is safeguarded by an aversion to defectors that causes defection in kind,
they can be viewed, in terms of evolution, as playing tit-for-tat.
Axelrod showed that tit-for-tat can be a quite robust strategy in iterated prisoner's
dilemmas, and hence that it can evolve. This implies that the type of altruistic
preferences that were mentioned above with regards to being nice and forgiving can
be favoured by selection. Hence the structure of interaction between evolutionary
actors can be of such a type that there will be an evolutionary pressure that can result
in the selection of altruistic preferences. And, once again, if preferences are seen as
the causes of egoist pleasure, this means that certain "altruistic" action can be seen as
instances of egoist hedonism.
142 These interactions do not necessarily have to be with the same being. In a population where
everyone interacts with everyone else just once, and where the structure of these interactions yield a
prisoner's dilemma, cooperation can still involve. Sigmund and Nowak showed that this is possible,
given certain conditions, if the strategies have some knowledge of others' past behaviour and can then
assign them an "image-score" (Badcock, 2000: 100-102). (This type of scenario also suggests how a
desire to talk about past defections and cooperations, i.e. "gossiping" as something inherently
rewarding, can be favoured by selection.) Boyd has also suggested that cooperation, where interaction
between any two individuals is infrequent, is possible in an amended game where it is possible to
punish both defectors and those who fail to punish defectors (Ridley 1996: 80-82). Axelrod (1997: 44-
68) invokes similar "meta-norms" to explain how cooperation can evolve in n-person prisoner's
dilemmas.
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3.8.3 The Limitations of Tit-for-tat
The importance oftit-for-tat should not be exaggerated. It is used in this thesis only to
demonstrate how the structure of human interactions can generate evolutionary
pressures in favour of altruistic preferences. It is not the only structure of interaction
that can have this effect. It is also not clear how much of human interaction can be
said to have this type of structure. The reference to tit-for-tat is being used only as an
example to demonstrate the theoretical possibility that the structure of human
interaction can, in principle, give rise to strong evolutionary pressures in favour of the
selection of altruistic desires, not that it will definitely do so143.
It should also be noted that tit-for-tat, while remarkably robust, is not an unbeatable
strategy in an iterated prisoner's dilemma of the type specified above. It's success,
and the success of any strategy for that matter, is always to some degree a function of
the others strategies that exist in the given environment. The situation also gets
considerably more complex if some of the extreme simplifying assumptions regarding
information in any environment are relaxed. For example, in games where strategies
can make mistakes a clear problem emerges with tit-for-tat. Tit-for-tat will respond to
a mistaken defection with a defection. If the competing strategy punishes defection, a
string of mutual defections can result and tit-for-tat can be beaten by a generous
strategy that forgives the occasional mistake without defecting in return.
One strategy that has been particularly successful in a more realistic game where
mistakes can be made, tactics can be switched and all strategies are not defined in
advance is a strategy called "Pavlov,,144. Pavlov is also known as Win-stay/Lose-shift.
It changes its behaviour if it gets one of the two worse pay-offs, but persists in what it
is doing if it gets one of the better pay-offs. It is a "don't fix what is not broken" type
of strategy. Pavlov is more vindictive than tit-for-tat in that it will continue to take
advantage of a strategy that unconditionally cooperates, but is "nice" in that it will
start by cooperating and forgive defections.
143 The search for prisoner's dilemmas giving rise to the evolution of tit-for-tat strategies has been, at
best, a partial success. There is strong evidence for tit-for-tat behaviour in vampire bats, and also in
some dolphins, monkeys, apes (Ridley, 1996: 71) and viruses (Badcock, 2000: 91).
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The success under different conditions of strategies like the more forgiving version of
tit-for-tat and of Pavlov serves to strengthen the claim for the evolution of altruistic
preferences. It is clear that the behaviour of the forgiving version of tit-for-tat can be
caused by altruistic preferences. The nice behaviour of Pavlov can also be caused by
altruistic preferences, even though these will have to be complemented by some less
laudatory preferences in order to account for its exploitative streak.
3.8.4 A Note on the Relation Between Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas and Group
Selection
Group selection was discussed above as a distinct method of accounting for the
evolution of altruistic preferences. Yet it is reasonably easy to see that the type of
situation that causes group selection to operate can be seen as just another different
type of social structure.
The above examples regarding iterated prisoner's dilemmas all concerned situations
where the only competition is against agents that form part of one's own group.
Group selection adds an important qualification to conclusions reached from such a
study that, because of Simpson's paradox, it is not even always necessary to do better
than the individuals in one's group in order to evolve.
One of the essential ingredients necessary for group selection to operate is that there
must be some assortative mechanism that causes the different groups to be constituted
in a highly nonrandom manner. This type of possibility can be incorporated in the
iterated prisoner's dilemma by giving the strategies a choice about whether to interact
with other strategies. Since the idea of a group is defined in terms of frequency of
interaction, the option of choosing whether to interact amounts to an assortative
mechanism that lets groups develop. Kitcher designed such a game and found that a
nice strategy, discriminating altruism, achieves the same type of success that tit-for-tat
achieves in the more standard game (Ridley, 1996: 81_82)145.
144 Pavlov's was originally designed by Anatol Rapaport of tit-for-tat fame, its strengths were fust
demonstrated by Sigmund and Nowak. For a discussion, see Ridley (1996: 76-80). On the limitations
oftit-for-tat, also see Badcock (2000: 95-98).
145 An intriguing question raised by such a game is the one regarding the ability of people to spot
potential cooperators and defectors. Frank has found that strangers placed in a room for thirty minutes
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In terms of this thesis any situation where the structure of interaction is of such a type
that Simpson's paradox and an assortative mechanism is necessary for selection to
occur is viewed as an instance of group selection. It should however be reiterated that,
as was said in footnote 123, that I am not here making any substantial claims
regarding problems concerning the proper "units of selection" or the relation of group
selection to complementary ways of explaining the evolution of altruistic preferences.
The categories chosen for the exposition of the main points of this chapter make little
or no substantive difference to the points being made here.
3.9 Summary Concerning the Evolution of Altruistic Preferences
Three different processes whereby altruistic preferences can evolve have now been
discussed. The first was kin-selection, which helps to account for altruistic desires
toward genetically related individuals. The second was group selection, which helps
to account for altruistic desires towards individuals that are, in some sense, seen as
members of the same group. The third was the structure of social interaction. Here
prisoner's dilemmas were used to demonstrate how the relative pay-offs of
evolutionary interaction can give rise to evolutionary pressures in favour of the
selection of individuals with altruistic desires.
The above explanations regarding the evolution of altruistic desires were intended to
demonstrate that there is reason to believe that human beings have altruistic desires'ï".
As such it helps to build the evidence for the main claim of this chapter. This claim is
that our intuitive judgements as to what type of actions egoist hedonists would
perform is untrustworthy. If a strong case for this contention can be made then the
existence of "altruism" no longer serves as a strong objection to the idea that people
should be egoist hedonists.
will do considerably better than chance at predicting whether any given person will cooperate in a one-
shot prisoner's dilemma (Ridley, 1996: 82). Tooby and Cosmides (1992: 19-136) have marshalled
considerable evidence in favour of the idea that the modular mind has a "cheater detection" module
that enables it to be much better at seeing the logical implications of conditionals when these
conditionals concern violations of the "social contract" than when they do not.
146 The above reasoning is intended to explain some reasons why human beings can have altruistic
preferences. It should not be taken to imply that all preferences are specifically determined by the
genes. Consider, for example, a phenomenon like the conscience. The conscience causes a powerful
affective response against certain action, and it will surely be uncontroversial to assert that the nature of
these actions will partly be a matter of environmental factors.
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The next way in which our intuitions regarding what egoist action would look like can
be shown to be untrustworthy regards the social structure of the interaction of utility
maxmusers.
4. The "Structure of Human Interaction" Defense
Above it was explained why the structure of interaction between actors, viewed from
the perspective of evolution, can give rise to evolutionary pressures in favour of the
selection of altruistic desires. Evolution can solve this problem in a number of ways.
It could, in principle, create a being that attempts to maximise fitness and for whom
this is the only ultimate desire. Then it could provide this being with sufficient
computational ability to figure out the structure of interaction and to realise that
cooperative behaviour might well be optimal.
The other possibility would be to equip the being with a mixture of altruistic and other
desires that result in the same behaviour. These desires, such as the desire to reward
cooperators and punish defectors imply that the actor is not, qua utility maximiser, in
a prisoner's dilemma situation. In the right context this method would have certain
potential advantages. Simply desiring to reward cooperators and punish defectors is
computationally cheaper than the whole process of analysing the structure of
interaction and realising what possibility would be optimal. This would also be a
potential pitfall, since a radical change in context could make the strategy a radically
sub-optimal one.
If certain desires evolve that save on computational cost by making cooperative
behaviour a straightforward matter of maximising preferences, then the converse of
the above can result. Here it could now be possible for an actor to be in a prisoner's
dilemma qua rational actor, but not qua evolutionary actor147• This provides a new
147 Does the contrast between the actor as evolutionary agent, and as maximising agent, imply that the
individual should be seen as "many selves"? The position defended thus far does, to a certain degree,
take such a view, but does not treat such agents on a par. Rather, and consistently with the basic folk
psychological categories used in this thesis, the conscious, maximising agent is a real agent. The agent
as evolutionary actor is merely a set of processes that can be interpreted by using the intentional stance,
an "as if' -agent. Ainslie (2001) gives an account of the "bargaining" that can occur between the many
"selves" that constitute an individual. This can, in terms of this thesis, be seen as a fundamental conflict
between the real, maximising agent, and the processes underlying maximisation that were selected for
by evolution.
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possibility of explaining how seemingly disinterested behaviour can be related to self-
interest. For, in the exact same manner that the structure of interaction can give rise to
situations where cooperative behaviour is surprisingly effective, so too cooperative
strategies qua rational actor can have the same counter-intuitive effectiveness.
Everything regarding the surprising effectiveness of strategies like tit-for-tat to the
actor as evolutionary agent also applies to the actor as preference maximiser. The
difference, however, lies in that the game-theoretic structure of the interaction qua
preference maximiser does not here give rise to altruistic desires. Rather it is possible
that, if confronted with an action that appears altruistic, this apparent altruism is a
mere consequence of egoism hiding behind the facade of a complex game-theoretical
structure.
Note that, while this type of defense does presuppose the existence of a preference
maximiser with a mind, it need not constitute an undue tax on the computational
capacity of the actor. It is, off course, possible that an actor will figure out the
structure of interaction and act on this knowledge. But it is also quite possible that the
actor is simply imitating the actions of other social beings, conforming to the practice
in a given culture, or using a method that worked in the past in a similar situation, etc.
These practices can all have similar behavioural consequences, without the actor
understanding much about the reason for the effectiveness of his actions. Behaviour
that is similar to that of an actor having figured out the virtues of, for instance, tit-for-
tat, can be the result of a set of beliefs that have behavioural consequences similar to
desires spoken of above when considering the evolutionary actor. In other words the
desire to reward cooperation and punish defection can often have the same
consequences as the belief that one should cooperate and should punish those who
defect.
These beliefs can still be traced to the structure of interaction if the reason for their
adoption is based on their past success in precisely such a situation, and there exists
some mechanism whereby the actor can learn from the past mistakes of herself or
others, even without fully understanding the nature of such mistakes.
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The next method of accounting for supposed altruism is related to the points made
above, and concerns the cognitive constraints of human beings.
5. The Bounded Rationality Defense
It was already argued in chapter four that people can, due to the cognitive constraints
imposed on them, the fact that decision-time is a cost, and the design-history of the
mind, only ever be rule-followers as opposed to calculators. In other words, people
will be satisficers and not perfectly rational actors.
This then has implications for how a specific act of altruism is to be interpreted. Even
if it can be shown that a certain action, given the preferences of the actor and the
structure of social interaction was sub-optimal, the bounded rationality of the actor
still needs to be taken into account'ï".
Consider a situation where cooperative action is mostly optimal, but with certain
exceptions. This is the type of situation that was discussed in chapter four with
reference to the hypothetical actors searching for gold coins. There it was argued that
optimal action will often include unsuccessful action. This is because the cognitive
constraints of the actor makes it too expensive to determine when to not commit an
action that is usually unsuccessful. This implies that, even if it can be shown that to be
a defector is sometimes optimal, it still does not necessarily follow that the actor can
be adjudged an altruist for not defecting. Rather the simple rule of cooperating more
than seems strictly optimal is rational, because of the savings on computational
costs 149.
The above type of situation can result in excessive cooperation when judged against
the standard of a rational actor. The converse of this is also possible. If defection is
148 This could then give rise to an evolutionary pressure in favour of beings who can use such mistakes
to their own advantage, This turn of events would give rise to beings who can spot such beings or can
exclude such beings in some other way, etc. Here the usual evolutionary arms race would occur, as
alluded to earlier in this chapter. It is important to realise that this type of evolutionary tinkering would
not change the fundamental truth that we are satisficers. Rather we just become more and more
complicated satisficers. Trivers ' (1971) visionary essay alluded to earlier cites this type of arms race
with regards to gaining advantage from relations of reciprocity and the resulting process as a possible
cause for the sudden explosion in human cognitive development.
149 This idea is also suggested by Wilson (1998: 486) and Ruse (1986).
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often optimal, and the exceptions where one should cooperate are too computationally
expensive to find, this will result in "surplus" defections. For this reason I wish to be
careful about exactly about what is being claimed.
It is possible that the cognitive constraints of human beings and the nature of their
environment causes more altruism than would otherwise be the case, if all interactions
are considered. But it is also possible that, if all cases are considered, the opposite is
true, i.e. that our relative stupidity results in more "selfish" behaviour than would
otherwise be the case. But it does seem certain that there will be some specific cases
where bounded rationality causes us to cooperate where we otherwise would not. This
means that there exists the possibility that any given instance of supposed altruistic
action can simply be the result of our constrained cognitive capacities.
6. The Cognitive Error Defense
The last way of accounting for apparently altruistic action is also the simplest. It is
possible that the actor in question could simply have made some or other mistake.
This mistake can be a simple one as to the nature of a situation or the nature of an
actor. It could also be the type of simple error in reasoning that we all sometimes fall
victim to. The negative consequences of such mistakes make it unlikely that an actor
is likely to make systematic and persistent mistakes of this nature.
A more serious problem can arise because of mistakes with regards to ethics as such.
If the central claim of this thesis is true, i.e. if people should be egoist hedonists, then
the history of thought concerning the basis of morality is false. This means that the
belief system of most people with regard to why actions should be committed is false.
This is not an implication that only follows from egoist hedonist premises. The mere
fact that there are a number of conflicting views with regards to the nature of morality
guarantees, as a matter of logic, that most people who have had an explicit view on
this issue have been wrong.
Such basic mistakes can wreak absolute havoc with regards to the actions resulting
from them. Consider the case of someone being a rather crude utilitarian. There are
certain actions that would be recommended by utilitarian premises that would conflict
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with that recommended by egoist hedonism. And yet this would not constitute a
refutation of egoism, rather these actions in question can be made consistent with
egoism by showing them to rest on a factual mistake with regard to the nature of
morality.
The implications of the above reasoning are not as disastrous as one would intuitively
suppose. It is a curious fact, much commented on by writers in ethics, that the most
divergent moral systems will often recommend the same type of action when applied
to specific cases. The categorical imperative, utilitarianism, ethical intuitionism and
virtue-ethics would all agree that a drowning stranger should definitely be saved if
this can happen without any great danger to the actor. Some reasons for supposing
that an egoist hedonist should also save the drowning stranger have also been
advanced above. Hence the degree to which such fundamental mistakes, if indeed that
is what they are, would cause sub-optimal action is less than one would expect. Yet,
since all moral systems do not always agree, it does present a powerful way of
explaining why certain apparently altruistic actions need not pose a challenge to
egoist hedonism 150.
7. Conclusion
The main focus of this chapter was to argue that our idea of what egoist hedonist
action would look like is untrustworthy. There are several ways in which action that
appear altruistic can be shown to be consistent with viewing the actor as an egoist
hedonist. It can firstly be shown that there would have been evolutionary pressure in
150 The existence of altruism would seem to pose a challenge to my claims regarding egoism. In similar
fashion, the existence of masochism seems to pose a challenge to my claims regarding hedonism. I
think that problems regarding masochism can be dealt with in a way similar to how altruism was dealt
with in this chapter. It should be noted that my main claim is with regards to ethical hedonism. No
action can, in principle, falsify a normative doctrine, and hence no conception of masochist action can
be a knockdown-argument against the normative thesis. This is not to deny that some account of why
the normative injunction is not heeded is necessary. Here the following possibilities present
themselves. Firstly, an act of apparent masochism can be instrumentally valuable with regards to
obtaining pleasure. Secondly, the choice for the masochistic act can rest on a cognitive mistake, or be
the result of the boundedly rational nature of the actor. A third possibility is more speculative.
Ordinarily pain and pleasures are not the objects explicitly sought or avoided by the actor. Rather the
actor will seek some other object, and the resultant experience will have a certain value as quality of
the experience. It seems a possibility that, under certain circumstances, pain can enter into experience
as the "object" of experience, without this necessarily affecting the value of experience adversely. This
would be the converse of the common observation that pleasure often diminishes if one focuses one's
concentration on the pleasure, instead of the object of the pleasurable experience.
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favour of actors who gain pleasure from the welfare of others. This is because of kin-
selection, group selection, and the structure of social interaction between evolutionary
agents. The structure of interaction between preference maximisers can also, and for
the same reason, often make apparently altruistic ways of acting surprisingly
effective.
The other two ways whereby apparent altruism can be turned into egoism both
involve our cognitive limitations. The first of these concerns our bounded rationality.
There will be cases where simple cooperative strategies might well be optimal if our
constrained computational capacities are taken into account. There also exists the
possibility that a given action was based on a mistake. Since it is a simple matter of
logic that most people throughout history have had mistaken beliefs regarding the
nature of morality, this is a potentially very powerful way of explaining apparently
troublesome actions.
The discussion in this chapter concludes the work in this thesis regarding specific
rules and strategies that an egoist hedonist should follow. The next chapter will
concern more abstract matters that have been implicit in the discussion thus far. These
regard fact, value, and the nature of objectivity.
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Chapter 7: Objectivity, Fact and Value
1. Introduction
The identification of value with the value of experience of a subject allows for the
treatment of normative statements as a subset of descriptive statements. This view has
certain epistemological implications; the first is that problems regarding the
naturalistic fallacy are overcome. It now remains to demonstrate some of the further
implications of such a view.
If a philosopher accepts the radical discontinuity between fact and value he seems to
have three possible responses. The first is to treat this distinction as indicating that
there are two different types of knowledge, both with their own logically distinct
criteria of validation, i.e. "scientific" and "ethical". This thesis opposes such a view.
Instead it tries to develop a conception of value that allows value-judgements to be
treated as a subset of descriptive statements. This chapter will argue that this
conception of the relation between fact and value allows for light to be shed on issues
in philosophy concerning our understanding of "objectivity". Itwill be argued, simply
put, that the conception of "objectivity" as "value-free" is a mistake. Rather
"objectivity" should be seen as a value. It will also be argued that this does not have
any impact whatsoever on the coherence and intelligibility of what is important about
our traditional conception of objectivity. Simply put, even if objectivity is recognised
to be a value, this does not, by itself, make it any less "objective".
The above conclusion can be shown to follow from a weaker assumption concerning
the relation between fact and value than the one developed in this thesis. It does not
only follow from viewing value-judgements as a subset of descriptive judgements, but
also from any view that allows fact and value to be distinct. The idea they are distinct
is both important to our understanding of objectivity and is fundamental to this thesis
in that it is an assumption underlying the central claim being made. For this reason
some of the most influential objections, mainly drawn from Putnam's Reason, Truth
and History, will be argued to be baseless.
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The chapter will end by considering one historically influential school of thought that
seems to have sometimes supported its main conclusions by using arguments that rest
on a misconstrual of the relation between fact and value. This school of thought is
pragmatism.
2. The Relation Between Fact and Value
The claim that the "good" is a quale about which we can have true knowledge leads to
a very simple view of the relation between fact and value. Value-judgements simply
become a subset of descriptive judgements, capable of being assigned a truth-value in
virtue of an entity that is independent of its representation in language. Determining
the value of anything does not, if the above conceptualisation is accepted, raise any
great conceptual difficulty. The value of a state of affairs is the difference in value,
understood as a quale, between the possible world in which the state of affairs exists
and the possible world that would result if the state of affairs does not exist. Any
judgement as to this difference is true or false in virtue of its relation to the fact as to
what the difference is.
3. Relevance of the Above View of Fact and Value to "Objectivity"
The notion of "objectivity", both as it applies to science and other activities, is a much
contested idea in philosophy. A defense of this notion in its entirety is obviously not a
matter that can be undertaken here. Yet there is one specific objection to the ideal of
objectivity that can be shown to be groundless if the main idea of this thesis are
accepted.
"Objectivity" is often, mostly within the realms of scientific practice, defined in terms
of "value-neutrality" or "value-freedom". Here it is supposed that, when doing
science, one should not bring one's prejudices to the laboratory. Rather we should just
try and determine what nature is actually trying to tell us, without imposing our views
upon her. It does not state that scientists should not make value-judgements, just that
they should not make them qua scientists. Rather they should be reserved for the
scientist's private life and the occasional letter to the editor.
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This type of view of objectivity is not that difficult to upset. If objectivity is
understood in terms of value-freedom, one just needs to show that the scientist has
some goal that he is trying to achieve, hence he cannot be value-free. He cannot even
object that he is just trying to ascertain "truth", for, as argued in chapter 5, the criteria
whereby we determine whether to accept or reject a belief, i.e. truth, is itself based on
a value-judgement. Even a seemingly "disinterested" search for truth still presupposes
the scientist's judgement that "truth" is the type of thing we need more of.
The above reasomng seems to be valid, and will not be challenged. What will,
however, be challenged is the view that some rather radical conclusions follow from
these premises. For instance, it has been suggested that, since science cannot be value-
free, "corrective biases" and "progressive political values" need to be introduced into
science':".
It will be argued that seeing "value-neutrality" to be impossible does not establish
anything interesting. Rather the idea of "objectivity" as "value-freedom" was a bad
conceptualisation of what is important about the idea of "objectivity". If one accepts
that value-judgements are a subset of descriptive judgements, then realising the above
conceptualisation to be false implies nothing with regards to debates concerning
"relativism vs. foundationalism", or anything of the sort. Rather the traditional
conceptualisation is interesting only as an example of how muddled thinking can be
used in support of questionable ideas.
The above conclusion, however, does not only follow from viewing the good as a
quale. Nor does it only follow from believing that there are representation-
independent entities in virtue of which value-judgements are true or false. An
improved understanding of "objectivity", one that safeguards what is important in the
traditional notion from attack by the above argument, can be reached if fact and value
are understood to be distinct.
The idea that fact and value can at all be distinguished has not escaped criticism. If
they are not conceptually distinct then the implications for this thesis are dire. The
151 This characterisation of "social constructivist"-doctrine is found, and excellently criticised, in
Koertge (1998: 4).
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idea that values can be a subset of facts clearly rests on the assumption that some
distinction can be drawn between fact and value. Hence this issue will be examined
below in some detail; both because the distinction between fact and value is vital to
this thesis and because it allows the notion of "objectivity" to be clarified.
4. The Distinction Between Fact and Value
4.1 Definitions
At the start of this thesis, "fact" was defined as the extra-linguistic reality, in virtue of
which a proposition's truth-value is determined. Note that this definition does not
commit one to any particular definition of "truth". If one defines "truth" as
correspondence, then the truth-value of a proposition is determined by the
corresponding fact. If one defines "truth" as coherence, then "facts" constitute the
ontological commitment demanded by a given theory if the theory is to be consistent.
"Value" was be defined as the irreducible152 goodness or badness of an object, action,
etc. A "value-judgement" is then a judgement regarding the irreducible "goodness",
"badness", etc., of something, or the equivalent judgement that something "should" or
"should not" be done.
Using these definitions, a "standard account" of the case for the seperability of fact
from value can be given. States of affairs can be asserted to have certain properties.
One of these properties is the goodness or badness (however understood) of the state
of affairs. In this manner I can describe a certain act of killing as morally wrong, as
having been committed by Jones and as having been done by using a knife. I can go
further by saying that this information is valuable to the police, that it is bad for Jones
if the police have this information, etc.
Here factual judgements and value-judgements can apparently be clearly separated. In
this example the fact that Jones committed the act of killing stands in no logical
relation to the assertion that this was done using a knife, i.e. there is no apparent
152 "Irreducible" is here used to exclude any use of "good" or "right" that can be defined without using
"value-terms". Hence cases where something is "good" or "bad" inasmuch as it satisfies a given goal,
or the logically equivalent "conditional/hypothetical should", are excluded.
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contradiction involved in agreeing that Jones did commit the act, but denying that it
was done using a knife. In a similar manner the assertion that Jones committed the act
of killing stands in no logical relation to the assertion that this was morally wrong, i.e.
there is no apparent contradiction involved in agreeing that Jones did commit the act,
but denying that it was morally wrong. In a similar manner it is logically possible that
Jones did commit the act, but that this information is useless to the police, etc.
I wish to make it clear that it is the fact/value distinction that is being defended here,
not the fact/value dichotomy. In other words, I am defending the idea that facts and
values are ontologically distinct, which implies that factual judgements can be
separated from value-judgements. The idea of a fact/value dichotomy seems most
often used to refer to the idea that only factual judgements refer, whereas value-
judgements are non-cognitive. The fact/value dichotomy depends on the intelligibility
of the fact/value distinction, but asserts something extra. This is that the objects of a
value-judgement (i.e. irreducible goodness or badness) are not instantiated. This thesis
tries to present an argument that allows the distinction to be maintained, but escapes
this dichotomy.
Hence the cognitive status of value is not being pre-judged. If value-judgements are
descriptive, i.e. there is a matter of fact that determines the truth or falsity of value-
judgements, then an assertion of value refers to a fact about a given object. Facts
about values are then - to use an example from Pigden (1993: 421-431) - a perfectly
delineable subspecies of facts in general in the same sense that facts about hedgehogs
are a perfectly delineable subset of facts in general. No one has ever doubted that the
fact/hedgehog distinction is dubious. If naturalism or intuitionism is true then the
fact/value distinction is of the same type.
If value-judgements are non-descriptive, i.e. there is no matter of fact that determines
the truth or falsity of value-judgements, then the situation is even clearer. In the case
of a fact/value dichotomy, the realm of statements that can be true or false in virtue of
a fact necessarily excludes value-judgements. No clearer case for the strict separation
of fact from value can be asked for. Whether value-judgements are then taken to be
nonsense, emotive utterances, commands, prescriptions, intersubjective rules of
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action, etc. does not matter. The idea of descriptivity provides an insuperable basis for
the fact/value distinction.
If the case for the separation of fact from value is as strong as it was portrayed to be
above, then how is it possible that some very capable philosophers can ask us to drop
this distinction? There are three possibilities that either suggest themselves or occur in
the literature. These will be examined in tum.
4.2 "Entanglement 1": "Truth" is Identical to "Value"
The separation of fact from value portrayed above might be seen as circular. "Fact"
was defined in terms of extralinguistic reality and truth, whereas value was defined as
a property of facts. It might be argued that the above definitions beg the most
important question, namely whether it is possible to form a conception of facts or
truth independently of value.
A pragmatist might well make this type of objection. William James stated that the
concept of truth is "essentially bound up with the way in which one moment in our
experience may lead us towards other moments which it will be worth while to have
been led to" (1978: 98; my italics). Here truth is explicitly tied to the idea of being
valuable. Indeed James makes the famous pronouncement that there is no difference
between saying "it is true because it is useful" and "it is useful because it is true"
(1978: 98).
If "useful" and "true" are synonyms+", then separating fact and value would be like
separating "bachelors" from "unmarried men". Here fact and value are not
"entangled", nor is the distinction "blurry", but there simply are no two things to
become entangled. Rather statements have a property, the "degree to which they are
useful to believe", and saying that a statement is true or that there exists a fact in
virtue of which it is true is just an inelegant and/or misguided way of again affirming
the existence of this property. Here the fact/value distinction disappears, not because
153 Rorty sometimes seems to endorse this view of "truth" as merely meaning "useful": '''P' and 'we
are better off even now if we believe 'p' come pretty close, for pragmatists, to saying the same thing."
(Rorty, 1997: 19).
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facts and value are inseparable, or because of some subtlety regarding value-
judgements, but because there simply are no facts in the sense defined above.
This is a clear instance of the fact/value distinction being "overcome", but only for the
rather brutal reason that facts are thrown out the window. Such a crude version of
pragmatism removes all constraints from the process of belief- formation. If it has any
validity then it might seem good news indeed, for now everything that I wish to be the
case is, by definition, true. But clearly people hold any number of beliefs that they
would have preferred to be otherwise. Hence there must be at least one constraint on
belief-formation over and above "usefulness". Regardless of what this constraint is
taken to be, it can be used to give content to the notion of "facthood".
It is doubtful whether any philosopher has ever defended, or consistently defended,
the crude pragmatism outlined above. Rather James is sometimes interpreted as
adding constraints like "correspondence" and "coherence" 154, while Rorty would also
add the constraint of being able to justify my beliefs to other people (Rorty, 1997: 9).
Any argument regarding the validity of such positions fall outside the scope of this
thesis. But note that, if one believes "truth" to name a set of constraints on belief-
formation, there is again no reason to believe that facts and values are, in any sense,
hard to separate.
Holding "truth" to be a set of constraints on belief-formation amounts to saying that
beliefs can "correspond", "cohere", "be valuable" and "be generally agreed upon",
and that "truth" is simply a name for one or more of these properties. Statements that
affirm that a given belief is valuable, while denying one or more of the other
properties, are evidently not tautological or self-contradictory. Hence there does not
appear to be any prima facie reason to think that they are not conceptually distinct,
and to abandon the "standard account" of the fact/value distinction as outlined above.
There would be a problem about the tautological or self-contradictory nature of such
statements only if one of these properties was simply a confused synonym for "value".
This is the position that was sketched above, and, if anyone seriously holds it, they
154 This interpretation of James is criticised below.
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might rightfully object to the "fact/value-distinction". But it is probably fair to say
that the onus of defending such a position would rest on them.
If pragmatists - and others - do not doubt the fact/value distinction based on an
identification of "value" with "truth", then what does this doubt rest on?
4.3 "Entanglement" 2: Certain Factual Claims are Also Value-claims
4.3.1 Putnam's Argument
Putnam is another pragmatist who insists that the distinction between facts and values
is "fuzzy,,155. He sets forth two arguments that will be considered here, the first rests
on the existence of expressions like "He is inconsiderate" or "She will do anything for
money". These expressions clearly convey some information about someone, but it is
also fairly clear that they convey a negative valuation of someone.
Before considering his argument, it should be noted that this phenomenon does not, of
itself, present any reason for abandoning the "standard account" set out above. If fact
and values are believed to be distinct, then this is no reason to be surprised at the
existence of terms that can be used to assert both something about value and fact.
There are many terms that can be defined by using conceptually distinct elements. In
this way "bachelor" can be defined as "unmarried" and "man", "lawyer" as
"practitioner" and "law", etc. There is no reason to suppose that there cannot,
similarly, be terms that are defined in terms of "goodlbad" and of the "something"
being called "good,,156. Hence the easiest definition of cases like "inconsiderate"
would be to distinguish between "good" and "the actions that are being called
"good". Or to explain "She will do anything for money" in terms of "the actions she
would commit" and "badness". Or, to put it more generally, to treat the contribution
of any such term to a sentence in terms of its "object" and the "evaluation of this
object".
155 His arguments, the clearest for such a contention that I have found, are set forth in Chapter 6 and
Chapter 9 of Reason, Truth and History (1981).
156 Instances less innocuous than "inconsiderate" - in the sense that they can smuggle normative claims
into descriptive arguments - would include "normal", "natural", "reasonable", "traditional" and the
like.
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The above analysis is one Putnam labels the "two-components theory" (1981: 203),
and rejects (203-205). His reasoning is as follows: In order to separate the
"evaluative" from the "factual", one would need to restate the "factual" in language
that does not contain any "evaluative claims". However, any analysis into the
language of physics (as supposedly "value-free" language par excellence) would fail
to capture the meaning of "inconsiderate". Any "particles in motion" description of,
for instance, "action" would not mean the same as "action,,157.
The same goes for any" ... ordinary language predicate whose conditions of
application do not mesh well with those which govern physical concepts. What this
means is that, if there are two components to the meaning of 'X is considerate', then
the only description we can give of the 'factual meaning' of the statement is that it is
true if and only if X is considerate. And this trivialises the notion of a factual
component" (205).
Putnam's objection is that, if we wish to separate the "factual" from the "evaluative"
content of a term, we can only state the "factual component" by employing the term
itself. Any such attempt would clearly have to assume that such a separation is
possible, i.e. that fact and value are onto logically distinct. Hence it cannot be
presented as an argument for such a separation.
4.3.2 Reply to Putnam's Argument
The first and obvious objection to Putnam's opposition to the fact/value distinction is
that he is constantly separating "fact" from "value" himself158. In fact, the very ability
to come up with examples that have both factual and normative components seems
157 For reasons of brevity I have not used Putnam's example. The above is, however, intended to be
equivalent to his reasoning.
158 Putnam admits this prima facie objection, in that he repeatedly refers to " ... two factors, rational
acceptability and relevance" (202). But he then states that they are "interdependent in any real
context ... ". What constitutes a "real context" is left unexplained, one might well ape the Austin of
Sense and Sensibilia and ask what an "unreal", "fake" or "imaginary" context might be. The statement
does not seem to mean anything more than an assertion that there are contexts in which words convey
both fact and value, something no one would seriously dispute. (Putnam does add that the use of any
word, etc. involves one in a "history, a tradition of observation, generalisation, practice and theory"
(203). This, however, is an unrelated argument, discussed in (4.4) below.)
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impossible to explain unless Putnam has a reasonably clear notion of "fact", "value",
and the conditions under which they are both present.
The more serious objection is to his assertion that we can only specify the meaning of
terms like "considerate" by using terms like "considerate", which is not at all helpful.
But consider the statement "It is good to be inconsiderate". This might well, on the
surface, appear to be a statement that is self-contradictory, since it ascribes
"goodness" to something that is, by definition, "bad". Such a statement might well
seem akin to saying that "Circles are square" or "bachelors are married".
But there is an important difference between "Circles are square" and "It is good to be
inconsiderate". Someone who states that circles are square will merely be met with
puzzled stares. Such a statement is unintelligible; all that can be deduced is that the
person does not know the meaning of "circle" or "square". But the statement "It is
good to be inconsiderate" does not need to be interpreted in like manner. In fact I
would venture that very few people would be at all mystified by the meaning that the
speaker is trying to convey.
For clearly the speaker can be interpreted as saying that certain actions, which we
refer to as "inconsiderate", are good or should be committed. Here the speaker is
simply disagreeing with the valuation of a certain set of actions. And, while one
might wish to quibble about his use of the term "inconsiderate", this is not necessary
for a perfectly intelligible argument about the moral worth of those actions we
normally call "inconsiderate" to occur.
How does the above affect Putnam's argument? If, as Putnam says, the "evaluative
content" of "inconsiderate" is inextricably tied to the "factual content", then a
disagreement about the moral worth of "inconsiderateness" would be unintelligible.
Simply put, the statement "inconsiderateness is bad" would be tautological and the
statement "inconsiderateness is good" would be self-contradictory. And any argument
about the "badness" of "inconsiderateness" could only be an argument about the rules
governing the use of the term "inconsiderate". But, clearly this is not the only
interpretation of the statement "inconsiderateness is bad". Using a weak
hermeneutical principle of charity, one which only assumes the speaker to be a
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
196
reasonably competent user of language, the statement "inconsiderateness is bad" can
be given a non-analytic interpretation. This non-analytic (not tautologous or self-
contradictory) interpretation of "inconsiderateness is bad" is only possible if the
evaluative element can be separated from the non-evaluative component, as is
claimed by the "two components theory".
This presents the possibility of answering Putnam's challenge, without resorting to
what he calls the myth that scientific description is the "One True Theory" (1981: xi).
The "factual meaning" of "inconsiderate" can simply be defined as the meaning of the
term "inconsiderate", as used in the phrase "inconsiderateness is good". Whether
these conditions can also be stated in any other way is simply beside the point. The
intelligibility of "inconsiderateness is good" logically guarantees the existence of
non-evaluative uses of "inconsiderate". And these uses are necessarily distinct from
evaluative uses, otherwise the intelligibility of "inconsiderateness is good" would
disappear.
The same can be done with any term/phrase that has both normative and factual
content. It is only possible to ask about the value of anything if the "goodness" or
"badness" is conceptually distinct from the "thing, action, etc." being called good or
bad. And in each case the non-evaluative meaning of the "thing, action, etc." can be
defined as the conditions for its correct application in a non-analytic proposition
affirming its "goodness" or "badness,,159.
Putnam does present a further argument for the contention that fact and value are
always intertwined. This is in many ways a more interesting argument, and one that is
regularly presented by authors who wish to deny the fact/value distinction.
159 Putnam uses "inconsiderate" as a paradigm example of fact and value being mixed up, but seems to
indicate that they are always mixed up, only more clearly in the paradigm examples (1981: 201-205). If
the idea that they are always mixed up is taken seriously, then all moral discourse becomes impossible
and unintelligible. For it implies that any statement about the goodness or badness of something can
only be tautological or self-contradictory. Hence any dispute about the moral status of controversial
practices, say abortion or cloning, can only be seen as an argument about the correct uses of the words
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5.1 "Entanglement" 3: All Factual Claims Presuppose Value-claims
4.4.1. Factual Claims Imply Value-claims
At the start of this chapter it was claimed that, when descriptive claims are made, the
maker of these claims is also necessarily committing himself to any number of value-
claims. Putnam states this point as follows:
Take the sentence 'the cat is on the mat'. If someone actually makes this
judgement in a particular context, then he employs conceptual resources -
the notions 'cat', 'on', and 'mat'- which are provided by a particular
culture, and whose presence and ubiquity reveal something about the
interests and values of that culture, and of almost every culture. We have
the category 'cat' because we regard the division of the world into
animals and non-animals as significant, and we are further interested in
what species a given animal belongs to. It is relevant that there is a cat on
the mat and not just a thing. We have the category 'mat' because we
regard the division of inanimate things into artifacts and non-artifacts as
significant, and we are further interested in the purpose and nature a
particular artifact has. It is relevant that it is a mat that the cat is on and
not just something. We have the category 'on' because we are interested
in spatial relations (1981: 201-202).
It seems certain that behaviour can, in a certain sense, be said to reveal certain values,
preferences, etc. of the actor. If we make value-judgements, then they must, in some
way or other, be reflected in our actions. And, since "distinguishing", "speaking",
"claiming", etc. are species of action, knowledge must in some sense reflect value-
judgements.
"abortion" or "cloning". Surely such an unavoidable absurdity is a reductio ad absurdum of the idea
that fact and value are always mixed up.
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4.4.2 Relevance of the Above
While it certainly is, in some sense, correct to state that all factual claims presuppose
a commitment to some normative claims, it is not immediately clear why this matters.
Does it imply that fact and value are inseparable? If someone simply says that facts
and values are "entangled", and by this only means that all factual claims presuppose
normative claims, then that person is, as stated above, correct. This sense of
"entangled" is, as will be shown below, epistemologically trivial.
But, if factual claims and value-claims are "entangled" in the above sense, there is
also another sense in which they are distinct. This appears, at first glance, to be
obvious. Putnam goes on at some length to outline the value-claims inherent in 'the
cat is on the mat'. If these were not distinct the passage quoted above would be
unintelligible.
More importantly, the above reasonmg IS often used to argue for a sense of
"entangled" different from the above. This can be best seen by looking at Hans
Albert, who, after stating that factual claims necessarily presuppose value-claims,
draws the following conclusion:
[I]n the last resort the unfoundable character of value statements must
itself colour knowledge (1985: 79)
It is therefore impossible to base a thesis of the irrationality of decisions
upon their unfoundability without this thesis necessarily being extensible
to the whole realm of knowledge (1985: 79).
Does the fact that all factual claims presuppose normative claims imply that any
potential problem with the cognitive status of normative claims must necessarily
result in a problem with the cognitive status of factual claims? The claim that this is
the case seems to be the main reason why the "factual claims presuppose normative
claims" - argument is regularly presented by authors who wish to "transcend" the
fact/value distinction. In similar vein the fact that scientists make value-judgements
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(choosing what to study, using distinctions, etc.) is commonly used to claim that there
is an important sense in which scientific knowledge is not "value-neutral".
That all of knowledge presupposes value-judgements seems reasonably clear. But the
idea these value-judgements necessarily "colour" our knowledge, or, that any doubt as
to the validity or cognitive status of value-judgements has implications for the rest of
knowledge, is false, as will be shown below.
4.4.3 Factual Claims "Presuppose" Normative Claims
The use of "presuppose" in the above heading is ambiguous. As was discussed above,
any action, including making factual claims, implies that certain normative claims are
tacitly being accepted, or govern my actions. However, this does not imply that these
factual claims logically depend on these normative claims.
If! claim that' Socrates is mortal', then I am logically committed to the claim that' at
least one thing is mortal'. The falsity of the latter would be inconsistent with the truth
of the former, hence the former can be attacked by attacking the latter. This is one
sense of "presuppose", but it is not the one used in the statement 'factual claims
presuppose value-judgements'.
If I make the claim 'Socrates is mortal', then I am acting in accordance with some
value-claim, imagine it to be 'It is important to assert that "Socrates is mortal'''. While
the assertion of the former might commit me to the latter, and necessarily commits me
to something akin to the latter, the truth of the one does not logically depend on the
truth of the other. A situation can be imagined where Socrates is immortal, but it is
still important to assert that he is mortal, i.e. to lie. Or a situation where Socrates is
mortal, but I am mistaken in thinking that it is important to assert this. It could be the
case, for instance, that I am having an argument with someone about Socrates'
mortality, but that a fire has broken out and I would be best served by keeping quiet
and running away. Hence, unlike 'Socrates is mortal' and 'At least one thing is
mortal', the truth of the one statement is logically independent of the truth of the
other.
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Simply put, the value-judgements that a factual claim commits me to are not
supporting premises of that factual claim. Hence even a successful attack on the
value-judgements of a speaker still leaves the factual claims of the speaker untouched.
This is related to the basic insight behind the naturalistic fallacy, the realisation that,
as a matter of logic, "is" can imply "is", and "ought" can imply "ought", but the one
cannot logically entail the other. And it doesn't matter how many factual claims are
made, or how many normative judgements they presuppose, for "never the twain shall
meet". Hence I can say that "the cat is on the mat", and admit that I am committed to
all the value-judgements Putnam found implied in such a statement. But, since these
value-claims are not supporting premises of my factual claims, they can all be wrong,
or nonsensical, etc., without this having any impact whatsoever on the truth of 'the cat
is on the mat'. The lack of logical entailment between "is" -claims and "value"-claims
provides an insuperable wall between these two types of statements.
4.4. "Supervenience", "Prejudice", etc.
Above it is argued that the "factual claims presuppose normative claims" - argument
fails to provide any support for thinking that the nature or truth of value-judgements
necessarily has implications for the nature or truth of factual judgements. I say
"necessarily has implications", however, since the one does, all too often, determine
the content of the other.
Note that this does not, necessarily, have to be an illegitimate move in an argument. If
"moral qualities" are found to be natural qualities, or supervenient on natural
qualities, as is argued in this thesis, then the existence of a natural quality can indicate
the existence or non-existence of a natural quality. Here, while there is no logical
relation of entailment, the relation of supervenience legitimates the inference. In fact,
in an argument it would amount to the exact same thing as a "normative premise".
Does this present any problem to the fact/value distinction? At the start of this chapter
it was stated that the fact/value distinction is intelligible regardless of what value is
taken to be, this is also the case here. While an argument might be formulated that
hinges on a relation of supervenience, it is not a necessary characteristic of knowledge
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that it hinges on such relations. Whether the supporting premises presented for any
given statement include the assertion of a relation of supervenience is a matter of fact.
We can, and do, formulate arguments that do not rest on such assertions. Sensibly,
since the idea of "supervenience relations" is somewhat mysterious, such appeals are
normally outlawed in academic discussions. But, irrespective of whether they are
legitimate or not, they can be coherently outlawed, since all conclusions do not
necessarily have such an appeal as a supporting premise. Hence nothing about
knowledge in general follows from the fact that, on some conceptions of value, an
inference from fact to value and vice versa might be legitimate'P''.
A more lamentable situation occurs when the rational reconstruction of someone's
thought-processes includes the assertion of some relation, supervenient or otherwise,
between fact and value. Consider something like: "It would be bad if man evolved
from apes, hence it cannot be true", where the implicit premise is that "the truth about
life cannot be bad". It would probably be fair to say that all people, at some point, fall
foul of this type of reasoning, we commonly refer to it as being "prejudiced". But,
while this type of reasoning is definitely possible, it is, as shown above, not necessary
for an argument to contain such premises.
4.5 "Truth"
If more than one definition of "truth" is intelligible (which amounts to saying that
there can be different constraints on belief-formation) then the specific criteria used
by an individual or community represents a choice. In other words "truth" is a norm
or value.
Does the idea that the constraints on belief-formation are chosen affect the fact-value
distinction? The answer is no, and the reasons are the same as were offered above. If a
choice for a specific criterion of "truth" presupposes an assertion of the value of this
criterion, then this assertion is still not a supporting premise of any claim regarding
the intelligibility of such a criterion, or any instance of its application. I might be
160 Even if such a move is allowed, there is nothing particularly problematic about it with regards to the
fact/value distinction as such. If evaluative qualities supervene on "natural qualities", then they are
conceptually distinct by definition.
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wrong about the value of "correspondence", "coherence", consensus", etc., but this is
logically unrelated to whether beliefs in general can "correspond", "cohere", etc., or
whether a specific belief "corresponds", "coheres", etc'?'. Simply put, there is no
more reason to suppose that the "truth about truth" is entangled with the "value of
truth" than there is to think that the "truth" of "Socrates is mortal" is entangled with
the "value" of asserting that "Socrates is mortal"162.
I wish to insert one clarification so as to be avoid confusion as to what is being
claimed here. One major topic with regard to the distinction between fact and value
was not discussed in this chapter. Our knowledge is, for the most part, fallible. While
some philosophers have claimed that we can, regarding some types of propositions,
have certain knowledge, no one would claim this for all our knowledge-claims. Rather
our beliefs are based on evidence, and can be upset by new evidence. Here a problem
arises, for clearly a set of rules needs to be employed to decide when evidence is
sufficient to warrant holding a belief to be true. The status of these rules, i.e. whether
they are "values" or only appear to be so, has been extensively debated 163.This topic
will not be discussed here.
This chapter concerns the relation between fact and value. The issue regarding the
relation of evidence to belief is, in principle, a distinct issue. Here the question
concerns the relation between 'justified belief' (or "putative fact") and value, not fact
and value. Simply put, the question "when is a belief true?" and the question "when
am I justified in believing that a belief is true?" are distinct questions.
161 The long association between pragmatism and "coherence" or "consensus" - theories of truth might
be partially explained as resting on a misunderstanding of the above point. Unless pragmatism is
defmed as any doctrine that dismisses the idea of correspondence, there does not seem to be anything
specifically pragmatic about viewing "coherence" "consensus", "simplicity", etc., as the proper criteria
for belief-formation. The association between pragmatism and "coherence", etc., might well be due to
the fact that these are "values". But if this criterion is used then "correspondence" is equally pragmatic,
since it is no less a value than "coherence", "consensus", "simplicity", etc.
162 If different sets of criteria for belief-formation can be chosen, then people can have contradictory
"true beliefs", and this contradiction is then the result of evaluative judgements. This 'contradiction',
however, is merely apparent or verbal, since the phrase "true belief' here has two different meanings.
163 See, for example, the essays in Brodie (1970).
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6. The Distinction Between Fact and Value and Objectivity
If the distinction between fact and value is allowed, then what is important about our
ideal of objectivity can be stated without recourse to the idea of "value-freedom". At
the start of this chapter it was explained that the definition of objectivity as value-
freedom makes it easy to reject the notion. But, in light of what was said above, it
must surely be clear how this problem can be overcome. Putnam's argument to the
effect that all our knowledge includes value-judgements was conceded to be correct,
but Albert's argument as to the implication of this argument was dismissed. The fact
that we make any number of value-judgements when we use language and pursue
knowledge does not render these value-judgements supporting premises of any of our
knowledge-claims. The same goes for objectivity. If there is anything coherent about
our ideal of objectivity, then the fact that objectivity is a value cannot be used to
attack the ideal of objectivity. Any assertion regarding the coherence or intelligibility
of objectivity is logically unrelated to any assertion as to the value of objectivity, if
fact and value are distinct.
If someone merely defines "objectivity" to mean "value-free" then the argument
cannot be challenged. But consider what we mean when we call a scientist
"objective", and especially what we mean when we call someone "not objective". I
think it is uncontroversial to say that this is commonly used to condemn someone for
being "biased" or "prejudiced". And what is meant by this? It will surely be
uncontroversial to say that we blame someone for not letting the object of his inquiry
decide a certain matter. Instead the person lets his own interests shape his view or
decision on a certain matter!".
In other words the difference between being "objective" and being "value-neutral"
can be viewed, not as a difference between making a value-judgement as to which
belief to hold and not making a value-judgement, but as a dispute between two
different value-judgements regarding the criteria involved in belief-formation. Even if
164 Schlick is clearly referring to this when he states that: "Desire for the truth is the only appropriate
inspiration for the philosopher when he philosophizes; otherwise his thoughts run the danger of being
led astray by his feelings. His wishes, hopes and fears threaten to enroach upon that objectivity which
is the necessary presupposition of all honest inquiry" (1962: 2).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
204
the value of objectivity can be deduced from a commitment to truth, then the fact that
"truth" is a value still negates the definition of objectivity as "value-free".
The following question arises based on the above reasoning: how can one reconcile
the apparently contradictory claims that the subject is always driven by self-interest,
and yet is able to admit facts he would have preferred to be otherwise? To a large
degree this was already done in chapter 4 and chapter 5. There it was explained that
people should follow rules, and it was argued that it is in a subject's self-interest to let
"truth" be a norm of inquiry'". Hence it is in a subject's self-interest to let his
expectations be corrected by reality. The discontinuity between an ultimate goal and
the sub-goals whereby an ultimate goal is best pursued removes the apparent
contradiction. Trying to ascertain "truth" is a self-interested act. The act of "letting
reality correct my expectations" was mentioned above as what is important about our
notion of "objectivity". Choosing to do so is to judge it likely to lead to successful
action, hence it should be apparent that objectivity is itself a value.
"Objectivity" can loosely be defined as a habit of mind or willingness to admit
cvidence'" that the subject would have preferred to be otherwise. This act of
"admitting evidence that you would have preferred to be otherwise" is not
"disinterested" or "value-free", but simply the best way to pursue the self-interest of
the subject. Note that, in accordance with the above discussion regarding value and
truth, the fact that "objectivity" is a value does not make it any less "objective". The
value of objectivity, as was the case with truth, is distinct from its coherence and
intelligibility.
Hence the situation is now reversed. Where value-judgements were seen as the enemy
of objectivity, self-interest now becomes the reason for objectivity.
It is important not to overstate the case made here. I am not implying that scientists
are always objective. As especially Kuhn has so eloquently demonstrated, objectivity
is an ideal that is sometimes imperfectly followed. Neither is it being asserted that this
165 Note that the argument here does not, strictly speaking, rest on the idea that "truth" should be a
norm of inquiry, just that it is not logically incoherent to suppose that it is.
166 This description means that "objectivity" is a methodological criterion.
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totally clarifies the problem of objectivity. Opponents of the idea tend to claim they
find it unintelligible. This is not an issue that will be discussed. What is being
claimed can be summarised as follows: the interests and value-judgements of the
observer can cause him to be biased, but it is also the basis of his "objectivity". Any
argument that uses the interest of the observer to make a case against the very
possibility of objectivity fails to understand how self-interest can lead to rule-
following behaviour.
7. Objectivity, Truth and Pragmatism
In this thesis I have at various times paused in order to relate the analysis being made
to various issues and movements in philosophy. I wish to do so again in order to relate
the above idea to the pragmatism of James and Rorty.
Above it was argued that the idea that truth is valuable need not conflict with the idea
that truth is objective. Rather the distinction between fact and value, added to the
distinction between an ultimate goal and sub-goals, allows these two ideas to be
consistent. An inability to see that these two ideas are consistent seem to have lead to
more confusion than the issue merits.
I wish to clarify exactly what will be argued below. It will not be argued that
pragmatism is false. An examination of pragmatism falls outside the scope of this
thesis. What will be argued is that one of the ways whereby pragmatist conclusions
are typically reached is fallacious, and that this way of reaching such conclusion
seems to rest on an inability to reconcile the "value" of truth with the "truth" of truth.
In other words, it is the same argument found in Putnam and Albert.
6.1 Pragmatism - William James
In order not to be accused of attacking a strawman, an interpretative issue needs first
to be addressed.
For someone used to thinking of pragmatism as a doctrine that rejects the idea of truth
as correspondence of propositions to reality, a reading of James can be quite startling.
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For he not only seems to repeatedly endorse this doctrine, but emphasises that it is a
necessary ingredient of the pragmatist conception of truth. For example, he states that:
My account of truth is realistic, and follows the epistemological dualism
of common sense. (James, 1978: 117).
Truth is essentially a relation between two things, an idea, on the one
hand, and a reality outside the idea, on the other. (1978: 91).
Realities are not true, they are; and beliefs are true of them. (1978: 106).
The notion of a reality independent of either of us, taken from ordinary
social experience, lies at the base of the pragmatist definition of truth.
(1978: 117).
Hence it would appear, if these statements are taken at face-value, as if James is
endorsing the correspondence theory of truth. Or, as he calls it, the "intellectual
theory". On this point there is some dispute. Thayer's introduction to the 1975 edition
of The Meaning of Truth states that James did not reject the correspondence theory.
Instead he was treating correspondence as a necessary condition of "pragmatic truth".
The three conditions for "pragmatic truth" are, according to Thayer, that a belief must
correspond to reality, cohere with other beliefs, and be beneficial167 (1975: xxxvii).
This interpretation of James will not be followed here. Instead Ayer's interpretation in
the 1978 introduction to a joint edition of Pragmatism and The Meaning of Truth will
be used. There are two main reasons for doing so:
Firstly, if correspondence was meant to be a condition for pragmatic truth, then all
disputes could have been avoided by simply using different terms to signify
"correspondence" and "pragmatic truth". In fact, James dismisses the attempts of
Hawtrey (1978: 316-318) and Pratt (1978: 90-98) to do this in order to clarify the
Issue.
167 This interpretation followed by Hallberg (1997: 205-223) in a volume edited by Hardwick and
Crosby.
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Secondly, there is Ayer's argument for his interpretation, which appears sound. The
whole argument will not be reconstrued, but the part that seems conclusive hinges on
James' answer to Russell's challenge to his theory. Russell interprets James as
dismissing correspondence, and claim that this implies that "the belief that A exists
may be 'true' even when A does not exist" (1978: zzv). James states that this is "the
usual slander, repeated to satiety by our critics" (1978: 147). However, Ayer doubts
whether this is really slander, for James' argument against this seems to presuppose
an unusual use of the word "true". Referring to the disputed authorship of
"Shakespeare's plays", he states that:
If the critic be both a pragmatist and a baconian, he will in his capacity of
pragmatist see plainly that the workings of my opinion, I being what I am,
make it perfectly true for me, while in his capacity of baconian he still
believes that Shakespeare never wrote the plays in question (1978: 147).
As Ayer points out, the correspondence theory does not hold that truth is "for me",
but precisely that it is independent of me:
On this view, a belief cannot be true for one person and false for another,
unless this is just a way of saying that one person may hold it and another
not. If a belief is true there is a fact which makes it so; if it is false there is
no such fact; and these facts obtain or fail to obtain, irrespectively of
anyone's belief(1978: zzvi).
It would appear as if James' seeming endorsement of correspondence is a misleading
one. The above criticism of Russell's objection invokes the idea that a person must
believe a proposition to correspond to reality in order for it to be true, not that it must
so correspond. And, as Ayer claims (1978: xxvi-xxviii), this distinction between
corresponding to reality and being believed to correspond to reality might very well
be exactly the distinction that James was arguing against. Whatever the merit of such
a view may be, this is definitely not the correspondence theory of truth as understood
by Russell, Ayer, and, I would contend, most philosophers.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
208
Hence Ayer's interpretation of James will be followed. If this turns out to be false, at
least the blow can be softened by knowing that anyone accused of misreading a
pragmatist is in good company'Ï". Turning to the substantive issue, what is James'
claim?
James appears169 to follow Peirce's pragmatic conception of meaning when he asks
what truth's "cash-value" is "in experiential terms"(1978: 97). He answers that true
ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. What is important
to this analysis is that he connects these above concepts to truth as being "essentially
bound up with the way in which one moment in our experience may lead us towards
other moments which it will be worth while to have been lead to" (1978: 98, my
italics.). Here truth is explicitly tied to the idea of being valuable. Indeed James makes
the famous pronouncement that there is no difference between saying "it is true
because it is useful" and "it is useful because it is true" (1978: 98).
We need not analyse his conception any further, the above statement is enough for us
to proceed. What can the above possibly mean? Rejecting the idea that he was using
"correspondence to reality" as a necessary condition for the above "truth", and
remembering his endorsement of the idea that truth is "truth-for-someone", it can only
be concluded that truth is "sacrificed" for value. The idea of "truth" or a "fact" as
something conceptually distinct from "value" is simply inconsistent with statements
like the above. Indeed, James concludes that the true "is only the expedient in the way
of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the way of our behaving"
(1978: 106).
Based on the interpretive matters discussed earlier, this means James can be treated as
ultimately claiming that "truth" is "value" (the "expedient", the "worth while", "what
works"). In other words, "truth" and "fact" can be fully reduced to value.
168 The Meaning of Truth contains several essays that are rejections of criticism. Without fail, James
admonishes his critics for misunderstanding him. Similarly Dewey (1939: 517-607), in an essay
replying to his critics, states that he has "obviously failed ... to make clear my actual position" (520),
and proceeds to take his critics to task. Philosophers commonly claim misunderstanding on the part of
their critics, but the pragmatist's repeated claim of systematic misunderstanding represents an extreme
case. After reading several of these replies one might be forgiven for wondering whether any non-
pragmatist has ever been admitted to fully understand pragmatism, and yet reject it.
169 I say "appears" because Peirce was not always equally sanguine about James' use of his work. In
fact, he changed the name of his theory of meaning to pragmaticism, "a name ugly enough to be safe
from kidnappers." (Honderich, 1995: 709).
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In chapter 5 it was explained why "truth" is a value, maybe the most important we
have. If this is correct, then James can be credited with a great insight. James saw that
truth is a value, and that there is no reason to hold beliefs in the first place if they do
not serve human needs. He also noticed that truth is very valuable, i.e. that we cannot
get along without the beliefs we hold to be true. Indeed, James' argument for the
value of truth is strikingly similar to the ones employed here:
The importance in human life of having true beliefs about matters of fact
is a thing too notorious. We live in a world of realities that can be
infinitely useful or infinitely harmful. Ideas which tell us which of them to
expect count as the true ideas in all this primary sphere of verification, and
the pursuit of such ideas is a primary human duty.... True ideas would
never have been singled out as such, would never have acquired a class-
name, least of all a name suggesting value, unless they had been useful
from the outset in this way (1978: 98).
At face value this thesis can agree almost completely with the above paragraph. James
is pointing out that true ideas fulfill a vital function in our lives, that if this wasn't the
case we would have no need for true ideas. Indeed, he states that the determination of
truth is a "primary human duty". In similar vein it was argued that the subject should
try and attain the truth. This thesis agrees with everything except that he takes the
above to imply that a conception of truth as conceptually distinct from value is
nonsense. In chapter 5 it was shown that realising the value of valuable belief
necessitates the conception of true belief as something different from valuable belief,
but easier to determine. On this account, emphasising the "value" of truth is not
something that needs to occur at the expense of the "truth" of truth. James need not
have excluded a conceptually distinct notion of truth in order to affirm the value of
truth. The two ideas are consistent.
A more extreme statement of some of the above sentiments can be found in Rorty.
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6.2 Pragmatism - Richard Rorty
Richard Rorty explicitly rejects the claim that there are two distinct types of
knowledge. Considering the claim that facts are cognitive and values not, he writes,
in a discussion of Davidson, that:
This picture is one that suggests that certain sentences in our language
"correspond to reality" whereas others are true only, so to speak, by
courtesy (1986: 1).
Rorty dismisses this view. The whole idea that sentences "correspond to reality" is,
according to him, misguided. Indeed, he argues that the attempt to "explicate
'rationality' and 'objectivity' in terms of conditions of accurate representation is a
self-deceptive effort to externalise the normal discourse of the day, and that...
philosophy's self-image has been dominated by this attempt" (1980: 11). His
argument for this can be described as neo-pragmatic. In support of it he enlists Kuhn,
Davidson, Derrida, Sellars, Heidegger, James'Ï'', Dewey, Wittgenstein, Gadamer'{'
and others. Rorty's unqualified dismissal of the "correspondence theory" has the
fortunate consequence that the interpretive problem incurred when looking at James
does not occur. Indeed, he himself interprets James as having tried to provide "a
utilitarian ethics of belief' (1997: 3). Rorty proceeds to defend and radicalise this
view. In contrast to James' view, quoted above, that the seeking of truth is a "primary
human duty", he approvingly interprets(!) James as claiming that:
The VIew that there is no source of obligation save the claims of
individual sentient beings entails that we have no responsibility to
anything other than such beings. Most of the relevant sentient individuals
are our fellow human beings. So talk about our responsibility to Truth, or
to Reason, must be replaced by talk about our responsibility to our fellow
human beings (1997: 3).
170 It was already noted that James says some surprising things. Rorty is selective about what he
considers to be "pragmatic" about James. As such Rorty calls James' statement that we are "recorders,
not makers of the truth" "highly unpragmatic" (1997: 9).
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Rorty's argument against the "correspondence" theory will, again, not form part of
this discussion 172. The claim relevant to this thesis is the claim that we do not have
any responsibility to "Truth", but instead have a responsibility to "other beings".
The position taken in this thesis can enthusiastically affirm that we do, indeed have a
responsibility towards "Truth". But, as was argued in chapter 5, "truth" is a "value".
Hence the responsibility to determine the "truth" is not some metaphysical
abstraction. Rather this "responsibility" is to our great benefit. One can reply to Rorty
that our responsibility to "Truth" is, in fact, a responsibility to ourselves. On this
account the idea that our only responsibility lies with sentient beings is no longer in
conflict with the idea that we should determine the truth. "Responsibility", in the final
analysis, does only apply to sentient beings, beings whose experience have a certain
value.
Rorty's conception of our responsibility to truth as something distinct from
responsibility to ourselves seems to rely on the type of idea criticised at the beginning
of this chapter. This was the idea of "objectivity" as "value-free". If we connote
"value-free" to "objective" then objective inquiry can no longer be portrayed as an act
that is in the interest of human beings. Rorty appeals to this idea for criticism when he
writes that:
On the traditional account, desire should play no role in the fixation of
belief. On the pragmatist account, the only point of having beliefs in the
first place is to gratify desires (1978: 7).
On the account in this thesis these two aspects are not exclusive. It can be agreed that
we only have beliefs in order to gratify desires, and agreed that they determine what
we wish to have beliefs about. But, as pointed out, this does not erase the possibility
of "objectivity". It does not erase the possibility that desire will play no role in the
fixation (assigning of the predicate "true") of our beliefs.
171 Rorty's interpretations of these philosophers has been questioned. Given the diverse collections of
thinkers he marshals in support of his views this is probably not surprising. For a critique of his
interpretation of Gadamer, see Warnke (1987: 139-166)
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Rorty's dismissal of our responsibility towards truth does not realise that this
responsibility is a responsibility towards ourselves. This seems to be the result of a
false dichotomy. He supposes that inquiry must either be "for ourselves" or "for
truth". But, as has been argued at length, this is a false dichotomy.
8. Conclusion
This chapter concerned some abstract epistemological matters that are implied
everywhere in this thesis, but did not receive explicit attention. These concern the
relation between fact and value, and the related conceptualisation of notions of
objectivity. It was argued that, if the good is a quale, the relation between fact and
value is that of a set to a subset.
This VIew has interesting implications for traditional VIews regarding objectivity.
These views do not, however, rest on the specific view of the relation between fact
and value that was presented in this thesis, but can be deduced from any view that
allows them to be conceptually distinct. Since the issue regarding the intelligibility
and coherence of the fact/value distinction is also a basic assumption of this thesis,
objections to this distinction were considered in some detail. These considerations led
to the conclusions that the objections are mistaken, and that there is no reason to
abandon the distinction.
The idea that fact and value are distinct, coupled with the idea that a goal can be
pursued by pursuing a logically independent, and sometimes conflicting, sub-goal,
implies that what is important about the traditional ideal of objectivity is untouched
by realising objectivity (and "truth") to be goals of actions, and therefore values. If
fact and value are independent, then the fact that objectivity is a value cannot be used
to doubt the coherence of claiming knowledge to refer to representation-independent
entities, nor can it be used to doubt our ability to acknowledge these representation-
172 With one exception. Rorty states that realists have to claim that reality has an intrinsic nature (1997:
5). Searle dismisses a variant of this argument as "remarkably feeble" (1998: 23). For a discussion see
Searle (1998: 20-26).
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independent entities where we would prefer that they did not exist. In other words,
objectivity as epistemie value does not imply objectivity to be incoherent.
It was also argued that pragmatists often use the idea of truth as valuable to argue
against the idea that truth relates to representation-independent entities. Hence the
pragmatist conclusion, at least inasmuch as it is reached by this argument, is
unwarranted.
The next chapter is the final one. It will attempt to clarify some issues that have been
implicit thus far, without being specifically addressed. It will also serve as a
conclusion to this thesis.
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Chapter 8: Concluding Comments
1. Introduction
This chapter will try and briefly state the position, elsewhere mentioned only by
implication, that this thesis takes concerning two matters that are clearly implicated in
this attempt to formulate the outlines of a cognitive ethics. The first issue concerns the
problem regarding actions that greatly conflict with our moral intuitions. The second
concerns the merit of the whole idea of having a cognitive theory of ethics. These
discussions of the gains from such a view will also serve as a conclusion to this thesis.
2. The Problem of Actions that Greatly Conflict with Our Moral Intuitions
2.1 The Problem and Whether Ethical Hedonism Solves It
How can an egoist ethics deal with cases where people commit actions that greatly
conflict with our moral intuitions? If someone was to, for instance, take great pleasure
in killing and robbing, is their action thereby justified?
If someone commits acts that greatly conflict with our moral intuitions there can be
two senses in which an Egoist can "condemn" these actions. The first is by pointing
out that the person "should" not have committed these actions, i.e. they cannot serve
his long-term self-interest. Hence it can be said that these actions were based on a
mistake of the type discussed above, and therefore were mistakenly judged to be in a
person's self-interest.
But what about the person who enjoys killing or robbing, won't suffer pangs of
conscience, and might well not be caught - a psychopath? How can one counter the
action of the Hobbesian "foole", or Hume's "sensible knave"? Here there exists an
instance where self-interests conflict, either because the person is robbing or killing
me, or because he is robbing someone in whose life I have a positive interest, or
because I have hatred of robbing and killing, etc. Here this thesis has nothing, in
principle, to offer over and above portraying such a situation as a clash of wills. The
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
215
other has an interest in robbing and killing, and I have an interest in stopping him. It
seems that the issue will be decided based on our relative power173.
The majority of society can foresee this type of possibility, and see that it is in their
own individual interests to create systems of law that increase the penalty attached to
such action, thereby making its occurrence more unlikely. It can also see that it is in
the interests of the majority of society to remove such people from society, i.e. prison
can be used as a type of assortative mechanism. But the person cannot be
"condemned" In the sense that action is "condemned" within, for instance, a
deontological ethical system. Anscombe's classic paper Modern Moral Philosophy
(1981) convincingly argues that our moral categories are attached to worldviews that
a lot of people no longer accept'?". The case of "condemnation" seems to be such a
case if ethical hedonism is accepted; certain moral categories perish when certain
worldviews perish.
Hence ethical hedonism does result in certain cases where action that radically
conflicts with our ethical intuitions cannot be "condemned". It does not, of course,
imply that we must "condone" such action; both categories are jettisoned by a
hedonist ethics. If it maximises value then we should act so as to prevent such action.
But ethical egoism cannot go beyond treating such cases as clashes of will.
Hence an egoist ethics cannot help when dealing with the "sensible knave" that was
the source of much trouble for Hume. It could possibly argue that there would be very
few sensible knaves because of evolutionary pressures against such actions. It can
definitely argue that those who are troubled by it should oppose it. But it cannot, in
principle, condemn any action, apart from showing that it is unrelated to self-interest.
173 The above clash has been referred to as a "paradox of egoism", and has been used to call egoism
incoherent. For a discussion of why this is not the case, see Singer (1993: 319-320).
174 "[T]he concepts of obligation, and duty - moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say - and of
what is morally right or wrong, and of the moral sense of "ought", ought to be jettisoned if this is
psychologically possible; because they are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier
conception of ethics which no longer generally survives, and are only harmful without it" (Anscombe,
1981: 27).
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2.2 Relevance of the Above Problem
It is important to be clear about what is being conceded above. It is being conceded
that an egoist hedonist ethics has one very counter-intuitive implication. It is not being
conceded that this should count against the validity of cognitive, egoist, ethical
hedonism.
Itwas already remarked, in chapter 6 and in connection with altruism, that the validity
of a cognitive ethics cannot be undermined by referring to any action that such an
ethics does or does not recommend. The validity of the egoist hedonism defended in
this thesis depends entirely on whether the claim that the good is a quale is accepted.
Arguments as to the validity of egoist hedonism need to attack the validity of this
conceptualisation of the good.
If one has an epistemological justification for treating a strong intuition as part of
what needs to be counted when it is determined whether one is justified in believing
something, then the above problem is one factor that counts against the rationality of
accepting egoist hedonism. But this does not relate to the validity of egoist hedonism,
rather it relates to whether a belief in egoist hedonism is a justified belief In other
words the situation is similar to one where an authority on some matter tells us his
view of the matter. To treat the person's authority as conclusive proof of the truth of
his views is to commit the logical fallacy of appeal to authority. But the fact that the
person is an authority does make it more rational to accept what he says. In a similar
manner the problem outlined above gives us grounds for being suspicious of egoist
hedonism, and reason to investigate its claims with great care. But it does not offer
conclusive proof of the fallacious nature of egoist hedonism.
3. The Gains Offered by a Cognitive Theory of Ethics
In chapter 1 it was argued that, given the categories of folk psychology and the
existence of qualia, a coherent meta-ethical position that allows for cognitive
statements regarding value can be formulated. It was argued that the folk
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psychological view that we are actors with certain irreducible desires can, on its own
terms, be shown to be incomplete. The idea of a desire or preference as a
"fundamental want" cannot be the final truth concerning human action. This IS
because it cannot state why a certain object is wanted, rather than another. This
explanatory gap can only be closed if some element of our experience enabled the
regress of justification to end in a non-arbitrary manner. This regress can only be
ended if there is something that, ultimately, simply is good.
Itwas argued that the whole idea of this regress ending in a non-arbitrary manner only
makes sense if we consider the phenomenon that we often call "pleasure". While the
word "pleasure" has a great many uses over and above referring to this self-justifying
element of experience, it was argued that there are uses of this term where it refers to
this self-justifying element of our experience. This self-justifying element was called
"value", and the main claim of this thesis is that it forms part of the inventory of
entities we encounter in the world.
This entity was then characterised as a phenomenal quality or quale, and hence part of
the first person, subjective ontology of the world. If the characterisation of value as
quale is accepted, it is immediately evident that this implies a form of egoism. The
sense in which "pleasure" is self-justifying is not shared, and hence the pursuit of
"pleasure" is irrevocably tied to a specific individual's experience.
To say that this entity is good is equivalent to saying that it should be pursued. Hence
the characterisation of the object of human motivation implies ethical hedonism, and
not psychological hedonism'f". If this is accepted, then it follows that the study of
ethics is the study of how individuals should maximise pleasure. The specifics as to
how this is to be done is a very complicated question.
175 Does the doctrine of egoist hedonism have any specific implication regarding the "freedom of the
will"? This topic is one of those that seem to be a problem for most explanations of human action. For
can action capable of explanation also be free? Philosophers have made ingenious attempts to save
apparently deterministic views of man from this implication. This is not a topic that can fruitfully be
discussed in this thesis. I do, however, wish to note one consequence of adopting ethical, as opposed to
psychological, hedonism. If ethical hedonism does result in determinism, and it is not sure that it does,
then this determinism might well be peculiar in one way. If ethical hedonism is true, then a being with
free-will and no cognitive constraints would choose the most pleasurable option any time, simply
because of the special nature of pleasure. This means that pleasure is chosen because it should be
chosen, not because one is in some sense forced to. In other words it is not that one cannot choose the
less pleasurable option, rather one simply does not do so.
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One specific part of it was addressed when it was argued that, subject to certain
qualifications, people should treat "truth" as a norm of inquiry. It was also claimed
that it is not at all clear that an egoist hedonist would not commit any number of
actions that we normally consider to be altruistic. This was done in order to cast doubt
on the intuitive plausibility of thinking that egoist hedonists would necessarily be
"vicious" and "self-serving", as these terms are commonly understood when used to
condemn certain actions.
The gams from the above position vest m the fact that it would make ethical
statements continuous with ordinary descriptive statements. In other words we can
know that there is a fact of the matter concerning how we should act. It might be
thought that this truth is an unappealing one, and that the guide offered by other
theories of ethics is preferable. But here egoist ethics has the one advantage in that
justifying the use of this guide is, in principle, a simple matter. We should act as it
prescribed because it is true, i.e. reality advises us to act in this way. Non-cognitive
theories ultimately face the difficulty of justifying their fundamental claims. Here one
option is to simply say that there are two distinct criteria for justifying statements, i.e.
one set for descriptive statements and one set for ethical statements. Alternatively it
can disregard purely descriptive statements, as pragmatism, on some interpretations,
seems to, or disregard ethical statements, as positivism seems to. The above options
seem entirely unappealing.
In providing a standard against which to measure action, ethical hedonism also
enables us to make sense of the idea that people can act against their own best
interests. We live in a time where a lot of people are deeply distrustful of any grand
justification of action. Yet the vacuum left by the loss of belief in ethical systems is
not a vacuum that can go unfilled. In some way or other life calls upon us to judge
and act. Here a sort of "default ethics" has emerged, whereby people should be treated
as beings that need to find their own way as best as possible, and should not be
criticised in terms of ethical views that are imposed upon them from outside sources.
This type of "default ethics" of tolerance, while not without considerable virtues, has
certain limitations. The first is that it cannot be a guide for action, except inasmuch as
it outlaws intolerance. But the majority of our actions have nothing to do with
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tolerance or intolerance. Rather we have to choose between any number of options
where there is nothing clearly tolerant or intolerant about any of them.
The second problem is that it cannot always be used to condemn things in our society
that we might wish to. If any action that does not in any obvious way interfere with
the rights of others, and is in some sense the outcome of choice, is thereby also
legitimate, then the quietist consequences cannot be avoided. Criticism is often seen
as paternalistic infringements of autonomy, and therefore dismissed. This type of
situation can only be averted if there is a standard whereby action can be judged, so
that it makes sense to say to someone that he has acted against his own best interests.
This type of criticism is possible if the fundamental claim of this thesis is accepted. It
is possible for two related reasons; the first is the obvious one that it gives a hedonist
standard against which actions can be judged. The second reason is more subtle, and
concerns the view of man as boundedly rational rule-follower. If rational choice
theory is an accurate description of human decision-making, and all action is a
function of desires and beliefs, then one can only act against one's own interests'"
because of inadequate information. The actual mechanism whereby decisions are
made can never be part of the explanation for why someone has acted against his own
interests. This makes it hard to see how systematically acting against one's interests is
possible.
The situation changes if one views people as boundedly rational. Bounded rationality
is context specific, and the rules according to which it operates can be extremely
unsuccessful in unfamiliar contexts. Hence acting against one's own interests can be
systematic if the right context, one that exploits the limitations in a boundedly rational
rule, is generated. This means that a prima facie case can be made against actions that
are only committed due to weaknesses inherent to boundedly rational rules177. In other
words bounded rationality has less quietist consequences than rational choice.
176 This assumes of course, that one's desires should be treated as having some normative import,
which is not itself a part of any version of rational choice theory.
177 For an example of such a boundedly rational rule that can be to the detriment of the actor, see
Ainslie's Breakdown of Will (2001). It is argued that weakness of will can be explained by seeing the
agent's discount curves as hyperbolic, rather than exponential. This leads to inconsistent preferences
over time. Such inconsistent preferences can lead to being exploited via "money-pumps", and yet
might have been adaptive in our evolutionary past (2001: 45-47).
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The above point is not made in order to justify wholeseale interference with human
action. It might well be that the attempted cure is a more dangerous poison than the
problem itself. But the situation can perhaps be improved by something a long way
from the nightmare visions of totalitarianism that we are so eager to associate with
any criticism of individual choice. Something as simple as educating someone about
his bounded rationality, as it concerns a specific action, could possibly have the
desired effect of changing action. Here it is a case of letting someone see how the
unwanted effect is generated. The effect can hereby lose its power, as it is unlikely
that the rules that will relate this new information to action are subject to the same
effect. It might lose its power in the same way that a magician's stage effect loses its
power when we realise how it is done.
Specific study as to specific action-generating rules, and how they cause behaviour
will be immensely useful here. Something like, for instance, the lament as to the
culture industry's dumbing down of culture can become more than a seemingly elitist
imposing of different views if it can be shown that the culture industry exploits certain
specific decision-making rules that might have been adaptive for a hunter-gatherer,
but are counterproductive in modem society. Here ethical hedonism adds the final
touch by explaining why, and in what sense, our desires have moral import.
The view presented in this thesis provides one way of thinking about the type of
critique discussed above. Two prima facie likely phenomena that can be exploited to
cause one to act against one's own interests are "weakness of will" (akrasia) and self-
deception. They are phenomena that cannot possibly occur within the rational choice
view of human action. But bounded rationality, coupled with some degree of realism
concerning preferences, provide an avenue whereby they can be coherently be
explained. If action can be the result of both boundedly rational rules, chosen mostly
by evolution in order to enhance fitness, and preference maximisation, which is only
related to evolution as secondary consequence, then the actor is effectively split into
two actors. One is trying to maximise a set of preferences, while the other actor is,
metaphorically speaking, trying to manipulate the first into maximising fitness. A
"multiple selves" view of action has often been thought to be exactly what is required
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in order to explain phenomena like akrasia and self-deceptionÏ''. Something like self-
deception, for instance, need in principle present no more conceptual difficulty than
the case from ordinary life where one person lies to another. This avenue of acquiring
these conceptual gains cannot be had unless there is a difference, in principle,
between action that is in some sense the result of a preference, and "action" which is
not. This is not possible if action is defined only in terms of behaviour, and the
situation is left at that.
Hence I wish to argue that egoist hedonism can avoid the quietist consequences of the
"default view", both because of cognitivity and because of the view of man as
boundedly rational actor.
I would like to end this thesis by citing a goal that, as argued in chapter 5, is often
taken to be such a self-evident goal that it is not realised that it is a goal. The main
gain of trying to formulate a cognitive ethics lies in the fact that success would imply
that one can have value-judgements that are true. And, as argued in chapter 5 and
chapter 7, this is one of the most important and useful values we have.
178 See, for example, the collection The Multiple Self (1987), edited by Jon Elster, and Ainslie (2001).
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